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That humans configure their behaviors in ways to avoid effortful actions is undoubtedly one of 
the most pervasive hypotheses put forth to account for a wide range of human behaviors. This 
dissertation describes a series of experiments aimed at testing accounts of how individuals make 
effort-based decisions, and why actions may be evaluated as effortful. In Chapter 1, I contrasted 
the hypothesis that individuals’ effort avoidance behaviors and conceptions of effort are driven 
by the performance associated with different lines of actions, versus the hypothesis that 
individuals generate a kind of metacognitive evaluation of effort that can be dissociated from 
performance. I found that individuals’ choices were not associated with their performance or 
with a physiological measure of demand, but rather tracked closely with subjective perceptions 
of effort associated with embedded cues supporting the latter hypothesis. Chapter 2 extended the 
idea that individuals make their effort-based decisions by utilizing cues through pitting options 
against one another that vary on cue saliency, demands on executive control, and performance. 
Chapter 3 looked to test how individuals evaluate expected effort across a range of tasks through 
manipulations of evaluation mode (i.e., whether options are evaluated comparatively or in 
isolation). Following from these results, I propose that evaluable forms of effort are driven by the 
presence of a failure point associated with the task. In Chapter 4, specific determinants of effort 
were examined by crossing anticipated time demands and error likelihood across different choice 
options. Data supported the notion that judgments of effort are closely related to the perceived 
likelihood of an error associated with a task, but not to the time demands. I conclude by 
proposing that cognitive effort can best be conceived of as a type of inferential metacognitive 
evaluation made over available cues that are weighed on the perceived likelihood of making 
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 “…the entire behavior of an individual is at all times motivated by the urge to minimize 
effort.” (Zipf, 1949, p. 3).  
The above statement by G. K. Zipf in his seminal work Human Behavior and the 
Principle of Least Effort effectively captures the ubiquity of the idea of effort minimization: the 
effort associated with some line of action is most often conceptualized as a cost to be minimized 
in decision-making processes (Botvinick, 2007; Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Inzlicht, Schmeichel, 
& Macrae, 2013; Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010; Kool & Botvinick, 2014; Kurzban, 
Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013; Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013; Shenhav et al., 2017; 
Westbrook & Braver, 2015; 2016). This proposed principle (Clark, 2010; Zipf, 1949) or law 
(Hull, 1949) of human behavior has been applied as an explanatory tool to a wide range of 
behaviors ranging from attempting to suppress inappropriate motor responses (e.g., the flanker 
task, Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), to engaging in shallow intuitive thinking (Pennycook, Fugelsang, 
& Koehler, 2015), to issues with resisting temptations and regulating emotions (see de Ridder et 
al., 2012 for a review). Although much work has recently focused on cognitive effort, how 
individuals make decisions based on effort and how effort is evaluated are still open questions in 
need of addressing. Thus, the present work aimed to test accounts of how individuals make 
effort-based decisions, and why some actions may be evaluated as effortful. 
Chapter 1 tests the hypothesis that individuals avoid courses of effortful action based on 
their associated performance with each action (i.e., response times and errors). This is contrasted 
with the hypothesis that individuals avoid such actions based on an inferential metacognitive 
evaluation of demand. Across two experiments individuals completed free-choice Demand 




trial-by-trail basis that used conditions that dissociate performance from perceived effort. Overall 
patterns of preference choices in the DST followed those of perceived demand rather than 
performance. Furthermore, choices were dissociated from a peripheral physiological measure of 
demand as indexed by blink rates. A final experiment utilized a forced-choice version of a DST 
that asked individuals to make choices based on effort, time, and errors. Patterns of choices were 
similar across the three rating dimensions, supporting the notion that a general metacognitive 
evaluation of demand is based on cues that drive choices. 
Chapter 2 extends the cue utilization account of how individuals make effort-based 
decisions. Specifically, the influences of time and demands on executive control are contrasted 
with the influence of an available effort cue across three experiments. Using a forced-choice 
version of a DST where effort minimization was instructed, evidence is demonstrated for 
avoidance behaviors dissociating from both time and demands on executive control in a manner 
predicted by a cue-utilization account. Furthermore, assessments of cue awareness were 
collected through self-report. Interestingly, awareness of the specific high-demand cues 
associated with the options (i.e., more stimulus rotation and more task switching) tracked closely 
with rates of avoidance of those high-demand conditions.  
Chapter 3 investigates how individuals evaluate effort. Here, the evaluability of effort is 
examined through methods described by the General Evaluability Theory (GET; Hsee & Zhang, 
2010). GET argues that evaluable attributes (here effort) should be consistently judged across 
joint (i.e., judged comparatively) and single (i.e., judged in isolation) evaluation modes. 
Individuals judged the anticipated effort of four task-specific efforts indexed by stimulus 
rotation, items to-be-remembered, weight to-be-lifted, and stimulus degradation. Across six 




weight to-be-lifted, and stimulus degradation can be considered relatively evaluable, while the 
effort associated with stimulus rotation may be relatively inevaluable. I argue that evaluability is 
driven by reference information specifically pertaining to when an expected error or failure may 
occur as perceived effort increases. 
Chapter 4 addresses the question of why some actions are evaluated as effortful. 
Individuals’ perceptions of anticipated effort were collected in contexts where two basic 
determinants of effort were traded off: time and errors. Across three experiments, I demonstrate 
that individuals perceive options that are associated with low time requirement but high error-
likelihood as more effortful than options that are more time consuming but have a low error-
likelihood. Furthermore, effort-based and error-based choices closely tracked one another, 
whereas time-based choices did not demonstrate this same pattern. Results support the 
conclusion that the likelihood of error commission drives effort-based choices in this trade-off 
context. 
 I conclude this thesis by integrating the evidence from these four chapters into a novel 
account of cognitive effort. Specifically, I argue that cognitive effort is best conceptualized as an 
inferential evaluation of demand based on available cues, and that these cues are weighted based 
on the likelihood of error commission associated with a line of action. Future implications for 
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In the mid-18th century, French mathematician and philosopher Pierre-Louis Moreau de 
Maupertuis formulated one of the most pervasive hypotheses with regard to the physical world–
the Principle of Least Action–according to which all phenomena occurring in nature minimize 
some form of “action” (Maupertuis, 1750). Given the sweeping implications of Maupertuis’ 
assertion, the notion that physical systems act in a way that minimizes action began to be applied 
across a range of human behaviors. In the case of human systems, the “action” that was thought 
to be minimized or avoided was some form of effort or demand, whether it be classified as 
physical or cognitive (e.g., Allport, 1954; Clark, 2010; Hull, 1943; Rosch, 1998; Solomon, 1948; 
Zipf, 1949). Interestingly, not until recently have systematic attempts been made to examine, 
experimentally, the latter type of demand avoidance behavior (Gold et al., 2014; Kool, McGuire, 
Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010; Westbrook, Kester, & Braver, 2013). This research has mostly relied 
on assessing individuals’ preference (as indexed via free-choice) for selecting particular courses 
of action that vary in cognitive demand. In the present investigation, I extend this line of research 
by examining the role of metacognitive evaluation in these types of decisions. 
Avoiding Cognitive Demand 
Possibly one of the most widespread hypotheses put forward regarding demand 
avoidance is likening strategies that optimize performance, such as minimizing response times or 
errors (Maglio, Wenger, & Copeland, 2008; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988; 1992; Siegler & 
Lamaire, 1997; Walsh & Anderson, 2009), to minimizing demand. One prevalent example of 
this notion, the soft-constraints hypothesis (Gray & Fu, 2004; Gray et al., 2006), states that the 
selection of interactive behaviors (i.e., strategy selection involving external resources) tends to 
minimize objective costs in terms of time (Gray & Boehm-Davis, 2000). Gray and colleagues 




time) associated with the activation of an item to be retrieved from memory, actual retrieval of 
that item, and the probability that the item will be recalled despite decay and noise. It is these 
objective, time-oriented costs that the system takes into account when selecting a demand-
minimizing action. Such a view suggests the cognitive system maintains a type of “direct-access” 
to differences in time in guiding action selection. 
An alternative to a performance-driven account of demand avoidance, the notion that 
cognitive effort is equated with the amount of controlled or executive processing required for a 
task, has received much attention. Research investigating the avoidance of demand within the 
context of executive control has used variants of what are referred to as demand selection tasks 
(DST; Botvinick & Rosen, 2009; Gold et al., 2014; Kool et al., 2010; McGuire & Botvinick, 
2010). In these tasks, individuals are faced with a repeated free-choice between two alternative 
courses of action. For example, to examine demand avoidance Kool et al. (2010) manipulated, 
across the two tasks, the amount of demand placed on the executive control system, 
operationalized as the likelihood of a task switch (see Monsell, 2003). Critically, across several 
experiments, Kool et al. (2010) demonstrated that individuals readily avoided selecting courses 
of action associated with a greater likelihood of a task switch (i.e., greater cognitive effort).  
An important feature of the design of Kool et al.’s (2010) demand selection experiments 
was the attempt to control “time-on-task” across the two choices. This is important because 
making a task objectively more cognitively demanding (e.g., through a high proportion of task 
switches) typically increases the amount of time it takes to complete the task and, consequently, 
participants’ choices could reflect a desire to minimize time as mentioned above (e.g., Gray et 
al., 2006; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988; Siegler & Lamaire, 1997) rather than to minimize 




creating a DST that involved a high-demand task-switching strategy that would result in 
minimizing the objective time required to complete the goal of the task, and a low-demand 
strategy that would avoid the need to engage in a task switch but result in longer times to 
complete the goal (i.e., a global cost). Individuals most often selected the low-demand strategy, 
thus avoiding the task switch even in light of a global cost in terms of time. Westbrook and 
colleagues (2013) additionally demonstrated that individuals forego awards to conserve cognitive 
effort while controlling for time-on-task. Such findings have led to the conclusion that a desire to 
minimize objective costs (in terms of performance) cannot fully account for demand avoidance 
behavior. 
Subjectivity and Explicitness 
Given the claim that demand avoidance can be observed even when controlling for 
objective costs (e.g., time-on-task), subjective accounts of demand avoidance have recently come 
into focus theoretically. Westbrook and Braver (2015; see also Kool & Botvinick, 2013) suggest 
that cognitive effort carries a subjective cost that may covary with objective costs (i.e., time, 
accuracy), but nonetheless cannot be described strictly in these objective terms. Such subjective 
costs are argued to be generated in the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) and are independent of 
signals associated with objective costs (McGuire & Botvinick, 2010; Naccache, et al. 2005). 
Recently, Kurzban and colleagues (2013) have specifically classified this hypothesized 
subjective cost in terms of an opportunity cost. That is, “…the costs of performing task X include 
the potential benefit of doing those other tasks (A, B, C, etc.) that are precluded because the 
systems required for the task X cannot be used for alternatives A, B, or C” (p. 664). Thus, tasks 
that utilize a range of systems required for many other tasks (e.g., executive processes) carry 




mechanisms used to measure the opportunity costs of engaging in a task and, critically, this 
explicit consciously experienced phenomenon serves as an adaptive signal as action selection 
unfolds (Kurzban et al., 2013) 
The idea that subjective costs and some degree of explicit awareness of said costs are 
tightly coupled in driving action selection represents an intriguing view with direct consequences 
for extant theories. Gold et al. (2014) recently demonstrated this notion utilizing the same DST 
method as in Kool et al. (2010). An initial experiment failed to replicate avoidance of cognitive 
demand (i.e., participants did not avoid the choices associated with more task switches). 
Interestingly, only when participants were explicitly instructed of differences in demand across 
conditions did Gold et al. (2014) find the pattern of expected demand avoidance (i.e., participants 
avoided the choices associated with more task switches). The authors interpreted the inability to 
observe demand avoidance in the free-choice DST as a failure within the sample to monitor the 
objective task-switching costs present in the task. Alternatively, the need to explicitly instruct 
participants in this manner suggests the possibility that individuals, in the context of the DST, are 
selecting tasks based on a determinant beyond the putative demands placed on the executive 
control system by task-switching. 
A Metacognitive Framework for Demand Avoidance 
Taken together, the foregoing evidence suggests that cognitive demand avoidance is 
driven by subjective costs, potentially correlated with, but not necessarily driven by objective 
task demands, and these costs may need to be explicit to the individual for avoidance behaviors 
to manifest (cf. General Discussion). Thus, one potentially productive avenue to pursue with 
regard to action selection within the context of demand avoidance is to view these decisions as a 




regulation of cognitive processes or behavior dynamically guided by an individual’s subjective 
monitoring of their own cognitive processes (Koriat, Ma’ayan, & Nussinson, 2006; Nelson & 
Narens, 1990; Son & Schwartz, 2002). Critically, the output of this monitoring process that is 
individuals’ metacognitive experiences (e.g., feeling of knowing, Hart, 1965; Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996; judgments of learning, Koriat, 1997; Koriat, Sheffer, & Ma’ayan, 2002; 
confidence judgments, Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Robinson, Johnson, & Herndon, 1997) have 
been demonstrated to play a causal role in controlling behavior (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; 
Koriat et al., 2006; Nelson, 1996).  
While authors typically postulate specific types of metacognitive experiences (e.g., 
feeling of knowing), others have hypothesized that a possible function of subjective experience 
may be to serve as a type of “summary” signal or global index of processing quality that reduces 
various processes into a single condensed experience (Epstein, 2000; Mangan, 2001), for 
example a subjective assessment of expected processing fluency (Arango-Muñoz, 2014; Reber, 
Fazendiero, & Winkleman, 2002; Reber & Schwarz, 2001). Similarly, recent work by Dunn and 
Risko (2016) suggests that a useful way of conceptualizing effort is to liken it to a type of 
general metacognitive evaluation of perceived task demand. Specifically, the authors found 
analogous patterns of perceived ratings of effort, time, and accuracy in a perceptual task. Hence, 
these metacognitive evaluations may incorporate several types of information. 
In this vein, individuals’ metacognitive evaluations of demand can be considered as akin 
to a type of metacognitive experience (e.g., perceived effort, Efklides, 2001; 2002; Efklides, 
Kourkoulou, Mitsiou, & Ziliakopoulou, 2006; Efklides & Petkaki, 2005; Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 
2001) and selecting a particular course of action (e.g., in a DST) as the behavior being regulated. 




considered largely inferential and, consequently, sensitive to factors such as preconceived biases, 
beliefs, or intuitive theories (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Koriat, 2007). Thus, it would be expected 
that individuals rely on multiple cues when making selections in a DST, only some of which will 
be directly observable in terms of objective costs (e.g., performance). Indeed, numerous 
dissociations between types of objective costs and metacognitive evaluations exist across a wide 
range of domains such as spatial attention (Wilimzig, Tsuchiya, Fahle, Einhäuser, & Koch, 
2008), metamemory (Castel, Rhodes, & Friedman, 2013; Logan, Castel, Haber, & Viehman, 
2012; Metcalfe, Schwartz, & Joaquin, 1993), blind insight (Scott, Dienes, Barrett, Bor, & Seth, 
2014; Timmermans, Schilbach, Pasquali, & Cleeremans, 2012), and cognitive offloading 
(Gilbert, 2015; Risko & Dunn, 2015). 
Present Investigation  
In the present investigation, I examine this metacognitive framework through a test of the 
hypothesis that individuals avoid courses of action based on a metacognitive evaluation of 
demand. As discussed above, I consider perceived demand to be a general-purpose signal that 
incorporates several types of information. To examine the contribution of perceived demand to 
free-choice in a demand selection task, I took advantage of a recent demonstration of stimulus 
conditions that yielded a dissociation between performance (i.e., time and errors) and ratings of 
perceived time demand, effort, and likelihood of error (i.e., what is being referred to here as 
demand more generally; see Dunn & Risko, 2016). Critically, this dissociation allows a strong 
test of the hypothesis that choices in a demand selection task are based on the metacognitive 
evaluation of demand, as different patterns of choices would be expected based on objective 




The dissociation between perceived demand and performance was observed in the 
context of a reading task that involved the factorial crossing of word and frame rotation in multi-
element arrays: Upright Words-Upright frame (UW-UF), Upright Words-Rotated Frame (UW-
RF), Rotated Words-Upright Frame (RW-UF), and Rotated Words-Rotated Frame (RW-RF; see 
Figure 1). Critically, Dunn and Risko (2016) demonstrated that performance in the RW-RF 
condition was equivalent to performance in the RW-UF condition with both producing longer 
RTs and more errors than the UW-RF and UW-UF conditions (i.e., RW-RF = RW-UF > UW-RF 
> UW-UF). Individuals, however, perceived reading the RW-RF array to be more effortful, time 
demanding, and less accurate relative to the RW-UF array, followed by the UW-RF and UW-UF 
arrays (i.e., RW-RF > RW-UF > UW-RF > UW-UF). The authors suggested that this 
dissociation was due to individuals’ preconceived (and mostly accurate) notion that “disoriented” 
visual stimuli are difficult to process and that the RW-RF display is more disoriented (i.e., both 
words and reading direction are rotated) than the RW-UF display (i.e., only the words are 
rotated). Based on this notion, participants infer based on the explicit cues available (i.e., the 
number of dimensions rotated in the display) that the RW-RF display will be associated with 
greater effort, more time, and more errors (i.e., greater perceived demand). Across three 
experiments (and 2 more reported here), however, there was no evidence of any performance 
differences between the RW-RF and RW-UF conditions. 
As discussed above, previous research has suggested that demand avoidance behavior can 
be dissociated from objective demand (e.g., time demands). However, this work is not without 
potential shortcomings that the present investigation directly addresses. For example, with regard 
to the Kool et al. (2010) experiment highlighted above, in choosing the low-demand strategy and 




cost in that maintaining an established strategy was faster at the trial level (i.e., they avoided 
switching between trials but ended up performing a larger number of trials and hence taking 
longer). The notion that individuals may focus on local optimization while demonstrating 
suboptimal performance at the global task level is a common theme within the strategy selection 
literature (Anderson, 1990; Fu & Gray, 2004, Gray et al., 2006). In this sense, the demand 
avoidance behavior in Kool et al. (2010) could have reflected the avoidance of local objective 
time-based demands. Moreover, in Westbrook et al. (2013), individuals completed a discounting 
task utilizing varying objective demands in terms of N-back levels. Although performance 
diminished as N-back levels increased, regression results suggested unique contributions of 
demand beyond performance on individuals’ wagers. Importantly, however, in each of these 
cases, performance differences were present and it is unclear how the system may exploit these 
signals during demand avoidance. Therefore, the demonstration of demand avoidance in the 
absence of an objective performance cost, as methods in the present investigation allows, 
represents a theoretically important hypothesis to test. 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, participants took part in a variant of a free-choice DST that involved 
choosing which of two displays of words they would prefer to read. The methodological move to 
a DST utilizing the different arrays described above provides several important extensions to the 
initial work by Dunn and Risko (2016). First, Dunn and Risko (2016) examined the role of 
perceived demand within the context of cognitive offloading (i.e., integrating an external strategy 
into a cognitive act; Risko, Medimorec, Chisholm, & Kingstone, 2014). Although the potential 
role of perceived demand as a determinant in deciding to integrate an external strategy and 




decision-making contexts differ in the role that perceived demand may play. Thus, providing 
evidence for a metacognitive account across unique decision-making paradigms represents an 
important finding to establish. Second, perceived demand was assessed in Dunn and Risko 
(2016) by way of individuals’ self-reported ratings on a likert-type scale. Recently, however, 
assessing demand in terms of decision-making (i.e., selections in the DST) rather than self-report 
has been argued to be a more fruitful evaluation of demand avoidance (Westbrook et al., 2013; 
Westbrook & Braver, 2015). Furthermore, additional issues with self-reported values of demand 
are examined in the General Discussion. 
In the DST, each trial consisted of a selection between two arrays of words that 
participants would then have to read. Each array consisted of 25 words arranged into the four 
different array configurations highlighted above (see Figure 1). If individuals avoid reading 
arrays based on a metacognitive evaluation of perceived task demand, then individuals should be 
more likely to select to read the RW-UF arrays than the RW-RF arrays, with both being selected 
less than the UW-RF and UW-UF arrays. Alternatively, if individuals avoid reading arrays based 
on objective performance demands, then I would expect no difference in the likelihood that 
individuals select the RW-UF and RW-RF arrays. In addition to the critical DST, individuals 
also completed a reading task utilizing the same arrays as described above in order to replicate 
the critical patterns in performance (i.e., the equivalence in terms of reading time and accuracy 








Examples of Array Types 
 
Note: (a) Upright Word-Upright Frame (UW-UF); (b) Upright Word-Rotated Frame (UW-RF); 
(c) Rotated Word-Upright Frame (RW-UF); (d) Rotated Word-Rotated Frame (RW-RF). Each 
array was presented using 25 unique words configured into 5 x 5 displays rotated at both ±60° 








 Thirty-six University of Waterloo undergraduate students participated in the study in 
exchange for research credit. Sample size was estimated assuming a moderate effect size for the 
critical RW-RF and RW-UF comparison group (i.e., Cohen’s d of .48) with an 80% probability 
to detect the effect for a within-subjects design at α = .05. This effect size was computed using 
the perceived effort data from Experiment 3 in Dunn and Risko (2016). Individuals provided 
self-report ratings of perceived effort after completing a reading task using the same stimuli used 
in the current study. The d value reported here is derived from the pairwise comparison between 
the RW-RF and RW-UF arrays (i.e., SDDiff as the standardizer). In addition, obtaining a large 
enough sample size to complete full counterbalancing of conditions was taken into consideration.    
Design 
 For both the demand selection task (DST) and the reading task, a one factor (Array Type: 
Upright Word-Upright Frame: UW-UF, Upright Word-Rotated Frame: UW-RF, Rotated Word-
Upright Frame: RW-UF, Rotated Word-Rotated Frame: RW-RF; see Fig. 1) within-subject 
design was employed.  
Apparatus 
Presentation of the stimuli and collection of vocal and manual button-press responses 
were handled by DMDX software (Forster & Forster, 2003). The stimuli were presented on a 24” 
LCD monitor and participants sat approximately 70 cm away from the monitor while loosely 
maintaining an upright head position in a headrest. Individuals were not asked to completely 
place their chin in the headrest so they could comfortably respond aloud. Participants used a 





Array stimuli were taken from the experiments reported in Dunn and Risko (2016). 
Arrays consisted of 25 random nouns and verbs, 4 to 5 letters per word (mean written word 
frequency = 58.96 per million), arranged into 5 x 5 displays (see Figure 1). All words were 
presented in 18 point Courier New font. Arrays for the DST only consisted of 5-letter words. The 
RW-RF and UW-RF array types subtended approximately 15° x 14° (H x W), while the RW-UF 
and UW-UF array types subtended approximately 9.5° x 11.5°. The first word in each array was 
colored red and arrows were included between words to ensure natural reading. Each disoriented 
array type (RW-RF, RW-UF, and UW-RF) was presented to the right of upright (0°) and to the 
left of upright (i.e., + and - 60°) an equal amount of times, while the UW-UF array type was only 
presented at 0°. Twelve unique lists were created and counterbalanced such that each 25-word 
set appeared an equal number of times in each condition.  
Stimuli for the array selection portion of the DST consisted of two arrays presented on 
the left and right sides of the screen separated by a black line. Each array was structured in the 
same manner as mentioned above, but “WORD” was presented in each position rather than a 
unique word to ensure that individuals were selecting based on the explicit structure of the array 
(i.e., rotated words, rotated frame) rather than the individual words within the array. Thus, in 
contrast to DSTs using a sampling methodology, that is using variations across decks that require 
monitoring of objective costs at the block-level, all cues were explicitly presented at the trial-
level. Instructions on the top of the selection screen stated to, “Please choose the type of array 
you would prefer to read.” The combination of all pairwise comparisons of the arrays resulted in 
six unique comparison groups: UW-UF | UW-RF, UW-UF | RW-UF, UW-UF | RW-RF, UW-RF 




presented 8 times during the task using 12 unique lists so that each array type appeared an equal 
number of times in each position in the selection screen (i.e., left or right) and each direction 
(i.e., 0° and ±60°).  
Procedure 
Participants read instructions based on the task that they were completing first (i.e., 
reading task or DST). Instructions for the reading task stated to read each word in the presented 
array aloud as quickly and accurately as possible and to press the B button once they had finished 
reading every word. Instructions for the DST stated that individuals were to choose as quickly as 
possible which of the two arrays they would prefer to read by pressing the Z button to choose the 
array presented on the left side of the screen or the M button to choose the array on the right side 
of the screen. Once the preferred array was chosen, participants then read the selected array type 
aloud. Emphasis was added in the instructions for both tasks to not hit the B button prematurely 
to avoid incomplete responses. Participants completed 32 randomized trials of the reading task 
and 48 randomized trials of the DST. Order of task was counterbalanced across participants. The 
entire study took approximately 45 minutes to complete. 
Results 
Results are reported first for the reading task followed by the DST, followed by Bayesian 
analyses of effect sizes. All analyses employed repeated measures ANOVA. Effect sizes are 
presented with all ANOVA results (eta-squared for one-way models) and pairwise comparisons 
(Cohen’s d using SDavg as the standardizer term; see Cumming, 2012, p. 291). In addition, 95% 
bootstrapped bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals (DiCiccio & Efron, 
1996) computed for the mean difference across groups are presented for all pairwise 





Response times (RT) were calculated as the amount of time between stimulus onset and 
the vocal onset of the last word in the array (i.e., the 25th word) using CheckVocal software 
(Protopapas, 2007). Grand mean outlier and by-subject within condition outlier analyses were 
conducted on raw RTs using a 2.5 standard deviation cut-off in both cases (Van Selst & 
Jolicoeur, 1994), resulting in the removal of 2% of the trials. In addition, spoiled trials in which 
participants cut their vocal responses off early (i.e., pressing the B button before they had 
finished responding) were removed (8% of trials). Errors were considered anytime a participant 
misread a word, skipped reading a word, repeated a correctly read word, or navigated the array in 
an irregular fashion. Trials in which one or more errors occurred were not removed from RT 
analysis because removal of such trials would result in a large proportion of trials being removed 
given that each array type affords 25 individual chances to make an error. Furthermore, previous 
studies using large multi-element displays in reading tasks have not found differences in RT 
analyses when trials with errors are included or removed (e.g., Kolers, 1975).   
Response Time (RT). A one-way repeated measures ANOVA demonstrated a significant 
effect of array type on participants’ response times, F(3,105) = 13.15, MSE = 421247.87, η2 = 
.27, p < .001. Critically, comparisons did not demonstrate a significant difference in RT for the 
RW-RF condition (M = 16551ms, SD = 3189) relative to the RW-UF condition (M = 16419 ms, 
SD = 3270), MDiff = 132 ms, t(35) = 0.97, 95% BCa CI [-109.85, 411.81], d = .04, p = .34. 
Comparisons for all arrays relative to the UW-UF condition (M = 15698 ms, SD = 2989) 
demonstrated at least marginal differences in RT, Min d = .10, Max d = .28, all p’s < .07. Both 
the RW-RF and RW-UF conditions demonstrated significant differences in RT relative to the 




respectively (see Figure 2). Thus, similar to Dunn and Risko (2016), results demonstrated that 
the RTs associated with the RW-RF condition are similar to the RW-UF condition, with both of 
these RTs being longer than in the UW-RF condition, and all being longer than in the UW-UF 
condition.  
Accuracy. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA did not demonstrate a significant 
effect of array type on errors, F(1,105) = .14, MSE = .12, η2 = .004, p = .94. Similar to RT, 
comparisons did not demonstrate a significant difference in errors for the RW-RF condition (M = 
1.01, SD = .69) relative to the RW-UF condition (M = 1.06, SD = .73), MDiff = -.05, t(35) = -.61, 
95% BCa CI [.09, -.20], d = .06, p = .54. Qualitatively, errors per trial did not vary as a function 
of array type, with individuals making approximately one error per trial for all arrays (UW-UF, 
M = 1.02, SD = .75; UW-RF array, M = 1.01, SD = .77) 
Demand Selection Task 
 Responses where individuals mistakenly hit the B button rather than selected an array 
were removed for all analyses (hitting the B button at this point would simply abort the trial). 
Array selection times were calculated as the time from the selection screen onset to when the 
participant made their manual response to select an array. These selection times were highly 
skewed (Min = 8.29 ms, Max = 44135.78 ms, Skewness = 14.23), and were thus trimmed using 
a trial-level grand mean outlier procedure (i.e., trimming values above and below 2.5 SD units; 
Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1994) to exclude extremely short and long selection times (approximately 
2% of all trials). Proportions of array selections were computed using the trimmed data set.  
First, I examined the effect of each array type on selections relative to the total number of 
times the array appeared within the experiment. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA 




MSE = .05, η 2 = .61, p < .001. Importantly, a pairwise comparison demonstrated a large 
difference in selections across the RW-RF condition (M = 24.12%, SD = 14.17%) relative to the 
RW-UF condition (M = 40.05%, SD = 19.16%), MDiff = 15.93%, t(35) = 3.91, 95% BCa CI 
[8.33%, 24.20%], d = .96, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons also demonstrated a significant 
difference in selections for the UW-RF (M = 47.36%, SD = 20.56%) relative to the RW-RF 
condition, MDiff = 23.24%, t(35) = 5.38, 95% BCa CI [22.07%, 23.27%], d = 1.34, p < .001, but 
not relative to the RW-UF condition, MDiff = 7.31%, t(35) = 1.23, 95% BCa CI [5.6%, 61.1%], d 
= .37, p > .1. Similar to RT, comparisons for all arrays relative to the UW-UF condition (M = 
86.28%, SD = 19.18%) demonstrated significant differences in array selections, Min d = 1.96, 
Max d = 3.73, all p’s < .001 (see Figure 2). Moreover, an analysis examining array selection 
within each of the six comparison groups yielded results consistent with the overall analysis 














Mean Overall Array Selection and Performance in Experiment 1 
 
Note: UW-UF = Upright Word-Upright Frame; UW-RF = Upright Word-Rotated Frame; RW-
UF = Rotated Word-Upright Frame; RW-RF = Rotated Word-Rotated Frame. Results displayed 
are overall array selection and reading task response times and errors (in brackets) in the left and 
right panels respectively. Error bars for the left panel represent 95% bootstrapped bias-corrected 
and accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals. Error bars for the right panel represent 95% within-
subjects confidence intervals (Masson & Loftus, 2003).  
 
The current experimental design allows for the examination of effects of intra-
experimental experience on array selections. Specifically, if individuals are monitoring and 
exploiting performance information during their selections, then I would expect those individuals 
that completed the reading task prior to the DST to show patterns of selections similar to the 
patterns of performance reported above. However, the between-subjects effect of task order (i.e., 
DST 1st vs. reading task 1st) did not demonstrate an effect on array selection, F(1, 34) = 2.60, 




performance) associated with processing the arrays prior to completing the DST did not seem to 
influence how individuals selected arrays to read. 
Table 1. 
Array Selection as a Function of Comparison Group for Experiment 1 and 2 
 
Note: UW-UF = Upright Word-Upright Frame; UW-RF = Upright Word-Rotated Frame; RW-
UF = Rotated Word-Upright Frame; RW-RF = Rotated Word-Rotated Frame; d = Cohen’s d; 
BCa CI = bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals. Cohen’s d is calculated 
based on a one-sample test against chance for the highest proportion value in each group. 
Confidence intervals are computed for the same highest proportion value. 
 
Bayesian Analyses 
 The two critical conditions at the center of the argument in favor of metacognitive 
evaluations of perceived task demand playing an important role in selections are the RW-RF and 
RW-UF conditions, specifically, the notion that the two arrays are matched on performance 




effects of each array within performance and selections, Bayesian estimation analyses 
(Kruschke, 2014) were conducted on response times, errors, and overall array selections using 
the BEST package (Kruschke, 2014) in R (R Core Team, 2014). For each dependent variable, 
100,000 estimates of the effect size (calculated for all analyses as RW-RF minus RW-UF) using 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling were simulated. 95% Highest Density Intervals 
(HDI), as well as the percentage of the effect size distribution contained within the Region of 
Practical Interest (ROPE) are presented (ROPE = -.1, .1; Kruschke, 2013). In addition, Bayes 
Factors (BF) computed using the BayesFactor package (Morey & Rouder, 2015) in R are 
presented. Interpretations of Bayes Factors follows the criteria outlined by Kass and Raftery 
(1995). The inclusion of both effect size estimates and Bayes Factors allows for a more robust 
picture of the effects on performance and array selection between the RW-RF and RW-UF 
arrays. 
 First, estimation of the effect size (ES) in response times demonstrated that 42% of the 
distribution fell within the ROPE, Mode ES = .04, 95% HDI [-.31, .38]. In addition, the 
computed Bayes Factor for RT across the two arrays demonstrated positive evidence for the null, 
BFNull = 3.61. Analyses of errors produced similar results to RT, with 41% of the distribution 
falling within the ROPE, Mode ES = -.07, 95% HDI [-.41, .31], BFNull = 4.69. Last, the 
estimation of effect sizes in array selection demonstrated that 0% of the distribution fell within 
the ROPE, Mode ES = -.69, 95% HDI [-1.1, -.32.]. In this case, the computed Bayes Factor 
demonstrated strong evidence for the alternative, BFAlt = 66.67. Thus, considering the RW-RF 
and RW-UF arrays, the effect sizes reported for performance can be considered negligible, 






 Experiment 1 confirmed the hypothesis that individuals would select arrays based on the 
previously reported patterns of perceived demand (Dunn & Risko, 2016) associated with 
processing the arrays despite there being no time- or accuracy-based reason to do so. Individuals 
most often avoided reading the RW-RF array, followed by the RW-UF array, UW-RF array, and 
lastly the UW-UF array. However, individuals’ performance in terms of RT and errors did not 
play this pattern out. Effect sizes across the RW-RF and RW-UF arrays for both performance 
measures were negligible as demonstrated by both inferential statistics and Bayesian analyses. 
Thus, while performance across the two conditions is nearly equivalent, there was a marked 
difference in individuals’ selections in the DST across the two conditions. Based on previous 
research demonstrating a robust difference between these two conditions, as well as the 
difference between UW-RF and these arrays, in terms of perceived demand (Dunn & Risko, 
2016), it can be concluded that the perceived demand represents a critical factor driving 
selections in the DST. 
 Although Experiment 1 confirmed the major hypothesis put forth above that individuals 
will select lines of action based on perceived demand, several potential shortcomings exist. First, 
while the results based on inferential statistics and Bayesian analyses suggest that performance 
across the RW-RF and RW-UF arrays is equivalent, the RW-RF array did demonstrate slightly 
slower reading times (by 132 ms). Despite this difference being statistically indistinguishable 
from zero, there exist several demonstrations arguing that the cognitive system can be sensitive 
to similarly small time costs (e.g., Gray et al., 2006; Gray & Boehm-Davis, 2000). Therefore, it 
remains a possibility that individuals are integrating this cost into the array selection process. 




research (Dunn & Risko, 2016), perceived demand was not directly measured in the sample. 
Thus, it remains a possibility that self-reported patterns of perceived task demand may dissociate 
from the patterns of array selection within the current experimental context, although the pattern 
here matches that previously reported. I looked to address these concerns in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 followed a similar procedure to that of Experiment 1, with several critical 
changes. First, all individuals completed the reading task prior to completing the DST. Thus, as 
opposed to Experiment 1, all individuals received experience with the objective costs associated 
with reading each type of array prior to making their selections in the DST. I expect the pattern 
of selections to mirror the pattern outlined above (i.e., UW-UF > UW-RF > RW-UF > RW-RF) 
given that selections for individuals that received experience from the reading task first in 
Experiment 1 did not differ from those for individuals that completed the DST first. In addition, 
upon completion of the DST, individuals provided perceived effort rankings of the four different 
arrays. The straightforward hypothesis is that rankings should closely track selections in the 
DST. That is, the RW-RF array should be ranked as the most effortful, followed by the RW-UF 
array, UW-RF array, and lastly the UW-UF array. 
Moreover, an additional measure of objective demand was considered alongside RT and 
errors. Assessing how peripheral physiological measures track demand avoidance behaviors 
represents a theoretically important issue (Westbrook & Braver, 2015). Thus, individuals’ eye 
blink data was collected during the reading task. Rates of eye blinks have been consistently 
shown to be a sensitive measure of demand during visual tasks (Drew, 1951; Fogarty & Stern, 
1989; Recarte et al., 2008; Ryu & Myung, 2005; Stern et al., 1994; Stern, Walrath, & Goldstein; 




observed for more demanding tasks. For example, Wilson (2002) found suppressed blink rates in 
professional pilots during flight segments that required more attention to cockpit instruments. 
Therefore, given the demonstration of equivalent objective demand (as indexed by performance) 
across the RW-RF and RW-UF arrays, I can derive a straightforward hypothesis regarding blink 
rates and the utilized arrays: I would expect the UW-UF array to show the highest blink rates 
(i.e., less blink suppression), followed by the UW-RF array, with blink rates being similar across 
the RW-UF and RW-RF arrays (i.e., RW-RF = RW-UF < UW-RF < UW-UF). That is, similar 
rates of blink suppression should be observed for the RW-RF and RW-UF arrays. Thus another 
dissociation is predicted, this time between a yet to be tested measure of demand (i.e., blink 
rates) and selections in the demand selection task. Observing this second dissociation would lend 
additional credence to the notion that individuals’ selections are driven by a metacognitive 
evaluation of perceived task demand and, to our knowledge, would be the first such 
demonstration utilizing a peripheral physiological measure.  
Method 
Participants 
 Forty-eight University of Waterloo undergraduate students participated in the study in 
exchange for research credit. The decision was made to increase sample size to achieve more 
precise estimates of the effects across arrays specifically for performance measures relative to 
Experiment 1. One individual could not be included in the following analyses due to a program 
error, resulting in a final N of 47.  
Design 
 For both the demand selection task (DST) and the reading task, a one factor (Array Type: 




Upright Frame: RW-UF, Rotated Word-Rotated Frame: RW-RF; see Figure 1) within-subject 
design was employed.  
Apparatus 
 All apparatus was the same as in Experiment 1. To record individuals’ eye blinks, a 
webcam was placed on the top of the monitor facing the individual. No attempt was made to hide 
the camera. 
Stimuli 
 Stimuli were the same as Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 2 was similar to that of Experiment 1. However, all 
individuals completed the tasks within the experiment in the same order. First, individuals 
completed the reading task, followed by the DST, and lastly the effort rankings. For effort 
rankings, individuals first were randomly presented each of the four array conditions at both 
rotation angles (i.e., ±60°, not including the UW-UF array) simultaneously. Each set of arrays 
was then randomly displayed at one of four quadrants on the screen labeled A through D (i.e., 
individuals saw all four array types together when producing their rankings). Individuals were 
then asked to rank each array type from most effortful (1) to least effortful (4) to read. The entire 
experimental session took approximately 45 minutes to complete. 
Results 
Results are reported first for the reading task (i.e., RT, accuracy, blink rate) followed by 
the DST, Bayesian analyses, and finally subjective effort. Perceived effort ratings are reported as 
reversed-scored ranks (i.e., initially lower ranks denoted higher effort in the task). All reporting 





Outlier analyses resulted in the removal of approximately 2% of the trials. Spoiled trials 
in which participants cut their vocal responses off early were removed (approximately 4% of 
trials). Eye blinks were coded by individuals blind to the condition on a trial-by-trial basis. The 
original coder and an additional coder recoded 25% (12 individuals) of participants’ eye blink 
data. Both inter- and intra-rater reliability was high, K = .95, for both respectively. To control for 
trial level time differences, blink rates were divided by the trial RT (i.e., blinks-per-second; 
BPS). Five individuals did not consent to be filmed during the experimental session and are thus 
not included in the blink rate analysis (N = 42). 
Response Time (RT). Results demonstrated a significant effect of array type on 
participants’ response times, F(2.57, 118.08) = 22.41, MSE = 788971.1, η2 = .33, p < .001. 
Importantly, comparisons did not demonstrate a significant difference in RT for the RW-RF 
condition (M = 17698 ms, SD = 3549) relative to the RW-UF condition (M = 17947 ms, SD = 
3575), MDiff = 249 ms, t(46) = 1.69, 95% BCa CI [-30.19, 554.36], d = .07, p = .09, and critically, 
the direction of the difference between the arrays flipped relative to Experiment 1. Both the RW-
RF and RW-UF conditions demonstrated significant differences in RT relative to the UW-RF 
condition (M = 17426 ms, SD = 3383), d = .08, p = .048, and d = .15, p < .01, respectively. 
Comparisons for all arrays relative to the UW-UF condition (M = 16638 ms, SD = 3529) 
demonstrated significant differences in RT, Min d = .23, Max d = .37, all p’s < .001 (see Figure 
3). Thus, the pattern of RT results replicated the pattern demonstrated in Experiment 1.  
Accuracy. Results did not demonstrate a significant effect of array type on errors, 
F(2.52,116.23) = .14, MSE = .09, η2 = .01, p > .1. Similar to Experiment 1, errors per trial did not 




arrays (RW-RF, M = .57, SD = .78; RW-UF, M = .54, SD = .92; UW-RF, M = .49, SD = .8; UW-
UF, M = .52, SD = .8) 
 
Figure 3. 
Mean Overall Array Selection and Performance in Experiment 2 
 
Note: UW-UF = Upright Word-Upright Frame; UW-RF = Upright Word-Rotated Frame; RW-
UF = Rotated Word-Upright Frame; RW-RF = Rotated Word-Rotated Frame. Results displayed 
are overall array selection and reading task response times and errors (in brackets) in the left and 
right panels respectively. Error bars for the left panel represent 95% bootstrapped bias-corrected 
and accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals. Error bars for the right panel represent 95% within-
subjects confidence intervals (Masson & Loftus, 2003).  
 
Eye-Blink Rates (BPS). Results demonstrated a significant effect of array type on BPS, 
F(2.48, 101.68) = 26.93, MSE = .002, η2 = .4, p < .001. Again, comparisons did not demonstrate 
a significant difference in BPS for the RW-RF condition (M = .24, SD = .15) relative to the RW-
UF condition (M = .24, SD = .15), MDiff = .003, t(41) = .35, 95% BCa CI [-.01, .02], d = .02, p > 




to the UW-RF condition (M = .27, SD = .16), d = .21, p < .01, and d = .23, p < .01, respectively. 
Comparisons for all arrays relative to the UW-UF condition (M = .31, SD = .18) demonstrated 
significant differences in BPS, Min d = .23, Max d = .43, all p’s < .001 (see Figure 4). Therefore, 




Mean Blink Rates (Blinks-per-Second) in Experiment 2 
 
 
Note: UW-UF = Upright Word-Upright Frame; UW-RF = Upright Word-Rotated Frame; RW-
UF = Rotated Word-Upright Frame; RW-RF = Rotated Word-Rotated Frame. Error bars 







Demand Selection Task 
 Array selection times again showed signs of skewness (Min = 223.26, Max = 8677.9, 
Skewness = 2.31), and were trimmed to exclude extremely short and long selection times 
(approximately 2% of all trials). Proportions of array selections were computed using the 
trimmed data set.  
Results demonstrated a significant effect of array type on participants’ overall selections, 
F(2.63, 120.84) = 76.43, MSE = .06, η 2 = .62, p < .001. Similar to Experiment 1, a pairwise 
comparison demonstrated a large difference in selections across the RW-RF condition (M = 
22.14%, SD = 15.7%) relative to the RW-UF condition (M = 35.11%, SD = 20.57%), MDiff = 
12.98%, t(46) = 3.43, 95% BCa CI [5.72%, 19.99%], d = .72, p < .01. Pairwise comparisons also 
demonstrated a significant difference in selections for the UW-RF (M = 51.92%, SD = 20.04%) 
relative to the RW-RF condition, MDiff = 29.79%, t(46) = 7.52, 95% BCa CI [22.45%, 37.27%], d 
= 1.67, p < .001, and RW-UF condition, MDiff = 16.81%, t(46) = 3.21, 95% BCa CI [6.67%, 
26.07%], d = .83, p < .01. Comparisons for all arrays relative to the UW-UF condition (M = 
88.97%, SD = 21.91%) demonstrated significant differences in array selections, Min d = 1.77, 
Max d = 3.55, all p’s < .001 (see Figure 3). Array selection within each of the six comparison 
groups again was consistent with the patterns of overall array selection (see Table 1).  
Bayesian Analyses  
 First, estimation of the effect size (ES) in response times demonstrated that 46% of the 
ES distribution fell within the ROPE, Mode ES = -.06, 95% HDI [-.36, .24]. In addition, the 
computed Bayes Factor for RT across the two arrays demonstrated no evidence for the 




with 47% of the distribution falling within the ROPE, Mode ES = .03, 95% HDI [-.26, .35], but 
showed positive evidence for the null, BFNull = 5.79. Analyses of BPS demonstrated that 16% of 
the distribution fell within the ROPE, Mode ES = -.25, 95% HDI [-.58, .06], BFNull = 5.67. Last, 
the estimation of effect sizes in array selection demonstrated that 0% of the distribution fell 
within the ROPE, Mode ES = -.6, 95% HDI [-.99, -.25.]. The computed Bayes Factor 
demonstrated strong evidence for the alternative, BFAlt = 23.35. Therefore, similar to Experiment 
1, the effect sizes reported for performance as well blink rates can be considered negligible, 
whereas the effect size reported for individuals’ selections can be considered medium in size and 
reliable. 
Perceived Effort 
 Rank data were submitted to a Freidman’s test. Results demonstrated a significant effect 
of array type on individuals’ perceived effort rankings, Χ2(3) = 47.77, p < .001. Wilcoxon rank-
sum tests were conducted to assess differences in mean ranks across array types. First, the RW-
RF array (M = 3.28, SD = 1.05) was ranked as significantly more effortful than the RW-UF 
array (M = 2.83, SD = .74), Z  = 2.22, r = .27, p = .03, and the UW-RF array (M = 2.4, SD = 
1.2), Z = 3.52, r = .36, p < .001. In addition, the RW-UF array was ranked as significantly more 
effortful than the UW-RF array, Z = 2.21, r = .23, p = .03. All disoriented arrays were ranked as 
more effortful relative to the UW-UF array (M = 1.5, SD = 1.09), all Z’s > 3.79, r’s > .39, p’s < 
.001. Thus, the RW-RF was ranked as the most effortful array to read followed by the RW-UF, 
UW-RF, and UW-UF arrays. Importantly, this pattern of results tracks the inverse pattern of 







Mean Effort Rankings (reversed scored) in Experiment 2 
 
 
Note: UW-UF = Upright Word-Upright Frame; UW-RF = Upright Word-Rotated Frame; RW-
UF = Rotated Word-Upright Frame; RW-RF = Rotated Word-Rotated Frame. Error bars 
represent 95% bootstrapped bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals.  
 
Discussion 
 First and foremost, Experiment 2 provides a clear replication of the major findings from 
Experiment 1. Individuals most often selected to read the UW-UF array followed by the UW-RF, 
RW-UF, and RW-RF arrays. Results from performance measures again demonstrated equivalent 
response times across the RW-RF and RW-UF arrays, with both producing longer RTs relative 




and RW-UF arrays flipped relative to Experiment 1. That is, the RW-UF array demonstrated 
slightly longer reading times relative to the RW-RF array (249 ms). If individuals were sensitive 
to this time cost, then I would have expected the RW-UF array to be chosen less often relative to 
the RW-RF array, though this notion was not supported. In addition, the added measure of 
demand (i.e., blink rates) supported the notion that the RW-RF and RW-UF arrays produce 
similar levels of demand, with both being greater than the UW-RF and UW-UF arrays. Thus, 
tracking performance, demand avoidance in terms of the DST was dissociated from this 
peripheral physiological measure. This is the first such dissociation of which I am aware. Last, 
individuals’ perceived effort rankings closely matched array selections; the RW-RF array was 
most often ranked as the most effortful, followed by the RW-UF, UW-RF, and UW-UF arrays. 
This pattern replicated the pattern of perceived demand as well as perceived time and accuracy 
across three experiments reported in Dunn and Risko (2016). This general pattern has now been 
demonstrated across rankings, subjective self-report ratings, and selections in a DST, and 
dissociated from objective performance in terms of response times and errors and now also from 
blink rates. Thus, if selections during the DST can be viewed as a proxy for demand avoidance, 
then action selection in this context seems to be largely driven by a metacognitive evaluation of 
perceived task demand. 
Experiment 3 
Throughout the current chapter, I have put forth the argument that individuals make use 
of a general metacognitive evaluation of perceived task demand during action selection in 
demand avoidance. As highlighted above, recent work by Dunn and Risko (2016) found similar 
patterns of ratings of perceived effort, time, and accuracy for perceptual stimuli. Therefore, this 




performance dimension (i.e., effort, time, accuracy) rather than selecting based on a free-choice 
preference, then patterns of selections should be similar across all dimensions. Although the 
similar patterns across performance dimensions have been observed in self-report ratings of 
demand (Dunn & Risko, 2016), these patterns have not been demonstrated in a decision-making 
context (see above) and thus utilization of a forced-choice DST paradigm affords the opportunity 
to generalize the expected pattern to the perhaps more revealing decision-making context. 
To address this decision-making situation, participants in Experiment 3 first completed a 
reading task similar to Experiments 1 and 2 online via Amazon Mechanical Turk. Amazon Turk 
workers have been shown to be much more demographically diverse than university samples and 
to provide reliable data when benchmarked against traditional experimental methods 
(Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). At the conclusion of the reading task, individuals 
completed a forced-choice version of the DST where instructions explicitly stated to select on 
every trial, based on the condition to which they were assigned, which of the two presented 
arrays was the most effortful, time demanding, or least accurate to read. Following our 
assumption that individuals exploit a general metacognitive evaluation during selections, I do not 
expect selections to vary as a function of rating dimension (i.e., effort, time, and accuracy), but 
rather the RW-RF array will be most often selected, followed by the RW-UF, UW-RF, and UW-
UF arrays. Importantly, however, if one dimension deviates from the patterns of selections 
observed in the free-choice DST, then it can be taken as evidence that individuals may not be 








 One hundred and eight individuals were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. All 
participants were over the age of 18 and native English speakers. Participants received $2.00 as 
compensation upon completion of the task.  
Design 
 For the reading task, a one factor (Array Type: Upright Word-Upright Frame: UW-UF, 
Upright Word-Rotated Frame: UW-RF, Rotated Word-Upright Frame: RW-UF, Rotated Word-
Rotated Frame: RW-RF; see Figure 1) within-subject design was employed. For the DST, a 3 
(Dimension: Effort, Time, Accuracy) by 4 (Array Type: UW-UF, UW-RF, RW-UF, and RW-
RF) mixed design was employed. 
Stimuli 
 Stimuli for the two tasks were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
Procedure 
Participants chose and accepted the human intelligence task (HIT) on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk and electronically provided informed consent. Participants first completed 16 
randomly presented trials of the reading task with each array type occurring four times. 
Instructions for the reading task stated that participants were to read through each array as 
quickly and accurately as they were able to themselves, and to try their best to keep their head 
upright while reading. In addition, in attempt to ensure that some time was spent actually reading 




were told that they would be timed while reading 1. Individuals then completed 36 trials of the 
DST similar to Experiments 1 and 2, however choice instructions varied based on the rating 
dimension (i.e., Effort, Time, Accuracy) to which they were randomly assigned. For the effort 
rating condition, individuals were asked, “Which array do you believe would be more effortful in 
reading aloud?” For the time rating condition, individuals were asked, “Which array do you 
believe would be more time demanding in reading aloud?” For the accuracy rating condition, 
individuals were asked, “Which array do you believe would be less accurate in reading aloud?” 
Upon completion of the DST, all individuals were debriefed and required to enter a randomized 
code into Amazon Mechanical Turk to receive remuneration.  
Results 
Demand Selection Task 
 First, results did not demonstrate a significant a main effect of Dimension, F(2, 105) 
= .88, MSE = .0004, η 2p = .02, p > .1 or a Dimension x Array interaction, F(2.23, 237.29) = .99, 
MSE = .08, η 2p = .02, p > .1. However, results did demonstrate a significant main effect of array 
type on selections, F(2.26, 237.29) = 157.82, MSE = .0004, η 2p = .6, p < .001 (see Figure 6). 
Collapsing across rating dimensions, a pairwise comparison demonstrated a large difference in 
selections across the RW-RF condition (M = 74.22%, SD = 22.99%) relative to the RW-UF 
condition (M = 54.87%, SD = 23.35%), MDiff = 19.25%, t(107) = 5.1, 95% BCa CI [11.95%, 
27.9%], d = .84, p < .001. Pairwise comparisons also demonstrated a significant difference in 
                                                
1 There is considerable lack of control with regard to participants’ RTs from the online task. For 
example, differences in Internet speed could cause stimuli to load slower, or individuals could 
simply click through the arrays without responding. Even after aggressive outlier trimming, 
mean RTs for each array type were much faster and produced much larger SDs than the two 
controlled reading tasks reported in Experiments 1 and 2 (RW-RF, M =11676 ms, SD = 6496; 
RW-UF, M =12565 ms, SD = 7294; UW-RF, M =12395 ms SD = 7468; UW-UF, M =11204 




selections for the UW-RF (M = 48.16%, SD = 24.37%) relative to the RW-RF condition, MDiff = 
26.06%, t(107) = 6.62, 95% BCa CI [19.29%, 33.26%], d = 1.1, p < .001, but not relative to the 
RW-UF condition, MDiff = 6.71%, t(107) = 1.67, 95% BCa CI [.6%, 14.23%], d = .28, p = .1. 
Comparisons for all arrays relative to the UW-UF condition (M = 4.67%, SD = 10.35%) 
demonstrated significant differences in selections, Min d = 2.51, Max d = 4.18, all p’s < .001. 
 
Figure 6. 
Mean Overall Array Selections in Experiment 3 
 
 
Note: UW-UF = Upright Word-Upright Frame; UW-RF = Upright Word-Rotated Frame; RW-
UF = Rotated Word-Upright Frame; RW-RF = Rotated Word-Rotated Frame. Error bars 
represent 95% bootstrapped bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals.  
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 3 looked to directly address the assumption that individuals make use of a 




choice DST where they were asked to select the more effortful, the more time demanding, or the 
least accurate array to read. Results supported this notion and replicated the pattern of self-report 
in Dunn and Risko (2016) in a decision-making context. Patterns of selections did not vary as a 
function of rating dimension. Individuals selected the RW-RF array to be more effortful, time 
demanding, and less accurate to read relative to the RW-UF array. Thus, forcing individuals to 
choose based on a specific conceptualization of demand did not change patterns of selections 
and, interestingly, demonstrated a similar pattern of results relative to individuals’ selections in 
the free-choice DST. Within the context of DSTs, individuals may indeed be attempting to 
integrate some type of performance information into their selections. However, the addition of 
ancillary metacognitive information (e.g., explicit cues) may lead to an “error” in selections as 
defined by objective demands. In a similar vein, theories incorporating the notion that 
metacognitive experiences are based on an evaluation of one’s performance in light of some 
metacognitive theory can be found within the literature (Whittlesea, 1997; 2003). It is important 
to note, though, that interpreting the similar patterns of selections across dimensions as evidence 
for a general evaluation of demand, does not support a claim that all dimensions are necessarily 
included in the evaluation all the time.  
General Discussion 
Chapter 1 looked to closely examine the role of metacognitive evaluations of task 
demand in a demand selection task (DST). To achieve this, a novel DST was employed utilizing 
stimuli that yield equal objective costs but varying levels of perceived task demand. Importantly, 
individuals actively avoided selecting to read arrays based not on objective costs but on 
metacognitive evaluations of task demand. Specifically, individuals less often selected to read 




Performance in the reading task, however, revealed that RT and errors for the RW-RF and RW-
UF conditions were similar. Thus, the pattern of array selections was dissociated from the pattern 
of objective performance as indexed by the reading task. Experiment 2 provided a 
straightforward replication of the critical findings demonstrated in Experiment 1. Moreover, an 
additional peripheral physiological measure of demand (i.e., eye blinks) nicely dovetailed with 
the notion that objective demand was equivalent across the RW-RF and RW-UF arrays. In 
addition, individuals’ perceived effort rankings closely tracked selections in the DST. 
Experiment 3 looked to address the notion that individuals base their selections on a general 
metacognitive evaluation of perceived demand by forcing individuals to make selections based 
on effort, time, and accuracy. Patterns of selections were similar across all dimensions and 
matched patterns observed in the free-choice DSTs suggesting that a type of general 
metacognitive evaluation is being exploited during the selection process. In the following, I 
consider the above results within a metacognitive framework of demand avoidance, provide 
connections to extant theories, and provide testable predictions for future work. 
Toward A Metacognition of Demand Avoidance  
The experiments in Chapter 1 provide evidence consistent with the notion that individuals 




more generally in a DST2. In addition, I have provided early evidence of demand avoidance 
being dissociated from a physiological measure of demand. I suggest that demand avoidance is 
driven by an individual’s metacognitive evaluation of perceived task demand elicited by 
available cues. As highlighted in the introduction, these results suggest that one potentially 
productive avenue to pursue with regard to demand avoidance behavior is under a metacognitive 
control framework (Dunn & Risko, 2016). From this framework, selecting courses of action 
based on demand can be considered largely inferential. As such, individuals may rely on multiple 
cues during the action selection process (e.g., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1992), and 
evaluations are influenced by factors such as preconceived biases, intuitive theories, and past 
experience (Dunn & Risko, 2016; Koriat, 2007). Furthermore, dissociations across objective 
demands and demand avoidance behavior could be considered the rule rather than an exception 
(cf. Koriat et al., 2006). 
The results in Chapter 1 are consistent with such an account. The RW-RF and RW-UF 
arrays are read in about the same amount of time, generate about the same number of errors, and 
generate similar responses using a physiological measure of demand (i.e., blink rates). It would 
be difficult to make the case that the two conditions differ markedly in any kind of objective 
                                                
2 Following Kool et al. (2010), I conducted an individual differences analysis on individuals’ 
selections in the DST and, in this case, rotation costs. Performance from the reading task and 
DST selections was pooled across Experiments 1 and 2 (N = 83). Correlations were conducted 
within each of the comparison groups incorporating disoriented arrays using a change score for 
both arrays (i.e., RW-RF – RW-UF; RW-RF – UWRF; RW-UF – UW-RF) for each variable of 
interest. We would expect moderate negative correlations between performance and selections 
for those individuals that showed larger rotation costs for one array relative to the other within 
specific comparison groups. However, all correlations were extremely small, Min r = -.01, Max r 
= -.13, all p’s > .1. Blink rates in Experiment 2 showed similar results, Min r = -.13, Max r = -
.24, all p’s > .1. Although these findings strengthen the overall argument presented here, they 
must be interpreted with caution given major issues concerning small sample size correlation 
analyses (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013) and utilizing change scores to index costs (Peter, 




costs. Critically, though, participants report that reading the RW-RF display is more effortful, 
more time consuming, and more error prone than reading the RW-UF displays. This belief likely 
derives from the intuitive notion that stimulus rotation impairs performance, and that the RW-RF 
array contains two visually salient rotations. Importantly, when faced with a free decision about 
which display to read, participants overwhelmingly avoid the RW-RF display. In this vein, the 
fact that the RW-RF condition is not associated with more time or errors is evidence for the 
contribution of some extra-experimental factor (e.g., preconceived bias, theory, past experience).  
This explanation above also goes some way to explaining the fact that there was a 
relatively small difference in the selections between the RW-UF and UW-RF displays despite 
large differences in performance. Critically, both displays feature the disorientation of a single 
dimension and on that standard alone could be perceived as approximately equally effortful, time 
consuming, and error prone. The objectively greater cost associated with rotating words relative 
to rotating the frame is to some extent “lost” on participants. 
What are the implications of adopting a metacognitive approach for the idea that 
individuals avoid demands based on executive control (Botvinick & Rosen, 2009; Gold et al., 
2014; Kool et al., 2010; McGuire & Botvinick, 2010)? One perspective is that a kind of sheer 
effort cost signal associated with demand on executive control exists and that this is exploited as 
a type of cue in action selection during the course of a DST. Importantly, a metacognitive control 
account of demand avoidance, specifically a bi-directional and sequential model of monitoring 
and control (Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001; Son & Metcalfe, 2005; Vernon & Usher, 2003), allows 
for the updating of an existing theory based on feedback from control. In those cases where 
variations in performance costs become explicit, feedback from the ultimate selection of a 




example, Kool et al. (2010) demonstrated that individuals who exhibited larger task switching 
costs subsequently exhibited more extreme effort avoidance behavior. 
Alternatively, avoidance of task switching in previous experiments may have been driven 
by a preexisting theory that task switching is demanding, and individuals thus avoid the option 
associated with more switches. Gold et al.’s (2014) demonstration that avoiding task switching 
was contingent on providing instructions about differences in effort across two options may 
reflect those instructions sensitizing individuals to variations in the probability of a task switch 
across decks. Importantly, although I have argued here that demand avoidance is driven by an 
individual’s metacognitive evaluation of perceived demand, such a view does not preclude the 
notion of individuals avoiding cognitive effort as defined by variation in executive control or 
some other conceptualization of effort more generally. Rather, and critically, my argument is that 
the driving factor of avoidance is the metacognitive evaluation. 
Subjective Control Costs as Metacognitive Evaluations 
An interesting question to address moving forward is what comprises a subjective control 
cost signal? As highlighted in the introduction, such subjective decision costs have been 
associated with increased activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC; Mcguire & Botvinick, 
2010). I have suggested above that individuals utilize a type of general metacognitive evaluation 
of task demand comprised of several types of objective information influenced by cues, theories, 
and biases, leading to perceived effort. Comparably, recent neuropsychological models of 
metacognition have also identified areas of the PFC as critical in metacognitive monitoring and 
control. For example, the rostrolateral PFC is hypothesized to receive input from areas of the 
cortex involved in a “closed-loop” of monitoring and control (i.e., the anterior cingulate cortex, 




evaluation of the state of the system that can be deployed or reported beyond the local task 
(Fleck et al., 2006; Fleming & Dolan, 2012; Medalla & Barbas, 2010). Although substantial 
overlap of processes involved in the ACC (i.e., executive control) and PFC (i.e., metacognition) 
exists (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000), they can be dissociated (Naccache, et al. 
2005). In this vein, Hebscher et al. (2015) recently demonstrated that deficits in metamemory 
monitoring were associated with damage to the ventromedial PFC, whereas deficits in control 
(e.g., withholding retrieved responses) were associated with damage to the orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC). Moreover, factors such as environmental cues have been posited to activate 
representations within the PFC that can drive action selection (see Miller & Cohen, 2001, for a 
review). Therefore, unique contributions of the PFC may be an essential determinant in 
controlling behavior within a metacognitive account of demand avoidance. Empirically 
exploring this notion represents a theoretically important issue for future investigations. 
A Role for Implicit Costs? 
Though much of the current discussion has focused on explicit demand costs in demand 
avoidance, one theoretical issue in need of addressing is the role of implicit costs in driving the 
behavior. Westbrook et al. (2015) note that, “Cost signals need not always be conscious to 
influence behavior, but they may become conscious when the costs are sufficiently high” (p. 
399). For example, Kool et al. (2010) reported effort avoidance for individuals who did not self-
report a difference between decks in the DST (though this proportion of individuals was 
relatively small). The opportunity cost model (Kurzban et al., 2013) would seem to suggest that 
such costs would not be expected to influence effort avoidance behaviors. That is, costs that are 
not “felt” would not be expected to affect decision-making. The influences of such implicit costs 




that the source of the cost signal would not necessarily need to be identifiable to drive demand 
avoidance. For example, if an individual perceives some difference in demand across conditions 
but cannot necessarily identify the source of the difference (e.g., differences in task switching), 
that individual may simply infer one alternative is more demanding relative to the other. 
Therefore, if cognitive demand carries a subjective cost (Kool & Botvinick, 2013; Westbrook & 
Braver, 2015), then robustly detailing what entails an implicit cost under this framework 
constitutes a significant issue to address.  
Variations in Judgments across Evaluation Modes 
 One potentially interesting finding emerging from the DST results in Chapter 1 is that, 
although selections in the task showed a qualitatively similar pattern of results relative to the 
subjective demand ratings reported in Experiment 3 in Dunn and Risko (2016), the effect of a 
rotated frame seemed to have a larger influence on selections relative to self-report ratings for 
arrays containing rotated frames (i.e., the UW-RF and RW-RF arrays). For example, in 
Experiment 3 the difference in the number of selections between the UW-RF array and the RW-
UF array was smaller than the reported effect sizes for the same arrays in self-reported subjective 
ratings3. That is, the difference in selections between the UW-RF and RW-UF arrays seems less 
than subjective ratings would predict. In addition, when considering the RW-RF and RW-UF 
comparison, the difference in selections was larger in Experiment 3 relative to the average effect 
for this comparison reported in self-reported subjective ratings. Again, within this comparison 
group individuals selected the array with the rotated frame (RW-RF) more often than what 
                                                
3 Experiment 1 shows a similar pattern for this comparison group (d = .37) relative to 
Experiment 3, however selections decrease in this context given selections in the free-choice 
DST represents an avoidance of demand as opposed to selecting which option is more 
demanding. The same holds true for the RW-RF and RW-UF comparison in Experiments 1 (d = 




subjective ratings would predict. In both cases, the existence of an array with a rotated frame 
increased the likelihood of selections of that array relative to other arrays. 
Why might the influence of a rotated frame have a larger effect on selections in the DST 
than it does on subjective ratings? General Evaluability Theory (GET; Hsee et al., 1999; Hsee & 
Zhang, 2010; Hsee, 1996) hypothesizes important differences in reported subjective value across 
single and joint evaluation modes. The joint evaluation mode represents instances where items 
are juxtaposed and evaluated comparatively. Joint evaluation is most associated with subjective 
values generated during the decision-making stage of choice. In contrast, single evaluation mode 
represents instances where items are evaluated in isolation and are associated with the experience 
stage of a decision (Hsee et al., 2013). Critically, GET predicts differences in evaluations (e.g., 
ratings or choices) across the two modes when a level of one factor is inherently inevaluable 
relative to another level. This “low-evaluability” level holds little prominence (e.g., low ratings) 
within single evaluation contexts, but becomes more evaluable (e.g., high ratings) during joint 
evaluation when contrasted with another level of a factor. For example, Hsee (1996) 
demonstrated that individuals evaluating two candidates for a computer programmer position 
favored the candidate with a higher GPA in single evaluation, but in joint evaluation reversed 
their preferences opting for the individual with more experience. Hsee (1996) concludes that the 
participants offering evaluations possessed richer knowledge concerning GPA relative to 
programming experience. 
Within the current context, one can conceive of rotated frames in multi-element arrays as 
inherently inevaluable relative to rotated words. Specifically, in single evaluation (i.e., subjective 
ratings on a likert-type scale), arrays containing rotated words (RW-RF and RW-UF) produced 




evaluation, rotated words are more salient. In joint evaluation, however, rotated frames become 
more evaluable when contrasted with rotated words, and selections increase for those arrays (i.e., 
RW-RF and UW-RF) relative to rotated words only (RW-UF). Hence, a type of quantitative shift 
was observed for rotated frames across single and joint evaluations for subjective judgments.  
This distinction between single and joint evaluation modes, together with the associated 
possible variations in judgments and choices, represent potentially important issues moving 
forward. First, individuals in trade-off contexts may more often select option X in a free-choice 
context suggesting that option X is the least demanding of the alternatives, but they may 
subsequently self-report (i.e., using likert-type scales) selections from X as being more 
demanding relative to the available alternative Y, thus demonstrating a type of demand seeking 
behavior (i.e., mischoice; Hsee & Zhang, 2010). Second, this approach may provide useful 
insight into the inherent evaluability of specific types of perceived demand (i.e., perception, 
memory). Specifically, investigating differences across evaluation modes may provide a clearer 
picture of how domain-specific demands are weighted and contribute to general metacognitive 
evaluations.  
Conclusion  
The framework developed in Chapter 1 makes clear that understanding demand-based 
decision-making will be critically dependent on understanding metacognitive evaluations of 
demand. In particular, on a metacognitive account, these evaluations play a causal role in the 
control of effort avoidance behaviors. Despite the importance of subjective demand to such 
decisions gaining in prominence (e.g., Kool & Botvinick, 2013; Westbrook & Braver, 2015; 
Westbrook, Kester, & Braver, 2013) there remains much work to be done. The present work has 





Results from Chapter 1 are consistent with the hypothesis that individuals utilize 
available cues to generate their perceptions of effort and to guide choices in a DST, as opposed 
to indexing their performance. The aim of Chapter 2 is to extend this cue utilization account of 
how individuals generate their notion of effort. Specifically, I introduced demands on executive 
control, alongside demands on performance, as an additional source of information that 
individuals may use to generate their perceptions of effort. These two potential determinants 
were contrasted with the potential contribution of a salient effort cue that demands little in terms 
of executive control and is associated with relatively low performance demands, to determine 
which form of information drives decisions in an effort minimization context. 
 
The following work is currently under revision at the Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance (Dunn & Risko, submitted). 













The idea that humans adapt their behavior in an attempt to avoid effort is indeed 
pervasive (e.g., Clark, 2010; Rosch, 1998; Solomon, 1948; Zipf, 1949). Given the driving role 
that effort avoidance is purported to play in our day-to-day lives, understanding how individuals 
decide which course of action is the least effortful – a seeming pre-requisite for successful effort 
avoidance – is critical. To this end, in the present chapter I consider three theoretical proposals 
regarding the information on which effort-based decisions may be made: time, demands placed 
on the executive control system, and available effort cues. 
Avoiding Cognitive Effort 
 Understanding what individuals are minimizing when they attempt to minimize effort has 
been arguably dominated by two influential ideas. The first is that individuals look to minimize 
time (e.g., Gray & Boehm-Davis, 2000; Gray & Fu, 2004; Gray, Sims, Fu, & Schoelles, 2006; 
Maglio, Wenger, & Copeland, 2008; Morgan, Patrick, Waldron, King, & Patrick, 2009; Siegler 
& Lemaire, 1997), and the second is that individuals minimize the level of demand placed on the 
executive control system (e.g., Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Kool et al., 2010; Kurzban, 
Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013; Westbrook & Braver, 2016; Yeung & Monsell, 2003).  
According to accounts arguing that time acts as a key determinant in effort-based 
decisions, individuals will minimize effort by selecting the course of action that will take the 
least amount of time (while maintaining an acceptable level of performance/reward). For 
example, according to the Soft-constraints Hypothesis (Gray et al., 2006) individuals select 
courses of action that tend to minimize performance costs in terms of time. On this account, the 
cognitive system assigns no privileged status amongst different types of effort, such as 
perceptual-motor effort (e.g., making eye movements) or memorial effort (e.g., retrieving an item 




this idea, Gray and Fu (2004) demonstrated that individuals become increasingly likely to opt for 
a less accurate memory-based strategy as the time costs associated with a more accurate 
perceptual-motor strategy increase. In a similar vein, Siegler and Lemaire (1997) demonstrated 
that when individuals had a free choice between different multiplication strategies, the relative 
speed of strategies was the best predictor of what strategy would be deployed. 
In addition to time playing a determining role in effort avoidance, several accounts of 
behavioral control argue that, when faced with a choice between different courses of action, 
individuals will minimize their effort by selecting an alternative that will put fewest demands on 
the executive control system (while maintaining an acceptable level of performance/reward). For 
example, Botvinick and Braver (2015) tie effort to the engagement of the executive control 
system spanning the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dPFC), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and 
intraparietal cortex. Specifically, tasks that engage the processes associated with control (i.e., the 
sets of superordinate functions that encode and maintain representations and feed to subordinate 
processes) are closely tied with cognitive effort (Botvinick & Braver, 2015). 
Within an opportunity cost framework of effort, Kurzban and colleagues (2013) have 
argued that tasks that are associated with utilizing a wide range of cognitive processes, such as 
those requiring high levels of executive control (e.g., the Stroop, Simon, or Flanker tasks), are 
associated with higher levels of subjective effort. Thus, such tasks would be expected to be 
avoided during decision-making when alternative lines of action are available. Consistent with 
this idea, when individuals were free to choose between alternative line of actions, Kool et al. 
(2010) found that individuals avoided options associated with a higher probability of a task 
switch (i.e., the option that placed higher demands on executive control) relative to an alternative 




on executive control). Importantly, though, in many cases increasing demands on the executive 
control system also increases the time associated with completing the task. Kool et al. (2010) 
additionally demonstrated that individuals would avoid demands on executive control at the cost 
of greater time spent, a result consistent with demands on executive control making a unique 
contribution to effort avoidance behavior beyond time demands at least in that experimental 
context. 
Beyond Time and Executive Control 
 While the influence of both time and executive control demands on effort avoidance have 
shared support from a number of domains, recent evidence has suggested the need for a broader 
framework when examining such decisions. Specifically, Chapter 1 demonstrated that effort-
based preferences can be dissociated from effort measured both with traditional performance 
measures such as time and accuracy, and with a physiological measure of demand indexed by 
blink rate. I argued that this dissociation was inconsistent with time and likely demands on the 
executive control system as well (i.e., there was no a priori reason to expect that options varied 
on demands on executive control) being solely responsible for effort-based decisions. An 
account was suggested wherein choosing the least effortful course of action is conceived of as a 
kind of inference based on available effort cues (see similarly Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 
1993). This account draws largely from cue-utilization models of metamemory judgments that 
attribute judgments to inferential or heuristic processes based on a variety of cues (Koriat, 1997) 
rather than on direct access to memory traces (e.g., King, Zechmeister, & Shaughnessy, 1980; 
Schwartz, 1994). For example, Koriat (1997) argued that individuals’ judgments of learning 
(JOLs) were based on a variety of extrinsic, intrinsic, and mnemonic cues (e.g., repetition, 




of memory traces. In support of this view, Castel (2008) demonstrated that individuals utilize 
cues pertaining to serial position of words in a memory task in generating their JOLs when such 
cues were made salient. Other cues purported to support metamemory judgments include, for 
example, font size (Rhodes & Castel, 2008), memorization effort (Koriat, Ma’ayan, & 
Nussinson, 2006), and presentation time (Mazzoni, Cornoldi, & Marchitelli, 1990). Thus, in the 
context of effort avoidance, individuals would be expected to utilize a variety of “effort cues” 
(e.g., the orientation of a stimulus to be named; Chapter 1; Dunn & Risko, 2015) rather than 
directly assessing levels of demand when attempting to minimize effort.   
Although a cue-utilization account need not deny the influence of time or demands on 
executive control for effort-based decisions, the shift in perspective offered by a cue-utilization 
account moves to center stage the need to understand the cues that individuals use and the 
inferences/heuristics that they employ when making effort-based decisions. It also draws 
attention to the fact that effort-based decisions will be subject to systematic biases, for example, 
the influence of misleading cues or intuitive theories pulled from past-experience (Dunn & 
Risko, 2016; Koriat, 1997; 2007). Critically, it is proposed that these cues drive the evaluation of 
effort generally (Chapter 1, see also Epstein, 2000; Mangan, 2001), incorporating several types 
of information such as expected performance (Whittlesea, 2003) or processing fluency (Reber, 
Fazendeiro, & Winkielman, 2002). As an illustration, within the context of metamemory 
judgments, Rhodes and Castel (2008) found that individuals assigned higher JOLs to items that 
were presented in larger fonts although there was no evidence of a relation between font size and 
recall. Similarly, Castel and colleagues (2012) found that individuals assigned higher JOLs when 
asked to say “YES” to specific items that were to-be-remembered (i.e., a variant of the 




Thus, in both cases, individuals were exploiting putatively misleading or superficial cues in 
generating their JOL rather than directly monitoring memory strength. Applying the cue-
utilization account to effort avoidance then carries over the expectation that effort-based 
decisions will deviate from effort as indexed by performance (Chapter 1; Kool et al., 2010; 
Westbrook, Kester, & Braver, 2013) as well as from demands placed on the executive control 
system (McGuire & Botvinick, 2010). 
Present Investigation  
In Chapter 2, I contrasted the influence of time and demands on the executive control 
system against the influence of a salient effort cue using variants of the free-choice demand 
selection task often used in investigations of effort-based decision-making (DST; Botvinick & 
Rosen, 2009; Gold et al., 2014; Kool et al., 2010; McGuire & Botvinick, 2010). This particular 
strategy was selected to provide a strong test of a cue-utilization account. That is, by contrasting 
the contributions of two factors thought to heavily drive effort-based decision-making against the 
contribution of putatively misleading cues, I can determine the utility of more seriously 
considering the latter as a major contributor in this experimental context. That said, it is 
important to note that the goal here is not to falsify time or executive control as being important 
factors in effort-based decision-making. Rather, the goal in Chapter 2 is to provide positive 
evidence for cue utilization by generating directly competing alternatives hypotheses. 
Across the three experiments in Chapter 2, in a given block of trials, individuals were 
presented with a pair of tasks consisting of a high- and a low-demand option, where one option 
took longer and placed more demands on the executive control system relative to the alternative 
option. Participants were first given experience with each option (i.e., they were forced to select 




preference. Performance on these “forced” trials provides an index of each option’s effort. 
Importantly, “effort” here is defined as the demands associated with a line of action by way of a 
direct measure of time and an indirect measure of demands on executive control through the 
proportion of task switching (see below). Participants’ choices on the “free” trials provide an 
index of their effort avoidance. Unlike previous research using the demand selection paradigm, 
the addition of an initial forced familiarization stage with each option should provide individuals 
ample opportunity to differentiate the different options. Furthermore, given that individuals’ 
preferences in free-choice contexts can be considered to be constructed on-the-fly and labile 
(Payne et al., 1993; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006), directed instructions with regard to generating 
a less-effortful preference (see similarly Gold et al., 2014) gives a strong indication of how each 
manipulation may affect individuals’ effort-based decisions. Specifically, participants should be 
biased toward selecting the low demand option to the extent that they perceive a difference in 
effort between the two options. By explicitly instructing participants to make decisions based on 
effort, the potential noise associated with eliciting preference-based choices (which has been 
utilized in previous iterations of the DST, Gold et al., 2014, Experiment 1; Kool et al., 2010) can 
be minimized. 
The critical manipulation in the present experiments is the nature of the factor that 
differentiates the low- and high-demand options in each pair presented to participants. In 
Experiment 4, two different pairs of options were used. The first pair of options differed in 
whether a to-be-identified stimulus was rotated or not (i.e., the rotation pair). The time costs of 
rotation on object identification are small (e.g., Jolicoeur, 1990) and arguably place minimal 
demands on executive control. Critically, stimulus rotation represents a salient effort cue. That is, 




define salience specifically as the extent to which individuals are aware of either the rotation or 
the switching cue. To specifically index awareness, individuals completed a self-report 
questionnaire (see below) aimed at gauging awareness of effort cues and explicit strategies 
employed (similar to that employed by Kool et al., 2010, Experiment 1).  
In the second pair, the options differed in the probability of a task switch (i.e., the 
switching pair; 90% vs. 10%). Task switching is often associated with a large time cost (e.g., 
Monsell, 2003), and is a representative task that engages the putatively effortful processes 
associated with executive control (Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Botvinick & Rosen, 2009; Kool et 
al., 2010; McGuire & Botvinick, 2010). Nonetheless, recent research suggests that the 
probability of a task switch appears to be a relatively “poor” effort cue. Individuals will often not 
avoid options associated with more frequent switching even with large differences in the 
probability of a task switch (i.e., 90% vs. 10%) and in the associated time costs and demands on 
executive control. For example, although Kool et al. (2010) demonstrated effort avoidance for 
low- and high-demand options consisting of a 10% and a 90% probability of a task switch 
respectively, Gold and colleagues (2014) failed to replicate these results and were only able to 
demonstrate similar patterns of effort avoidance using the same probabilities when individuals 
were explicitly instructed that a difference existed across alternatives. That is, they tended not to 
notice unless told to look for a difference. This lack of awareness occurs despite the large 
observed costs of increases in the proportion of a task switch and arguably reflects (among other 
possibilities) the fact that (a) task switching consists of a relation between consecutive trials, and 
(b) individuals are often unaware of even rather large manipulations of the proportion of a given 
trial type (e.g., Risko & Stolz, 2014; Schmidt, Crump, Cheesman & Besner, 2007). While 




on performance and theoretically can be tied directly to increased demands of the executive 
control system (Monsell, 2003). Indeed, in Kool et al.’s (2010) influential work demonstrating 
the avoidance of cognitive demand, proportion of switches was one of the central manipulations. 
It is important to note that, given the specific task switching manipulation used in the 
present context, the time and demands on executive control accounts will largely make the same 
predictions. Contrasting these two contributions has been the focus of other work (Kool et al., 
2010). That said, in addition to contrasting overall performance across different proportions of 
task switching, I also compare the magnitude of the switch cost across these conditions. In their 
Experiment 3, Kool and colleagues (2010) reported smaller switch cost in a condition with a 
higher probability of a task switch despite performance overall being poorer in that condition 
relative to a condition with a lower probability of a task switch. This likely represents a type of 
preparation effect (Monsell, 2003) provided the variation in the likelihood of a task switch. 
Importantly, participants avoided the option with a high proportion of switches and lower switch 
cost and not the option with a low proportion of switches and an associated larger switch cost. 
Thus, I report switch costs as another potential executive demand to further explore. 
From the perspective of time and overall demands on executive control driving effort 
avoidance, I would expect to observe higher rates of effort avoidance (i.e., a stronger bias toward 
the low demand option) in the switching pair relative to the rotation pair. On the other hand, 
from a cue-utilization perspective, saliency of the effort cue should contribute to effort-based 
decisions and be signaled by rates of effort avoidance equivalent or greater for the rotation pair 





Here the “deck” is strongly stacked against the rotation pair generating much in the way 
of effort avoidance behavior relative to the switching pair provided that the switching pair 
features two options that will differ strongly in terms of time (i.e., hundreds of milliseconds) and 
demands on executive control (i.e., almost no task switching vs. task switching nearly every 
trial). Based on time and demands on executive control being the driving determinant within this 
context, there should be high rates of effort avoidance particularly given that I asked individuals 
to make their choices based on effort. In the rotation pair, the tasks should differ little in terms of 
time and arguably will not differ in terms of demands on executive control, barring the claim that 
the processes involved in dealing with modest stimulus rotation places higher demands on the 
executive control system than the processes involved in task switching. Against this clear 
difference in relative time and executive control demands, the rotation pair features only a salient 
effort cue (i.e., stimulus rotation). Considering the strong evidence that time and demands on 
executive control can drive effort-based decisions, positive evidence for the cue-utilization 
account in this context would represent strong support for that approach to understanding effort 





 Thirty-six University of Waterloo undergraduate students participated in the study in 
exchange for research credit. Sample size was estimated (Power = .8, α = .05) from a pilot study 
suggesting a moderate effect in low-demand selections across the rotation and switching pairs (d 




One participant was unable to satisfy the practice criterion outlined below and a program issue 
caused no switch trials to be delivered to another participant for the low-demand option, thus 
their data are not included in the following analyses (N = 34). 
Design 
  A 2 (Pair of Alternatives: Rotation Pair, Switching Pair) x 2 (Demand Option: Low 
Demand, High Demand) within-subjects design was employed. 
Apparatus 
The DST was programmed in MATLAB using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions 
(Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et al, 2007). Stimuli were presented on a 24” LCD monitor 
approximately 70 cm away from the participant. Participants used a standard optical mouse to 
provide responses. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli employed followed Kool et al. (2010; Experiment 3) and Gold et al. (2014; 
see Figure 7)4. For each pair of alternatives, individuals were presented with two options, a low-
demand and a high-demand option (the relative demand was not communicated to participants), 
to the left and right of the center of the screen. Once the mouse was placed over a target centered 
between the two options, both pairs were activated for selection. Individuals were then free to 
move the mouse over an option to reveal a colored digit, either blue or yellow, to which a 
response was to be made.  
                                                




When digits (1, 4, 7, & 8)5 were colored blue, individuals were tasked with making a 
magnitude judgment (i.e., greater than or less than) with five as the reference number. When 
digits were colored yellow, individuals were tasked with making a parity judgment (i.e., odd or 
even). The left mouse button served as a less than five or odd response; the right mouse button 
served as a greater than five or even response. For the rotation pair, the low-demand option 
consisted of all upright digits (0°), whereas the high-demand option consisted of all digits rotated 
±90°, with both options associated with a 50% probability of a task switch. For the switching 
pair, the low-demand option consisted of a 10% probability of a task switch whereas the high-
demand option consisted of a 90% probability of a task switch, with digits always presented 
upright for both options.  
Procedure 
Individuals entered the testing room and provided informed consent. First, for individuals 
to gain sufficient experience with task response mappings, a practice session consisting of three 
blocks with feedback was completed. Individuals were required to reach a minimum accuracy of 
90% in the last practice session prior to moving on to the main experiment. Instructions for the 
DST stated that individuals were to complete 3 blocks in the experiment for each pair of 
alternatives. To provide experience with the relative demand within each pair, the first two 
blocks constituted forced-choice instructions where a small cue displayed above one of the two 
options signaled that the individual was to choose only from that cued option. The starting option 
to be sampled from was randomized and counterbalanced. Once the first cued option was 
                                                
5 In both Kool et al. (2010) and Gold et al. (2014), the digit set included 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9. 
However, during debriefing sessions of the pilot study, individuals often stated that the 6 and 9 
digits were indistinguishable in the rotated conditions, therefore they were removed from the 
digit set for the current experiments. Removal of these digits also caused a need to remove an 






finished being sampled from for 50 trials, the cue would then move to the other option where 
individuals would sample for 50 trials. Critically, the third block constituted the free-choice 
portion of the experiment. Individuals were instructed that that they may have noticed 
differences between the options after the first two blocks, and that some individuals begin to feel 
that one option is more effortful than the other. For this block, individuals were explicitly told to 
attempt to develop a preference about which option they felt was the least effortful of the two 
and to continue to choose that option until the block was complete (see Gold et al., 2014 for a 
similar approach). Individuals were randomly assigned to an order (i.e., rotation pair first, 





















Figure 7.  
Example DST in the Rotation Pair Condition 
 
Note: In the first block, participants were cued to select one option by a small circle placed above 
the to-be-selected option. In the second block, the cue moved to the opposing option where 
individuals completed an additional 50 trials. The order of the first two blocks was randomized. 
In the third block, a circle was placed above both options indicating that the participant was to 
attempt to generate a least-effortful preference for one of the options and to continue to select 
that option until the block was complete. Each of the options was either a low-demand or a high-
demand option. The rotation pair used in Experiments 4 and 5 is displayed in the figure where 
the low demand option consisted of upright digits and the high demand option consisted of 
rotated digits. In the switching pair (not shown), the low demand option consisted of a lower 
likelihood of switching (i.e., 10% Experiment 4; 30% Experiment 5) and the high demand option 
consisted of a higher likelihood of switching (i.e., 90% Experiment 4; 70% Experiment 5). In 
Experiment 6, the low demand option consisted of digits rotated 90° with a 30% probability of 
switching whereas the high demand option consisted of digits rotated 15° with a 70% probability 
of switching. 
 
At the end of the DST, individuals completed a self-report questionnaire similar to that 
reported in Kool et al. 2010 (pp. 668) which included questions regarding whether individuals 
felt that they had constructed a less-effortful preference, what that preference was based on, 
whether a noticeable difference was apparent across options, and whether individuals were 




added assessing how confident (from 0% to 100%) individuals were in the belief that there was 
some difference across options (see Appendix A). The entire experiment took approximately 45 
minutes to complete. 
Results 
Results are reported first for RTs for task responses, switch costs (following Kool et al., 
2010), and accuracy, followed by the DST (see Table 2) and self-report data. All effect sizes 
associated with within-subjects comparisons are Cohen’s d using SDavg as the standardizer term 
(see Cumming, 2012, p. 291) and all reported 95% confidence intervals (CI) are bootstrapped 
bias-corrected and accelerated (BCa) intervals (DiCiccio & Efron, 1996). To supplement 
inferential statistics, Bayesian estimation analyses were conducted on selections in the DST and 
RT using the BEST package (Kruschke, 2014) in R (R Core Team, 2014) using 100,000 
estimates of the effect size across groups using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling. 
Ninety-five percent Highest Density Intervals (HDI), as well as the simulated mode effect size 
(i.e., the maximum a posteriori estimate; MAP) are presented. In addition, Bayes Factors (BF) 
computed using the BayesFactor package (Morey & Rouder, 2015) in R are presented. 
Interpretation of BFs follows the criteria outlined by Kass and Raftery (1995). In addition, any 
manual response times faster than 200 ms would be removed for all RT analyses.  
Performance 
No manual RTs were faster than 200 ms. Grand mean outlier and by-subject within 
condition outlier analyses were conducted on raw RTs using a 2.5 standard deviation cut-off 
VanSelst & Jolicoeur, 1994) in both cases and resulted in the removal of approximately 6% of 




Performance. Accuracy did not vary as a function of pairs or demand option (all F’s < 
1.33).  With respect to task RTs at the block level, a 2 (Pair of Alternatives) x 2 (Demand 
Option) repeated measures ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of pair of 
alternatives, F(1, 33) = 7.77, MSE = 29979.34, η2p = .19, p < .001, and demand option, F(1, 33) 
= 73.98, MSE = 14453.64, η2p = .69, p < .001, as well as a pair x demand option interaction, F(1, 
33) = 20.96, MSE = 18496.28, η2p = .39, p < .001. The difference in response time between the 
low and high demand option (i.e., the demand effect) for the rotation pair (M = 71 ms, SD = 155) 
was significantly smaller than for the switching pair, (M = 284 ms, SD = 204), MDiff = 213 ms, 
t(33) = 4.56, SE = 45.36, d = 1.19, 95% BCa CI [121 ms, 304 ms], p < .001. Aligned with the 
reported inferential statistics, Bayesian analyses demonstrated strong evidence for the alternative 
(i.e., that there is a difference between means), MAP = .79, 95% HDI [.38, 1.19], BFALT = 
380.87.  
Next for switch costs, a 2 (Pair of Alternatives) x 2 (Demand Option) x 2 (Switch Trial) 
repeated measures ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of demand option, F(1, 33) = 
24.91, MSE = 31387.63, η2p = .43, p < .001, a significant main effect of switch trial, F(1, 33) = 
26.41, MSE = 51295.65, η2p = .45, p < .001, a significant demand option x switch trial 
interaction, F(1, 33) = 6.46, MSE = 17906.98, η2p = .16, p = .02, and a significant pair of 
alternatives x demand option x switch trial interaction, F(1, 33) = 9.57, MSE = 27693.48, η2p = 
.23, p < .01. To further examine this three-way interaction, switch costs (i.e., switch trials – no 
switch trials) were computed for each demand option within the rotation and switching pairs. 
Pairwise comparisons demonstrated that switch costs within the rotation pair did not differ across 
the low demand (M = 110 ms, SD = 184) and high demand (M = 152 ms, SD = 174) options, 




.24, 95% HDI [-.13, .69], BFNULL = 3.17. In contrast, higher switch costs for the low demand (M 
= 255ms, SD = 319) relative to the high demand (M = 48 ms, SD = 174) option, were 
demonstrated within the switching pair, MDiff = 42 ms, t(33) = 3.35, SE = 61.49, d = .67, 95% 
BCa CI [82 ms, 333 ms], p < .01, MAP = .58, 95% HDI [.20, .96], BFALT = 16.96. 
Thus, the difference in task RTs between the low and high demand options in the 
switching pair was significantly larger (about 3x) than in the rotation pair. In contrast, for the 
rotation pair the average switch costs for the high-demand option was similar to that for the low-
demand option, whereas for the switching pair, the low-demand option produced higher average 
switch costs relative to the high-demand option. The latter interaction likely reflects the fact that 
the high-demand option in the switching pair featured frequent switching whereas switching was 
relatively rare in the low demand condition. Indeed, Kool and colleagues (2010) reported a 
similar finding in their Experiment 3, and smaller switch costs associated with a higher 
probability of a switch trial may therefore represent a type of preparation effect (Monsell, 2003) 
given the experience afforded to individuals for each block.  
If individuals are utilizing the salient effort cue associated with stimulus rotation, then I 
should observe higher rates of low-demand options for the rotation pair relative to the switching 
pair. Alternatively, if time and overall demands on executive control are driving effort-based 
decisions in the DST, then there should be a corresponding difference in terms of the selection of 
the low and high demand options in the DST. That is, there should be a stronger bias toward the 
low demand option in the switching pair than in the rotation pair. Last, if relative switch costs are 
driving selections in the DST, then I should observe similar frequencies of selections across 




the switching pair (i.e., individuals should avoid the low-demand option associated with high 
average switch costs). 
Table 2.  
Demand Selection Task and Mean Performance Results for Experiments 4 and 5 
 






Demand Selection Task  
 Individuals chose the low-demand option in the rotation pair 67% of the time (SD = 
37%). This value significantly differed from chance and demonstrated positive evidence for the 
alternative (i.e., low-demand selections were greater than chance), t(33) = 2.62, SE = .06, d = 
.45, 95% BCa CI [53%, 70%], p = .013, MAP = .47, 95% HDI [.09, .90], BFALT = 3.44. 
Individuals chose the low-demand option for the switching pair 62% of the time (SD = 39%). 
This value did not significantly differ from chance and did not demonstrate evidence for either 
the null or the alternative, t(33) = 1.71, SE = .10, d = .29, 95% BCa CI [49%, 74%], p = .1, 
MAP = .30, 95% HDI [-.05, .70], BFALT = .68. Low-demand choices across pairs did not 
significantly differ, MDiff = 5%, t(33) = .64, SE = .08, d = .14, 95% BCa CI [-9%, 2%], p > .1, 
and provided evidence for the null, MAP d = .07, 95% HDI [-.30, .44], BFNULL = 4.51.  
Thus, effort avoidance was similar across the rotation and switching pairs, despite the 
fact that the difference in terms of time and overall demand on executive control was much 
greater in the switching pair than in the rotation pair (see Figure 8)6. Furthermore, if I redefine 
demands on executive control as the magnitude of the switch cost across options, this does not 
change the conclusion. The differences in switch cost between options was much greater in the 
switching pair (larger switch cost in the low demand option with infrequent switching) than in 
                                                
6 In addition to these analyses, non-parametric tests were conducted on rates of low-demand 
selections. Wilcoxon Signed-rank tests confirmed the parametric and Bayesian analyses in that 
low-demand selections for the rotation decks differed from chance, p = .02, whereas low-
demand selections for the switching decks did not, p > .1. Furthermore, treating individuals 
dichotomously as “avoiders” within each deck type (i.e., greater than 50% low-demand 
selections) demonstrated that 68% of individuals fell into the “avoider” category for the rotation 
decks, binomial test against chance, p = .058, whereas 66% of individuals fell into the category 
for the switching decks, p = .12. Importantly, however, dichotomizing individuals into these 
categories can be argued to be too conservative given that individuals with selections near 





the rotation pair, and effort avoidance went in the direction opposite that predicted pattern in the 
former pair (i.e., participants selected the low demand option/high switch cost option as the least 
effortful more often). Furthermore, in the rotation pair there was no difference in the magnitude 
of the switch cost but there was a marked difference in low effort selections. 
 
Figure 8.  




Note: The left panel consists of the percentage of selections of the low-demand options for each 
pair. The right panel consists of the demand effect in RT (i.e., high-demand option minus low-
demand option) for each pair. Error bars in the left panel represent 95% Bias-corrected and 
accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals. Error bars in the right panel represent 95% within-







One individual was unable to complete the self-report portion of the experiment (N = 33 
for the following analyses). Considering all individuals, 79% (26) reported noticing some 
difference across options for the rotation pair and 70% (23) reported noticing some difference for 
the switching pair, Sign Test p > .1. Likewise, self-reported confidence in reporting noticing a 
difference across options was similar for the rotation pair (M = 82%, SD = 20%) and the 
switching pair (M = 76%, SD = 21%), MDiff = 6%, t(31) = 1.52, SE = .04, d = .28, 95% BCa CI [-
1%, 13%], p > .1. Sixty-one percent of individuals (20) reported that they became explicitly 
aware of a difference in switching across the options in the switching pair, Binomial Test, p > .1 
(participants were not explicitly asked about stimulus rotation). Sixty-four percent of individuals 
(21) explicitly reported stimulus rotation as the determinant of their preference for the rotation 
pair relative to only 33% (11) of individuals explicitly reporting differences in the probability of 
switching as the determinant of their preference for the switching pair, Sign Test p = .031. 
Consistent with effort avoidance rates being similar in Experiment 1, individuals reported 
noticing “some” difference (and confidence in that difference) in effort across the low and high 
demand options at about the same rate across the rotation and switching pairs. Interestingly, in 
the rotation pair, individuals were more likely to say that stimulus rotation was the basis of their 
preference than individuals in the switching pair were to say that the high rate of task switching 







Table 3.  
Self-report Data for Experiment 4 
 
Discussion 
 In Experiment 4, the low- and high-demand options in the switching pair were associated 
with a greater difference in task RTs within block and theoretically a greater difference in 
demand on executive control than in the rotation pair. Nevertheless, individuals avoided the high 
demand option in the rotation pair (i.e., the 90° rotated stimulus) at a rate similar to the high 
demand option in the switching pair (i.e., a 90% chance of a task switch; see Figure 8). From a 
cue-utilization perspective, this result can be seen to reflect the influence of the salient effort cue 
in the rotation pair (i.e., stimulus rotation). That is, the presence of this effort cue led to rates of 
effort avoidance equivalent to that produced by a large difference in time and demands on 
executive control. Given the central role that the latter two contributions have played in 
theoretical discussion of effort-based decision-making, this result provides strong support for a 
cue-based contribution. It is also important to note that while switch costs were similar across 




high-demand option for the switching pair. Yet in neither case did it appear that effort-based 
selection followed relative switch costs.  
Self-report data demonstrated that a 90° rotated stimulus and a high-probability of a task 
switch (i.e., 90% vs. 10%) evoked a similar level of subjective experience of relative 
effortfulness, consistent with the DST results. Again this is despite the large differences in time 
costs and demands on executive control. While individuals were equally likely to report “some” 
difference in effort between the pairs, more individuals reported stimulus rotation than task 
switching as the determinant of their choice. It may be the case that, although becoming aware of 
the switching cue, individuals did not endorse task switching as a source of effort to-be-avoided 
(e.g., Michaelian, 2012). For example, some individuals may not have garnered sufficient intra- 
or extra-experimental experience necessary to generate the belief that task switching is difficult. 
Alternatively, individuals may have experienced differences in effort across the options (e.g., 
Kurzban et al., 2013), but were unable to explicitly identify switching as the source of the 
difference.  
Experiment 5 
Experiment 5 looked to extend the results of Experiment 4 by reducing the difference in 
the probabilities of a task switch in the switching pair to 70% and 30% (from 90% vs. 10%) for 
the high- and low-demand options respectively. In Experiment 4, rates of effort avoidance for the 
switching pair were statistically similar to rates for the rotation pair. Critically, according to a 
cue-utilization account, if I were to reduce the putative salience of the effort cue in the switching 
pair (i.e., by reducing the difference in the proportion of switching), then low-demand selections 
should be reduced as well.  While I would also expect the difference in time and demand on 




unlikely to become less than that observed between options in the rotation pair. If I assume that 
the low-demand selections will remain similar in the rotation pair, then this raises the interesting 
possibility that individuals will avoid the high demand option in the rotation pair more than the 
high demand option in the switching pair, despite the difference in time and demand on 
executive control not being smaller in the latter than the former. 
Last, in Experiment 5, I looked to further gauge individuals’ explicit awareness of each of 
the effort cues. To do so, I added a self-report question allowing individuals to express what they 
believed the specific difference was (if any) across the options for both of the pairs (this was 
only done for the switching pair in Experiment 4).  
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty-six University of Waterloo undergraduate students participated in the study in 
exchange for research credit.  
Design 
 A 2 (Pair of Alternatives: Rotation Pair, Switching Pair) x 2 (Demand Option: Low 
Demand, High Demand) within-subjects design was employed. 
Apparatus 
 All apparatus were the same as Experiment 4. 
Stimuli 
For the rotation pair, the low-demand option consisted of all upright digits, whereas the 
high-demand option consisted of all digits rotated ±90°, and the probability of a task switch was 
reduced to 30% for both options. For the switching pair, the low-demand option consisted of a 




probability of a task switch, with digits always presented at ±15° for both options. The move to 
add 15° of rotation to the high-demand option was to ensure that both manipulations were 
crossed to some extent across the options (i.e., high-and-low degree of stimulus rotation, high-
and-low probability of switching).  
Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 4. However, the self-report questionnaire 
completed by individuals at the end of the DST was changed to include a free-response question 
asking what attribute of the task individuals felt the difference across options for each pair was 
(see Appendix B).  
Results 
All reporting procedures follow Experiment 4 (see Table 2). 
Performance 
One observation had a response faster than 200 ms and was removed. Grand mean outlier 
and by-subject within condition outlier analyses were conducted on raw RTs using a 2.5 standard 
deviation cut-off in both cases, resulted in the removal of approximately 6% of the trials.  
Performance. Again, accuracy did not vary as a function of pairs or demand option (all 
F’s < 1.15). With respect to block response time, a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA 
demonstrated a significant main effect of pairs of alternatives, F(1, 35) = 10.39, MSE = 32520.3, 
η2p = .23, p < .01, and demand option, F(1, 35) = 9.04, MSE = 21922.92, η2p = .21, p < .01, but 
not a significant pair x demand option interaction, F(1, 35) = 1.25, MSE = 9896.01, η2p = .04, p > 
.1. The difference between the low and high demand option for the rotation pair (M = 56 ms, SD 




MDiff  = 37 ms, t(35) = 1.12, SE = 32.05, d = .19, 95% BCa CI [-30 ms, 102 ms], p > .1. 
Similarly, Bayesian analyses demonstrated positive evidence for the null (i.e., the two demand 
differences are equivalent), MAP = .21, 95% HDI [-.15, .54], BFNULL = 3.13.  
Next for switch costs, a 2 (Pair of Alternatives) x 2 (Demand Option) x 2 (Switch Trial) 
repeated measures ANOVA demonstrated a significant main effect of pair, F(1, 35) = 5.30, MSE 
= 68533.83, η2p = .13, p = .027, a significant main effect of demand option, F(1, 35) = 4.59, MSE 
= 49135.36, η2p = .12, p = .039, and a significant main effect of switch trial, F(1, 35) = 51.62, 
MSE = 27007.58, η2p = .59, p < .001. Furthermore, a marginally significant pair x demand option 
x switch trial interaction was demonstrated, F(1, 35) = 4.06, MSE = 14357.99, η2p = .10, p = 
.052. Following Experiment 4, to examine this three-way interaction switch costs were computed 
for each demand option within the rotation and switching pairs. Pairwise comparisons 
demonstrated that switch costs within the rotation pair were similar across the low demand (M = 
141 ms, SD = 181) and high demand options (M = 181 ms, SD = 200), MDiff = 40 ms, t(33) = .97, 
SE = 39.35, d = .21, 95% BCa CI [-37 ms, 105 ms], p > .1, MAP = .24, 95% HDI [-.15, .60], 
BFNULL = 3.63. Similar switch costs for the low demand (M = 154 ms, SD = 217) relative to the 
high demand options (M = 80 ms, SD = 185), were demonstrated within the switching pair as 
well, MDiff = 74 ms, t(33) = 1.64, SE = 44.25, d = .37, 95% BCa CI [-3 ms, 159 ms], p > .1, MAP 
= .27, 95% HDI [.08, .63], BFNULL = 1.67. 
In contrast to Experiment 4, both the rotation and switching pairs demonstrated 
statistically similar differences between the low- and high-demand options. Furthermore, switch 
costs again were similar across options for the rotation pair, and larger in the low-demand option 
relative to the high-demand option for the switching pair. Again, if individuals are utilizing the 




demand options for the rotation pair relative to the switching pair. Alternatively, if time and 
overall demands on executive control are the determinant of choices in the DST, then there 
should be no difference in participants’ selections of the low demand option across the two pairs. 
Last, if switch costs are being avoided then I should see low-demand selections near chance for 
the rotation pair and higher high-demand selections for the switching pair. 
Demand Selection Task  
 Individuals chose the low-demand option in the rotation pair 72% of the time (SD = 
35%), and this value significantly differed from chance and demonstrated strong evidence for the 
alternative hypothesis (i.e., selections are greater than chance), t(35) = 3.85, SE = .06, d = .64, 
95% BCa CI [61%, 84%], p < .001, MAP = .57, 95% HDI [.36, 1], BFALT = 61.11. Individuals 
chose the low-demand option for the switching pair only 47% of the time (SD = 37%). This 
value did not significantly differ from chance and demonstrated positive evidence for the null 
(i.e., selections are equivalent to chance), t(35) = -.55, SE = .06, d = -.09, 95% BCa CI [35%, 
58%], p > .1, MAP = -.1, 95% HDI [-.43, .25], BFNULL = 4.86. In addition, low-demand choices 
across deck type differed significantly, MDiff = 25%, t(35) = 3.14, SE = .08, d = .72, 95% BCa CI 
[8%, 41%], p > .01, and provided positive evidence for the alternative, MAP = .51, 95% HDI 
[.17, .92], BFALT = 10.73. Therefore, despite equivalent demand effects in terms of time across 




option than for the switching options7 (see Figure 9). Furthermore, selections did not follow the 
pattern hypothesized by switch costs alone driving selections. 
 
Figure 9.  
Percentage of Low-Demand Selections and Demand Effect for Rotation and Switching Pairs in 
Experiment 5 
 
Note: The left panel consists of the percentage of selections of the low-demand options for each 
pair. The right panel consists of the demand effect in RT (i.e., high-demand option minus low-
demand option) for each pair. Error bars in the left panel represent 95% Bias-corrected and 
accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals. Error bars in the right panel represent 95% within-
subject confidence intervals (Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
 
 
                                                
7 Wilcoxon Signed-rank tests confirmed the parametric and Bayesian analyses in that low-
demand selections for the rotation decks differed from chance, p = .01, whereas low-demand 
selections for the switching decks did not, p > .1. Furthermore, 75% of individuals fell into the 
“avoider” category for the rotation decks, p < .01, whereas only 50% of individuals fell into the 





Considering all individuals, 92% (33) reported noticing some difference across options 
for the rotation pair whereas only 47% (17) reported noticing some difference for the switching 
pair, Sign Test p < .001. Fifty-six (20) percent of individuals explicitly reported that the 
difference across options for the rotation pair was stimulus rotation, whereas only 22% (8) 
explicitly reported switching as the difference across options for the switching pair, Sign Test p 
< .05. Last, 64% of individuals (23) explicitly reported stimulus rotation as the determinant of 
their preference for the rotation pair relative to only 22% (8) of individuals explicitly reporting 
differences in the probability of switching as the determinant of their preference for the 
switching pair, Sign Test p = .001. Thus, as opposed to Experiment 1, more individuals reported 
being aware of and utilizing the stimulus rotation cue relative to switching (see Table 4). 
Table 4.  






Combined Experiments 1 and 2 Analyses 
 In the following, I directly compare demand selection, demand costs, and self-reports in 
the switching pairs across the different probabilities of a task switch (i.e., Experiment 4: 90% vs. 
10% vs. Experiment 5: 70% vs. 30%).  For the switching pair, low-demand selections 
significantly declined from Experiment 4 (M = 69%, SD = 47%) to Experiment 5 (M = 47%, SD 
= 37%), MDiff = 22%, t(64.62) = 2.18, SE = .1, d = .52, 95% BCa CI [2%, 42%], p = .03. In 
addition, the demand effect across options significantly reduced from Experiment 4 (M = 289 
ms, SD = 218) to Experiment 5 (M = 93 ms, SD = 196), MDiff = 196 ms, t(69) = 3.98, SE = 
49.24, d = .94, 95% BCa CI [98ms, 294ms], p < .001. Last, considering individuals that reported 
becoming aware of some difference across options (this question was consistent across the 
experiments) 71% of individuals reported a difference in Experiment 4 relative to only 47% in 
Experiment 5, χ2(1) = 3.93, p = .05. Thus, reducing the difference in the probability of a task 
switch across experiments led to a smaller difference in demand across the high and low options, 
a reduced likelihood of noticing “some” difference in effort and a reduced likelihood of selecting 
the low demand option. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 5, the difference in the proportion of switching across the options in the 
switching pair was reduced. This led to a reduction in the difference in time across the low- and 
high-demand options such that the difference between the two options was statistically similar to 
the difference across the options in the rotation pair. Nonetheless, effort avoidance rates for the 
rotation pair were much higher than in the switching pair (see Figure 9). This dissociation was 
predicted based on a cue utilization account. Despite the equivalence in demand, the salient 




data from Experiment 2 are consistent with the interpretation provided of the dissociation 
observed. Individuals more frequently reported being aware of, and making use of, the rotation 
cue for their less-effortful choices even though differences in RTs between the low and high 
demand options across the switching and rotation pairs and demands on executive control in the 
former pair were similar. Overall, the results of Experiment 5 provide further support for cue-
utilization being a critical determinant in effort avoidance in situations where these three types of 
information (i.e., cues, time, and demands on EC) are available. 
Experiment 6 
To this point, I have relied on the relative rates of effort avoidance across the rotation and 
switching pairs to test the hypotheses derived at the outset. In Experiment 6, I pit the high-
demand options from each pair in Experiment 5 directly against one another. Participants 
selected between two alternatives: (1) a low probability of a task switch with the stimulus rotated 
90°, and (2) a high probability of a task switch with the stimulus rotated 15°. The first option 
should be both faster and less demanding on executive control than the second option, hence I 
refer to (1) as the low-demand option and (2) as the high-demand option. Thus, in this context, 
there is a direct trade-off between avoiding a high-demand option associated with higher time 
demands and demands on executive control, and avoiding a relatively low-demand option 
associated with a salient effort cue. Again, from a time and overall demands on executive control 
perspective, I would expect individuals to avoid the high-demand option. Alternatively, from a 
cue-utilization perspective, the effort cue associated with the low-demand option (i.e., stimulus 
rotation) should counteract this effect given the higher rates of awareness relative to the 




off situation would be signaled by equivalent selections across the two options or a bias to select 
the high-demand option.  
Method 
Participants 
 Thirty-six University of Waterloo undergraduate students participated in the study in 
exchange for research credit.  
Design 
  A one-factor (Demand Option: Low Demand, High Demand) within-subjects design was 
employed. 
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 
 All apparatus and stimuli were the same as Experiment 5. 
Results 
All reporting procedures follow Experiments 4 and 5 (see Table 5). 
Table 5.  
Demand Selection Task and Mean Performance Results for Experiment 6  
 





No RTs were faster than 200 ms. Grand mean outlier and by-subject within condition 
outlier analyses were conducted on raw RTs using a 2.5 standard deviation cut-off in both cases; 
this resulted in the removal of approximately 6% of the trials.  
Accuracy did not vary as a function of demand option (t = .42). RTs for the high-demand 
option (M = 1390 ms, SD = 312) were slower relative to the low-demand option, (M = 1266 ms, 
SD = 327), MDiff = 124 ms, t(35) = 2.85, SE = 41.9, d = .38, 95% BCa CI [45 ms, 205 ms], p < 
.01. Similarly, Bayesian analyses demonstrated positive evidence for the alternative, MAP = .49, 
95% HDI [.12, .91], BFALT  = 5.57.  
To examine switch costs, a 2 (Demand Option) x 2 (Switch Trial) repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted. Results demonstrated a significant main effect of switch trial, F(1, 35) 
= 29.57, MSE = 32597.23, η2p = .46, p < .001. The switch cost for the low-demand option (M = 
221 ms, SD = 254) was larger than the switch cost for the high demand option (M = 106 ms, SD 
= 258) producing a marginally significant demand option x switch trial interaction, F(1, 35) = 
3.62, MSE = 32789.90, d = .45, p = .066, MAP = .33, 95% HDI [-.03, .68], BFNULL = 1.11.  
Therefore, as expected, the option associated with a higher probability of a task switch 
was significantly slower than the option associated with a higher degree of stimulus rotation. If 
individuals are utilizing the salient effort cue associated with stimulus rotation, then I should 
observe higher rates of choices for the high-demand option (i.e., individuals will avoid the 
rotated stimulus). Alternatively, according to time and overall demands on executive control 





Demand Selection Task  
 Individuals chose the low-demand option in the rotation decks only 42% of the time (SD 
= 37%); this value did not significantly differ from chance, t(35) = -1.36, SE = .06, d = -.23, 
95% BCa CI [30%, 54%], p > .1, Bayesian analysis, MAP = -.24, 95% HDI [-.6, 1], BFALT = 
.41. In addition, I could test the hypothesis that low-demand selections were at or below chance 
(i.e., the negative interval -∞ < d  < 0, where 0 = chance, i.e., 50%, and d = the low-demand 
selection effect) relative to above chance (i.e., the positive interval 0 < d < +∞). Results 
demonstrated positive evidence for the alternative BFALT = 9.07. That is, selections occurred in 
the negative interval at or below chance. Indeed, the 95% HDI reported above [-.6, 1] lends 
additional evidence to this notion given that the majority of the simulated d distribution was 








                                                
8 Again, Wilcoxon Signed-rank tests confirmed the parametric and Bayesian analyses in that 
low-demand selections did not differ from chance, p > .1, and only 39% of individuals fell into 






Percentage of Low-Demand Selections and Demand Effect in Experiment 6 
 
Note: The left panel consists of the percentage of selections of the low-demand options for each 
pair. The right panel consists of the demand effect in RT (i.e., high-demand option minus low-
demand option) for each pair. Error bars in the left panel represent 95% Bias-corrected and 
accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals. Error bars in the right panel represent 95% within-
subject confidence intervals (Masson & Loftus, 2003). 
 
Self-Report 
 Sixty-nine (25) percent of all individuals reported noticing some difference across the 
low- and high-demand options, Binomial Test p = .029. Forty-four percent (16) of individuals 
explicitly reported that the difference across options was stimulus rotation, whereas only 8% (3) 
explicitly reported switching as the difference, Sign Test p < .01. Fifty percent of individuals 




6% (2) of individuals explicitly reporting differences in the probability of switching as the 
determinant of their preference, Sign Test p < .001 (see Table 6).  
Table 6. 
Self-report Data for Experiment 6 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 6, participants chose between a low-demand option consisting of a low 
probability of a task switch with the stimulus rotated 90° and a high-demand option (i.e., 
significantly slower and more demand on executive control) consisting of a high probability of a 
task switch with the stimulus rotated only 15°. Critically, results demonstrated that individuals 
did not avoid the high-demand option (see Figure 10). Experiment 6 therefore demonstrates the 
importance of effort cues in effort-based decision-making. That is, individuals did not avoid an 
option associated with greater time costs and greater demands on executive control when it was 
pitted against an option with a salient effort cue. Interestingly, the switch cost was higher for the 
low demand option as has been observed in previous experiments, thus one might suggest that 




and 5 together (and Kool et al., 2010; Experiment 3) suggest that this cost is unlikely to be the 
driver in selections.  
General Discussion 
Chapter 2 examined how individuals decide which course of action is the least effortful. 
To achieve this, using variants of the DST, I contrasted the influence of time and demands on the 
executive control system against the influence of a salient effort cue not associated with much in 
the way of either time or executive demands. All three experiments demonstrated clear evidence 
for the influence of a kind of cue utilization process in effort-based decision-making in the DST. 
In Experiment 4, individuals avoided the high-demand option associated with stimulus rotation 
at a rate similar to the high-demand option associated with a high probability of a task switch, 
even though the performance costs and demands on executive control in the switching pair were 
much greater than in the rotation pair. In Experiment 5, individuals avoided the high-demand 
option associated with stimulus rotation at a higher rate than the high-demand option associated 
with a high probability of a task switch, even though the performance costs across the pairs were 
similar (though the difference in demands on executive control likely still favored the switching 
pair). Last, in Experiment 6, individuals did not avoid the high-demand option associated with a 
high probability of a task switch when pitted against a low-demand option associated with a 
salient effort cue, again despite the former inducing significant performance costs and demands 
on executive control. The results observed here are all consistent with cue-utilization being an 
important determinant in effort avoidance behaviors. As such, the present results provide strong 





Cue-Utilization in Effort Avoidance 
A critical variable in effort-based decisions according to a cue-utilization account is the 
availability of cues and the inferences/heuristics applied to those cues when generating a 
subjective evaluation of effort. While Chapter 2 has focused on contrasting cue-utilization with 
time and overall demands on executive control, it is important to note that the current proposal 
does not make the claim that the latter two factors do not contribute to the control of behavior in 
effort avoidance. For example, if the option associated with a high proportion of switches was 
indicated to participants (or discovered spontaneously), then individuals should avoid that option 
assuming that they held or generated the belief that switching was effortful. The results of 
Experiments 4 and 5 are consistent with this notion. When the difference in the proportion of 
switching between options was 90%/10%, participants avoided the high demand option 
somewhat more than chance, but when it was reduced to 70%/30% they did not. That is, in 
certain situations, high demands on executive control (or time) can serve as salient cues 
exploited in the evaluation process. Thus, the cue-utilization approach does not preclude time or 
demands on executive control playing a role in effort-based decisions. Rather, cue-utilization 
simply predicts that individuals exploit available effort cues with the strongest (or most salient) 
cue being utilized to generate which option is more effortful. 
While the theoretical proposal that I offer here might appear counterintuitive in that 
individuals could often end up making non-optimal effort-based decisions (as they did for 
example in Experiment 6; also see below), it is important to note that effort avoidance is itself a 
potentially effortful task (Boureau, Sokol-Hessner, & Daw, 2015; Payne et al., 1993). That is, 
monitoring some veridical effort cost (i.e., which option takes longer, which option makes 




minimizing effort may place additional demands on the system beyond that of the task at hand. 
Both the time- and executive control-based accounts imply what could be argued to be a 
demanding monitoring process (e.g., Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013) to arrive at a least 
"effortful" solution. Exploiting a salient effort cue on the other hand arguably requires little in 
terms of processing. Similarly, Payne et al. (1993; see also Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) note 
that the deployment of a heuristic strategy such as cue utilization would be expected to be 
associated with a large savings in effort when contrasted with more normative strategies, 
especially in decision environments where effort minimization is emphasized. Reliance then on 
effort cues that might be detached from objective demand (i.e., the cognitive work taken on by 
the system) could itself be conceptualized as a least effort solution to the problem of selecting a 
least effort solution9. 
The results demonstrated across Chapter 2 additionally highlight the importance of the 
level of explicit availability of an effort cue in effort-based decision-making (Dunn et al., 2016). 
Cue-utilization predicts that optimal effort avoidance would only be expected in situations where 
cues associated with variations in objective effort (e.g., time, demands on executive control) 
across alternatives become available to the individual. That is, a demand cue (or cues) becomes 
explicit to the point that a qualitative judgment can be made in the decision-making process (i.e., 
“Option A is more effortful than Option B”). Effort avoidance would be expected to often follow 
objective demand in situations where tasks are structured in ways to facilitate such evaluations 
(e.g., explicit feedback, a large number of trials) or where a difference in some form of objective 
demand across alternatives is large. Dissociations between objective demand and effort 
avoidance, on the other hand, should occur in situations where differences in objective demand 
                                                




are present, but there is a lack of awareness of a cue highlighting such a difference (e.g., results 
from the switching pair in Experiment 2 and to some extent Experiment 1). Such a prediction is 
seemingly at odds with accounts suggesting that implicit costs or processes can influence control 
of behavior (e.g., Payne et al., 1993; Reber, 1989; Westbrook & Braver, 2015). Moreover, 
dissociations would be expected in situations where there are no differences in objective 
demands, however a salient cue leads to the inference that one option is more effortful than the 
other (see Chapter 1). 
Furthermore, situations can undoubtedly arise where the deployment of cue-utilization is 
overridden with other decision strategies (e.g., strategies that reduce objective demands). For 
example, within cost-benefit accounts of control, motivation plays a critical role in configuring 
behaviors (e.g., Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Braver et al., 2014, Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012). 
Inzlicht and colleagues (2014) argue that effortful tasks become aversive when motivation shifts 
away from goal-directed behavior associated with a task to engaging in cognitive leisure (i.e., 
disengaging; see also Kool & Botvinick, 2014). As an example, if motivation is specifically 
manipulated, perhaps through the use of incentives to monitor, identify, and complete a task at 
some level of accuracy, then deployment of a cue-utilization strategy in generating less-effortful 
preferences may vary relative to what was observed in the current experiments. Here, arguably 
the only extrinsic motivation present was the explicit instructions to participants to attempt to 
generate a less-effortful preference; a situation in which cue-utilization drove choices in the 
DST. Testing how manipulations of motivation and incentive modulate less-effortful choices 






Cue-Utilization as a Non-compensatory Strategy in Effort Avoidance 
The claim that effort-based decision making relies on effort cues to form a kind of 
metacognitive evaluation of effort raises important theoretical questions about potential 
competition between cues. One interesting issue to consider is whether effort-based decision-
making is best described as non-compensatory or compensatory (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; 
Payne et al., 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Non-compensatory decision strategies do not 
make trade-offs across attributes (i.e., these strategies do not incorporate an ability of a good 
value on one attribute to make up for a bad value on another attribute) whereas compensatory 
strategies make such trade-offs possible (Payne et al., 1993). In Experiment 6, two potential 
effort cues (i.e., stimulus rotation and probability of a task switch) were pitted against one 
another. There was some evidence that the stimulus rotation cue actually overshadowed the 
probability of a task switch consistent with a non-compensatory strategy. In particular, the self-
report data revealed that awareness and utilization of the switching cue reduced from Experiment 
5 (22%) to Experiment 6 (6%), χ2(1) = 4.18, p = .04. That said, if individuals were relying on the 
stimulus rotation cue to the complete exclusion of the probability of the task switch, I would 
have expected many more selections of the high demand option (i.e., less rotated option) given 
the high rates of avoiding the rotated option in Experiments 4 and 5 (where rotation was 
nominally the only available effort cue). Future work designed to test between non-
compensatory and compensatory versions of the cue-utilization account is needed. 
Awareness and Utilization of Effort Cues 
While the experiments in Chapter 2 were not directly designed to assess the relation 
between the explicit awareness of effort cues and effort avoidance, a number of notable patterns 




were similar, as were the frequencies of individuals self-reporting some difference across options 
in each of the pairs. In addition, when the probability of switching was reduced in Experiment 5, 
reported awareness and effort avoidance similarly decreased for the switching pair. Thus, it 
appears that explicit awareness of effort cues and effort avoidance might be tightly coupled (see 
Chapter 1). Furthermore, reported utilization of the cues was higher for stimulus rotation relative 
to switching in Experiment 4 even in light of similar rates of effort avoidance suggesting that, in 
addition to requiring awareness, cues seem to need to be endorsed (e.g., Michaelian, 2012) as a 
source of effort for a least-effortful preference to be generated.  
Indexing Demands on Executive Control 
 In Chapter 2, I relied throughout on an indirect measure of demands on executive control 
(i.e., the probability of a task switch) to test the hypothesis that such demands will drive effort 
avoidance behavior. Furthermore, I relied on response times to bolster this inference. Of course, 
given that demands on executive control cannot be measured directly, both of these assumptions 
should be assessed critically. For example, the implications of the present results would change if 
stimulus rotation produced greater demands on executive control than task switching. While a 
priori this idea seems inconsistent with most theoretical conceptions of executive control, it is 
nonetheless worth considering. Importantly, any test of the relation between demands on 
executive control and effort-based decision-making will necessarily rely on assumptions about 
the nature of that demand. Being clear about the nature of this assumption is important to avoid 
the circular argument that the act of avoidance in and of itself constitutes evidence of a 
difference in demands on executive control. For example, if one was to make the argument that 
the equal rates of avoidance in Experiment 4 are a result of the difference between upright and 




control. Along similar lines, it is important that I note that previous work has demonstrated that 
RTs can be dissociated from these demands on executive control (e.g., Kool et al., 2010; 
McGuire & Botvinick, 2010) and, thus, represents only a noisy index of such demands. Thus, 
again it is important to rely on our theoretical understanding of the types of tasks or 
manipulations that put demands on the executive control system and not to rely solely on 
measures of time. 
The Probability of a Switch-by-Switch Cost Interaction 
With respect to the notion that individuals avoid demands on executive control, the 
consistent observation of an interaction between the probability of switch trials and switch costs 
provides a potentially important observation. Specifically, this interaction can be interpreted in 
the context of Braver’s (2012) dual mechanism framework that distinguishes between proactive 
and reactive control. Proactive control consists of a form of sustained, prepatory control whereas 
reactive control consists as a type of “as-needed” control recruited when an event demanding 
control is detected. The reduction in the switch cost in a context with a high switch probability 
can be interpreted as the engagement of a more proactive mode of control relative to a more 
reactive mode of control adopted when switching occurs less frequently. Proactive control in this 
context could, for example, consist of maintaining both tasks sets in a partially activated state. 
Consistent with such a mechanism is the observation that the probability of switching by switch 
cost interaction seems largely due to differences in repeat trial response times (see Tables 2 and 
5). 
Against this background, two points are worth noting. First, in Experiment 4, where this 
interaction was particularly large, effort-based choices demonstrated an avoidance of the high 




of control, rather than the avoidance of the low probability switch option, which can be taken as 
being associated with a more reactive mode of control. This suggests that avoidance of demands 
on executive control might be more strongly tuned to avoiding proactive rather than reactive 
control. The second observation is that the presence of the interaction between the probability of 
switching and the switch costs suggests, at least on some level, a response to the probability of a 
switch manipulation. Thus, in Experiment 5, while there was no evidence of differential 
avoidance of the options observed at the level of effort-based decisions, there was at the level of 
the cognitive systems’ response to the proportion switching (e.g., a switch between more 
proactive and reactive modes of control). While not the aim of the present research, further 
examination of the proportion switching by switch cost interaction might promise a more 
nuanced understanding of the relation between different types of control and effort based 
decisions. 
Conclusion 
One of the fundamental principles of human psychology principle (e.g., Clark, 2010; 
Zipf, 1949) is that humans tend to avoid effort. The experiments reported here contribute to our 
understanding of how it is that individuals achieve this goal. Future work examining the novel 











Chapters 1 and 2 provided evidence in support of the hypothesis that the utilization of 
available cues drives perceptions of effort (i.e., in self-report) and effort-based decision (i.e., in a 
DST). That is, individuals appear to infer effort through a type of metacognitive evaluation made 
over available cues. However, this cue utilization account does not address why some cues would 
signal that a task may be effortful. Chapter 3 begins to address this question by investigating how 
individuals evaluate effortful tasks through the lens of the General Evaluability Theory (GET; 
Hsee & Zhang, 2010). 
 
The following work has been accepted for publication and is currently in press at the Journal of 
Behavioral Decision Making (Dunn, Koehler, & Risko, in press). 















Recently, a focus on effort-based decision-making has pushed the hypothesis of effort 
minimization to the fore as a critical behavior to understand empirically in human decision-
making (e.g., Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Dunn, Lutes, & Risko, 2016; Dunn & Risko, 2016; 
Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010; Kool & Botvinick, 2014; Kurniawan, Guitart-Masip, 
& Dolan, 2011; McGuire & Botvinick, 2010; Westbrook & Braver, 2015; Westbrook, Kester, & 
Braver, 2013). Although many of these endeavors have focused on the factors that drive effort-
avoidance (e.g., cues, see Chapters 1 and 2; demands on executive control, Kool et al., 2010), 
less attention has been paid specifically to individuals’ subjective evaluation of efforts (Clithero 
& Rangel, 2014; Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 2013; Kable & Glimcher, 2009; Otto, Zijlstra, & 
Goebel, 2014). That is, how do individuals appraise the level of anticipated effort associated with 
some action within the decision-making process? In the current set of experiments, I examined 
subjective evaluations of task-specific efforts in three domains through the scope of General 
Evaluability Theory (Hsee & Zhang, 2010). 
General Evaluability Theory 
It is proposed that humans integrate various dimensions of an option (e.g., type and 
quantity of some reward) into a singular abstract measure of subjective value during evaluation 
and decision-making processes (Hsee & Zhang, 2010; Kable & Glimcher, 2009; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). A critical theoretical issue in understanding individuals’ subjective evaluations 
of a given attribute (here effort) is their value sensitivity (i.e., the responsiveness of evaluations 
to changes in the value of the attribute). One influential theory of value sensitivity is the General 
Evaluability Theory (GET; Hsee & Zhang, 2010; also see Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & 
Bazerman, 1999; Hsee, 1996). According to GET, value sensitivity is dependent on the 




reference information needed to gauge values and map them onto a subjective evaluation (Hsee 
& Zhang, 2010). In a typical university student sample, an example of an evaluable attribute 
might be a students’ GPA. In making a judgment about job prospects, students would be 
expected to be sensitive to a difference between candidates with a 1.9 GPA and a 3.5 GPA. An 
example of an inevaluable attribute (for students) might be the value of a diamond based on size. 
In estimating the value of a diamond, students might not be sensitive to a difference between a 
10 karat and a 15 karat diamond. 
Within GET, evaluability is dependent on three types of reference information: mode, 
knowledge, and nature. First, mode refers to the evaluation mode that a person is placed in. Any 
evaluation takes place in either a (1) Joint Evaluation (JE) mode in which two or more 
alternatives are explicitly juxtaposed and evaluated comparatively, or a (2) Single Evaluation 
(SE) mode where evaluation of a single value takes place in isolation. As an example, 
individuals may make a choice between renting one of two apartments (i.e., JE mode), or 
individuals can provide a willingness-to-pay estimate of only one of the options without 
knowledge of the other (i.e., SE mode). Knowledge refers to the distributional information, such 
as the variability and average, about some target attribute that is gained through experience. For 
example, college students have greater knowledge about Grade Point Average (GPA) than 
diamond size. Last, nature refers to whether individuals possess a stable physiological or 
psychological reference system to evaluate some value, for example, temperature. Those values 
that have such a scale are considered inherently evaluable. Importantly, these three types of 
reference information are conjunctive in determining sensitivity, or consistency, of valuation. 
That is, the manipulation of one type of information such as knowledge would be expected to 




GET provides a theoretically motivated means of assessing the evaluability of a given 
attribute as it posits a straightforward relation between level of evaluability and mode: low-
sensitivity attributes will produce less evaluability in the SE mode relative to the JE mode. As 
Hsee et al. (1999) note, difficult-to-evaluate attributes have little influence in differentiating the 
evaluations of values in SE, whereas in the comparative JE mode difficult-to-evaluate attributes 
become easier to evaluate and hence exert a greater influence. By contrast, easier-to-evaluate 
attributes will have similar impact in SE and JE. The effect of mode (SE vs. JE) should then be 
observable in individuals’ subjective value functions (i.e., the functions that demonstrate how 
objective quantities map onto subjective evaluations; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). GET 
proposes that subjective value functions for relatively inevaluable attributes are more linear in JE 
relative to SE (see Figure 11) by virtue of individuals being similarly sensitive to 
qualitative/categorical (i.e., from some meaningful reference point) and quantitative/continuous 
differences (i.e., judgments not made to the reference point) across incremental values. In the SE 
mode, in contrast, individuals are expected to be more sensitive to qualitative differences from a 
reference point and to show less sensitivity across quantitative values thereafter similar to a log 
function. Examining the relation between levels of some value, such as effort, and subjective 
values across evaluation modes thus provides a useful tool in determining the evaluability of a 











Subjective Value Functions for a Relatively Inevaluable Attribute under Single and Joint 
Evaluation Modes  
 
Note: The subjective value function for the Single Evaluation (SE) mode is presented as the solid 
line, whereas the function for the Joint Evaluation (JE) mode is presented as the dashed line. 
General Evaluability Theory proposes that subjective value functions are more linear in JE than 
in SE across values (adapted from Hsee & Zhang, 2010). 
 
The Evaluability of Effort 
Although the evaluability of effort has yet to receive considerable attention, it would 
seem plausible to suggest that effort should be a highly evaluable dimension. That is, effort may 
be both high in knowledge, where individuals putatively have a swath of experience making 
effort-based decisions, and in nature where effort may be inherently evaluable. Consistent with 
these ideas, there have been a number of demonstrations that individuals can behave in a manner 
that would suggest the ability to accurately evaluate effort (e.g., Bitgood & Dukes, 2006; Gray, 
Sims, Fu, & Schoelles, 2006; Kool et al., 2010; Kurniawan et al., 2010; Siegler & Lemaire, 




made decisions between simply holding a grip device and engaging in effortful gripping (i.e., 
squeezing of air compressed cylinders), Kurniawan and colleagues (2010) demonstrated less 
frequent engagement in the high-effort gripping option. In a similar vein, Walsh and Anderson 
(2009) demonstrated that as the effort to successfully compute a solution to a multiplication 
problem increased, and consequently performance decreased, reliance on an external strategy of 
using a calculator increased. Similar findings consistent with a least effort principle have 
additionally been demonstrated in a variety of animal behaviors, for example, foraging (Marsh, 
Schuck-Paim, & Kacelnik, 2004; Stephens & Krebs, 1986).  
While the evaluability of effort appears intuitive, it might be prudent to consider whether 
different types of effort may be more or less evaluable. One critical distinction to make may thus 
be between more physical and more cognitive (mental) forms of effort. With regard to physical 
effort, one could hypothesize that individuals possess a clear signal (e.g., energetic costs) needed 
to accurately evaluate the costs of expending physical effort. However, this does not appear to be 
the case with regard to cognitive effort. Cognitive effort is a far more challenging construct to 
define and study empirically (Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Dunn & Risko, 2016; Kurzban, 2016; 
Westbrook & Braver, 2015). Although many accounts have attempted to generalize the energetic 
aspect of physical effort accounts to cognitive effort accounts (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, 
Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Boksem & Tops, 2008; Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007), this premise has 
been met with a large amount of skepticism based on theoretical and empirical grounds (e.g., 
Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Carter & McCullough, 2013; Gibson, 2007; Hockey, 2011; Inzlicht & 
Schmeichel, 2013; 2012; Job, Walton, Bernecker, & Dweck, 2013; Kelly, Sunram-Lea, & 
Crawford, 2015; Lange & Eggert, 2014; Lurquin et al., 2016; Kurzban, 2010; Kurzban, 




Westbrook & Braver, 2015). Furthermore, whether similar systems underlie evaluation of both 
physical and cognitive effort remains to be determined (Westbrook & Braver, 2015; cf. Boksem 
& Tops, 2008). Therefore, the information (e.g., the reference information) available to 
individuals while attempting to evaluate physical versus cognitive effort may indeed differ.  
Present Investigation  
In Chapter 3, I use the GET framework to examine the evaluability of task-specific 
efforts via manipulations of evaluation mode in the context of effort judgments across 
perceptual, memorial, and motor tasks. Here I focus specifically on evaluations of anticipated 
effort as opposed to experienced effort. Payne and colleagues (1993) make a critical distinction 
between the two arguing that it is the evaluations and judgments of anticipated (or perceived) 
effort that play the primary role in strategy selection and decision-making, for example, deciding 
to not engage in a task outright. Nonetheless, experienced effort can indeed theoretically become 
anticipated effort given some hypothesized monitoring mechanism (e.g., Anzai & Simon, 1979; 
Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001; Payne et al., 1993; Son & Metcalfe, 2005; Vernon & Usher, 2003). 
Several recent proposals have argued that perceived effort is subjective in nature (Dunn & Risko, 
2016; Kool et al., 2010; Westbrook & Braver, 2015) serving as a type of “summary signal” used 
to select lines of action (see Chapter 1). It is important to note, though, that while effort is often 
closely coupled with other potential determinants of behavior (e.g., task difficulty) and often 
covaries with similar signals (e.g., fatigue or arousal), effort can be understood as a unique cost 
considered in the decision-making process (for reviews on these issues see Kurzban, et al., 2013, 
and Westbrook & Braver, 2015). 
 The application of the GET framework to effort affords an examination of whether 




may vary across JE and SE modes can provide evidence concerning the evaluability of a given 
type of task-specific effort. Critically, attributes that are high in evaluability do not demonstrate 
increased sensitivity in the JE mode because they are evaluable in the SE mode as well. Highly 
evaluable attributes should thus be consistently evaluated (i.e., demonstrate similar patterns of 
judgments) across the two modes. If a given task-specific effort does not show a susceptibility to 
evaluation mode, then I would expect subjective rating functions in both SE and JE to be similar 
(cf. Figure 11). Such a pattern, if observed consistently across different types or manipulations of 
effort, would provide initial evidence that effort and its determinants are evaluable. That being 
said, given the partial exploratory nature of Experiment 7, no specific hypothesis is offered 
concerning whether one specific type of effort is expected to be evaluable or not. 
To foreshadow, in Chapter 3, six studies were carried out utilizing the GET framework 
for examining mode by value effects (Hsee & Zhang, 2010). I examined evaluations of effort 
where individuals rated perceived effort related to stimulus rotation and stimulus degradation in 
a reading task, set size pertaining to a short-term memory task, and lifting various degrees of 
weight. Of these four specific tasks, results suggested that perceived effort related to stimulus 
rotation is the least evaluable, whereas the perceived effort associated with the other three tasks 
could be considered relatively evaluable.  
Experiment 7 
To examine the influence of evaluation mode on task-specific efforts, evaluation mode 
(i.e., JE and SE) was manipulated between subjects. Individuals assigned to the JE mode were 
presented with all values of a task to be evaluated together, whereas individuals assigned to the 
SE mode evaluated only one value of a task in isolation. I employed three types of task-specific 




the perceptual domain, effort was manipulated by stimulus rotation, for the memorial domain by 
the number of to-be-remembered items, and for the motor domain by weight to-be-lifted (see 
below for more details). I chose these rather simple tasks in order to isolate specific types of 
effort as they allowed straightforward (and empirically confirmed) parametric increases in the 
putative effort within each task. As an example, increasing the number of items to-be-
remembered increases the amount of perceived effort associated with engaging in the task (e.g., 
Risko & Dunn, 2015). Using a more complex “everyday” task (e.g., math), at least at this stage, 




 Five hundred and forty Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) workers participated in the 
online study (see Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) for compensation of $1 USD. One 
hundred and eighty individuals were assigned to each of the effort dimensions, 30 in each of the 
six nested effort manipulation judgment groups (five in SE and one in JE; see below). Twenty-
four percent of individuals failed at least one of three attention checks embedded in the survey 
(see below) resulting in a final N of 411 (MAge = 34 years, 47% female participants, 57% reported 
completing a Bachelor’s degree or higher).  
Design 
 A 3 (Effort Dimension: Perceptual Task, Memorial Task, Motor Task) x 5 (Effort Level: 
Stimulus Rotation – 0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, 180°; Set Size – 2-letters, 4-letters, 6-letters, 8-letters, 10-
letters; Weight – 5 lbs., 10 lbs., 15 lbs., 20 lbs. 25 lbs.) x 2 (Evaluation Mode: Joint Evaluation, 






For stimulus rotation (perceptual), individuals judged visual displays consisting of the 
stimulus “WORD” rotated from 0° to 180° in 45° increments that were displayed on the screen 
to the participants. The use of “WORD” rather than an actual word was to tune individuals to the 
perceptual manipulation, rather than incorporating a potential confound of an actual word (e.g., a 
word randomly high in concreteness) driving judgments. Stimuli for items to-be-remembered 
(memorial) consisted of randomized letter strings presented in audio form through the survey 
software. Individuals were required to hit “Play” for each one of the set sizes to hear the specific 
stimuli over their headphones or speakers (the requirement of having working speakers or 
headphones was outlined to participants prior to consent). Set sizes ranged from 2-letters to 10-
letters in increments of two, with each letter presented at 1-second intervals. For weight-to-be 
lifted (motor), a visual diagram featuring an individual lifting an unlabeled bag from the ground 
in three steps with the weight to be judged labeled beneath the diagram was presented to 
individuals on their screen. Presented weight ranged from 5 lbs. to 25 lbs. in five-pound 
increments. For perceptual effort conditions, individuals were asked “How effortful would it be 
to read this word aloud? For memorial effort conditions, individuals were asked “How effortful 
would it be to recall all X letters immediately in the order that they are presented?” For motor 
effort conditions, individuals were asked “How effortful would it be to lift X lbs. starting from the 
ground?” The evaluation scale was kept consistent across modes (i.e., a sliding 0-100 scale; see 







 MTurk workers selected and accepted the Human Intelligence Task (HIT) and provided 
informed consent electronically. All participants first read instructions outlining the rating scale 
to be used in the study. Instructions stated that individuals were to make their judgments on a 
scale ranging from “0 – No Action Taken” to “100 – Full Effort”. A rating of “0 – No Action 
Taken” was explained as entailing not engaging in the task outlined to the participant. For 
example, if an individual was assigned to the motor effort group, then instructions stated that a 
rating of “0 – No Action Taken” would entail not attempting to lift the amount of weight 
specified in the question. This lower anchor was chosen in an attempt to keep ratings off the 
floor, as well as to encourage individuals to imagine at least attempting the presented task when 
generating their effort rating (e.g., theoretically there should not be any “0” ratings if individuals 
are following instructions). 
Individuals were then asked to move the rating scale to “0 – No Action Taken” and move 
onto the next portion of instructions. The next section outlined the “100 – Full Effort” rating. 
Individuals were instructed that a “100 – Full Effort” rating would entail “…a mental or physical 
act that would require all of your effort to complete successfully (i.e., if it was any more effortful 
you would not have been able to complete it successfully)”. Furthermore, individuals were asked 
to freely respond in a text box with a description of “one mental or physical act that they had 
completed in the past that required all of their effort to complete successfully” and instructed that 
this act (i.e., the one self-reported) would be equivalent to a “100 – Full Effort” rating. 
Individuals were then asked to move the rating scale to “100 – Full Effort”. The movement of the 




an act entailing a “Full Effort” action, served as attention checks. All instructions were then 
briefly reiterated before individuals moved on to the judgment portion of the survey. 
Evaluation mode was manipulated between subjects. Individuals assigned to the JE mode 
were presented with all values to be evaluated together, whereas individuals assigned to the SE 
mode evaluated only one value in isolation. Individuals assigned to the SE conditions received 
only one randomly assigned effort manipulation (e.g., for stimulus rotation, either 0°, 45°, 90°, 
135°, or 180°). Individuals in the JE conditions were presented with all five effort levels 
sequentially from the lowest effort manipulation to the highest (see Hsee & Zhang, 2004, for a 
similar approach). Upon completion of the judgment portion of the survey, individuals were 
asked to complete three short demographic questions about their age, sex, and highest level of 
education completed. Individuals were then given the option to provide any feedback to the 
researchers and debriefed electronically.  
Results 
All reported analyses were conducted using R statistical software (R Development Core 
Team, 2015). Results are reported first for JE judgments followed by SE judgments for each 
effort dimension (see Figures 12 and 13). For JE judgments (i.e., within-subject judgments), 
Linear Mixed Models (LMM) were constructed using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2015). All models incorporated a crossed random effect structure including 
random subject slopes, and slope-by-intercept correlations10 (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). 
In addition, the RePsychLing package (Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & Baayen, 2015) was employed 
                                                
10 All random effect correlations produced across efforts were relatively negative. These results 
suggest a type of “fanning in” pattern of individuals’ within-subject ratings. Specifically, 
individuals who started their ratings lower on the scale generated more positive slopes, whereas 
individuals who started higher on the scale generated less positive slopes, reflecting in the latter 




to ensure that random effect structures were not over-fitted (cf. Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 
2013). Significance criterion for slope terms was set as | t | > 2 following Baayen et al. (2008). 
Model assumptions were assessed using visual depictions of residuals plots using the car 
package (Fox & Weisberg, 2011). In addition, influential case analysis (i.e., Cook’s distance) 
was conducted using the influence.ME package (Nieuwenhuis, Grotenhuis, & Pelzer, 2012). To 
test slope model goodness-of-fit, the LMM containing the slope term (i.e., effort level for a 
particular dimension) was compared against an intercept-only model using a Log Likelihood test. 
Single evaluation judgments were analyzed using linear regression models (LM). Model 
assumptions and influential case analyses followed a similar procedure to LMMs. Removed 
cases (e.g., trials for LMMs and subjects for LMs) are reported at the start of each effort 
dimension section for both LMMs and LMs with all procedures following an iterative process for 
removal. Standardized beta values (β) and bootstrapped confidence intervals (CIs) are provided 
for all slope estimates. Last, all models were visually compared to loess fits to ensure that linear 













Single and Joint Evaluation Subjective Effort Rating Results in Experiment 7 
 
 
Note: Single Evaluation (SE) represents between-subject ratings; Joint Evaluation represents 














Figure 13.  
Standardized Beta Values for Slopes in Experiment 7 
 
 
Note: Single Evaluation (SE) represents between-subject ratings, whereas Joint Evaluation 
represents within-subject ratings. Error bars represent bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Stimulus Rotation (Perceptual) 
 First, approximately 2% of cases were removed for joint evaluation. LMM results 
demonstrated a significant positive slope associated with increased degree of stimulus rotation, b 
= 4.71, SE = 1.07, t = 4.42, 95% CI [2.61, 6.69], β = .48, β 95% CI [.27, .69]. The slope model 




For single evaluation, approximately 8% of cases were removed. Similar to LMM results, LM 
results demonstrated a significant positive slope associated with increased stimulus rotation, b = 
.07, SE = .02, t = 4.16, p < .001, 95% CI [.04, .1], R2 = .14, β = .37, β 95% CI [.2, .55]. The slope 
model significantly improved model fit relative to the intercept-only model, F(1, 106) = 17.29, 
residual SE = 10.47, p < .001. 
Set Size (Memorial) 
Approximately 4% of cases were removed in joint evaluation. LMM results demonstrated 
a significant positive slope associated with increased set size, b = 21.17, SE = 1.38, t = 15.37, 
95% CI [18.21, 23.98], β = .86, β 95% CI [.75, .98]. The slope model significantly improved 
model fit relative to the intercept-only model, χ2 (1) = 59.6, p < .001. For single evaluation, 
approximately 5% of cases were removed. LM results demonstrated a significant positive slope 
associated with increased set size, b = 10.9, SE = .67, t = 16.35, p < .001, 95% CI [9.87, 11.91], 
R2 = .75, β = .87, β 95% CI [.76, .97]. The slope model significantly improved model fit relative 
to the intercept only model, F(1, 89) = 267.3, residual SE = 17.93, p < .001. 
Weight (Motor) 
Approximately 2% of cases were removed in joint evaluation. LMM results demonstrated 
a significant positive slope associated with increases in weight, b = 8.01, SE = .86, t = 9.29, 95% 
CI [6.44, 9.69], β = .68, β 95% CI [.53, .82]. The slope model significantly improved model fit 
relative to the intercept-only model, χ2 (1) = 40.21, p < .001. Approximately 8% of cases were 
removed in single evaluation. LM results demonstrated a significant positive slope associated 




95% CI [.31, .65]. The slope model significantly improved model fit relative to the intercept only 
model, F(1, 106) = 31.78, residual SE = 8.99, p < .001. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 7 demonstrated several interesting findings with regard to the evaluability of 
task-specific efforts. First, effort judgments for the memory task produced very similar positive 
slopes across both the JE and SE evaluation modes. This finding provides initial evidence that 
effort associated with items to-be-remembered may be highly evaluable. Both stimulus rotation 
and weight to-be-lifted showed similar patterns of perceived effort judgments across evaluation 
modes, but not to the same extent as the memory task. Slopes were somewhat more positive in 
JE relative to SE, though both dimensions did produce significant linear functions (i.e., all effort 
dimensions remained relatively linear in the SE mode). That is, for all dimensions across 
between-subject raters only rating a single effort level in isolation, appeared to demonstrate value 
sensitivity in a similar fashion to individuals rating in JE where all alternatives were explicitly 
present. Such correspondence suggests that each task-specific effort dimension may have high 
levels of both knowledge and/or nature according to GET. Examination of the stimulus rotation 
effort slopes, and to some extent the weight effort slopes, though, suggests that the judgments 
were relatively constrained toward the bottom of the rating scale. Therefore, it is possible that the 
overall low perceived effort for these dimensions did not allow the shape of the function to be 
fully demonstrated across effort manipulations. Experiment 8 sought to address this issue. 
Experiment 8 
 Individuals in Experiment 8 performed a task similar to Experiment 7. To increase effort 
ratings across the evaluation scale, and to provide a clearer picture of the functions associated 




associated with the memory task was kept consistent with Experiment 7. For stimulus rotation, 
displays were increased from a one-word display to a nine-word 3 x 3 display. The addition of 
items in a rotated display is known to increase performance costs and, thus, the putative expected 
effort required to read the display (Risko, Medimorec, Chisholm, & Kingstone, 2014). For 
weight, effort levels were doubled relative to Experiment 1. Effort levels were presented in 10 
lbs increments starting at 10 lbs and ending at 50 lbs. Experiment 8 additionally affords the 
opportunity to replicate the main findings from Experiment 7. If all task-specific effort 
dimensions are evaluable, then I would expect to observe similar positive linear functions across 
evaluation modes for all dimensions.  
Method 
Participants 
Seven hundred and twenty MTurk workers participated in the online study. Two hundred 
and forty individuals were assigned to each of the effort dimensions, 40 in each of the six nested 
judgments groups (i.e., five in SE and one in JE). Eight percent of individuals failed at least one 
of three attention checks embedded in the survey resulting in a final N of 663 (MAge = 33 years, 
42% female participants, 50% reported completing a Bachelor’s degree or higher).  
Design 
 A 3 (Effort Dimension: Perceptual Task, Memorial Task, Motor Task) x 5 (Effort 
Manipulation: Stimulus Rotation – 0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, 180°; Set Size – 2 letters, 4 letters, 6 
letters, 8 letters, 10, letters; Weight – 10 lbs., 20 lbs., 30 lbs., 40 lbs., 50 lbs.) x 2 (Evaluation 







 Stimuli for the memorial task manipulations were kept the same as in Experiment 7. For 
the perceptual task manipulations, stimulus rotation was kept constant, but set size was increased 
to nine words presented in a 3 x 3 display. Motor task manipulations were increased to 10 lbs. to 
50 lbs. in 10 lbs. increments.  
Procedure 
All procedures followed Experiment 7. 
Results 





















Single and Joint Evaluation Subjective Effort Rating Results in Experiment 8 
 
 
Note: Single Evaluation (SE) represents between-subject ratings; Joint Evaluation represents 














Standardized Beta Values for Slopes in Experiment 8 
 
 
Note: Single Evaluation (SE) represents between-subject ratings; Joint Evaluation represents 
within-subject ratings Error bars represent bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Stimulus Rotation  
 First, approximately 4% of cases were removed in JE. LMM results demonstrated a 
significant positive slope associated with increased degree of stimulus rotation, b = 8.33, SE = 
1.26, t = 6.62, 95% CI [5.92, 10.91], β = .43, β 95% CI [.31, .56]. The slope model significantly 




evaluation approximately 6% of cases were removed. Conflicting with the JE results, LM results 
for SE judgments did not demonstrate a significant positive slope of stimulus rotation, b = .03, 
SE = .02, t = 1.32, 95% CI [-.01, .7], R2 = .14, β = .1, β 95% CI [-.05 .25]. 
 
Figure 16.  
Generalized Additive Model (GAM) Predicted Fit for Single Evaluation Stimulus Rotation Effort 
Ratings in Experiment 8 
 
 





In addition to a demonstrated non-significant positive slope, visual inspection of loess fit 
to the data suggested a nonlinear model would perhaps best describe the SE data. Therefore, to 
test a non-linear fit, a generalized additive model (GAM) was constructed using the mgcv 
package (Wood, 2006). A cubic spline smoothing term was applied to degree of stimulus rotation 
utilizing three knots. Results demonstrated a significant smooth term, edf = 1.92, F = 7.05, 
approximate p < .00111. Furthermore, a deviance test demonstrated that the GAM model 
produced a better fit to the SE data relative to the LM model, p < .001, as well as a smaller 
Akaike information criterion (i.e., better goodness of fit; AIC; see Burnham, Anderson, & 
Huyvaert, 2011) value relative to the LM model, AIC = 1490, AIC = 1501.71, for the GAM and 
LM models respectively. Thus, GAM results suggest that the nonlinear model provided a better 
fit to the SE data relative to the LM model (see Figure 16). I return to the importance of this 
pattern in the discussion of this chapter. 
Set Size 
Approximately 4% of cases were removed in joint evaluation. LMM results demonstrated 
a significant positive slope associated with increased set size, b = 11.18, SE = .48, t = 23.41, 
95% CI [17.36, 21.95], β = .82, β 95% CI [.72, .92]. The slope model significantly improved 
model fit relative to the intercept-only model, χ2 (1) = 78.09, p < .001. Approximately 2% of 
cases were removed for single evaluation. LM results demonstrated a significant positive slope 
associated with increased set size, b = 10.9, SE = .67, t = 16.35, p < .001, 95% CI [10.51, 11.93], 
R2 = .75, β = .87, β 95% CI [.8, .94]. The slope model significantly improved model fit relative to 
the intercept-only model, F(1, 178) = 548, residual SE = 17.77, p < .001. 
 
                                                





Approximately 6% of cases were removed in joint evaluation. LMM results demonstrated 
a significant positive slope associated with increases in weight, b = 12.22, SE = .86, t = 14.15, 
95% CI [10.33, 13.99], β = .68, β 95% CI [.58, .77]. The slope model significantly improved 
model fit relative to the intercept-only model, χ2 (1) = 67.15, p < .001. Approximately 3% cases 
were removed in single evaluation. LM results demonstrated a significant positive slope 
associated with increased weight, b = 1.24, SE = .12, t = 10.43, p < .001, 95% CI [1.01, 1.45], R2 
= .38, β = .62, β 95% CI [.5, .74]. The slope model significantly improved model fit relative to 
the intercept-only model, F(1, 175) = 108.8, residual SE = 22.1, p < .001. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 8 replicated the main finding of Experiment 7 for the memorial and motor 
tasks: Both SE and JE produced highly similar positive linear functions of perceived effort 
ratings for the dimensions. Thus, Experiments 7 and 8 together suggest that the perceived effort 
associated with the specific memorial and motor tasks used here are evaluable. I return to 
potential explanations of why this may be the case for these dimensions in Experiment 11 and in 
the General Discussion of this chapter. In contrast to these tasks, stimulus rotation produced a 
flat slope in SE (as well as a nonlinear fit), whereas a positive linear pattern was observed in JE. 
As highlighted in the introduction, GET proposes that subjective value functions are more linear 
across values in JE relative to SE for inevaluable attributes (see Figure 11) due to individuals 
being similarly sensitive to quantitative and qualitative differences in JE, but only being sensitive 
to qualitative differences (i.e., from some meaningful reference point) with ratings asymptoting 
thereafter in SE. Individuals in SE seemed to be insensitive to the incremental differences in 




sensitive to the qualitative shift from the 0° reference point, but not sensitive to the incremental 
differences between 45° - 90°, 90° - 135°, and 135° - 180°. Therefore, as opposed to Experiment 
7 when the putative perceived effort was increased for stimulus rotation, the perceived effort 
associated with the task appeared to be relatively inevaluable.  
Experiment 9 
 One potential explanation for the pattern of results for effort associated with stimulus 
rotation in Experiment 8 is that, in addition to 0° (i.e., upright), 180° stimulus rotation (i.e., 
upside down) may also serve as a meaningful reference point in judgments. This can be seen in 
the large drop in effort ratings from 135° to 180° (see Figure 14). Therefore, the nonlinear 
pattern in SE and, thus, the presumed inevaluability of the expected effort associated with 
stimulus rotation, may have been driven by the inclusion of two potential reference points within 
the effort level manipulation. Interestingly, the pattern of ratings produced in SE does somewhat 
follow patterns of response times (i.e., a performance index of effort) for reading simple rotated 
words aloud (see Koriat & Norman, 1985). Thus, an alternative account is that individuals are 
sensitive to the effort (in terms of response times) associated with stimulus rotation in SE, but 
having several alternatives present in JE modulates the pattern to be more positive. To address 
this, Experiment 9 manipulated stimulus rotation effort at 15° increments ranging from 0° to 90°, 
thus excluding the potential 180° reference point. If perceived effort associated with stimulus 
rotation is inevaluable, then I would expect to find similar results as Experiment 8: Individuals in 
SE should demonstrate greater sensitivity to the qualitative difference between 0° and 15°, but 
not demonstrate the same sensitivity to all differences thereafter. Judgments in JE should 




sensitive to the response times associated with reading rotated words, then I would expect similar 
flat (or non-linear) functions in SE and JE. 
Method 
Participants 
Four hundred MTurk workers participated. Fifty individuals were assigned to each of the 
eight nested judgment groups (i.e., seven in SE and one in JE). Eight percent of individuals failed 
at least one of three attention checks embedded in the survey resulting in a final N of 368 (MAge = 
34 years, 49% female participants, 50% reported completing a Bachelor’s degree or higher).  
Design 
 A 2 (Evaluation Mode: Joint Evaluation, Single Evaluation) x 7 (Stimulus Rotation: 0°, 
15°, 30°, 45°, 60°, 75°, 90°) design was employed. 
Stimuli 
 Set size was reduced to two-word displays and rotated from 0° to 90° in 15° increments. 
Procedure 
All procedures followed Experiments 7 and 8. 
Results 












Single and Joint Evaluation Subjective Effort Rating Results (Left Panel) and Standardized Beta 
Values for Slopes (Right Panel) in Experiment 9 
 
 
Note: Single Evaluation (SE) represents between-subject ratings; Joint Evaluation represents 
within-subject ratings. Error bars for the left panel represent ±1 SEM. Error bars for the right 
panel represent bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Stimulus Rotation 
 Approximately 6% of cases were removed in JE. LMM results revealed a significant 
positive slope associated with increased degree of stimulus rotation, b = .36, SE = .05, t = 7.1, 
95% CI [.27, .46], β = .5, β 95% CI [.36, .64]. The slope model significantly improved model fit 
relative to the intercept-only model, χ2 (1) = 35.02, p < .001. For single evaluation approximately 




slope of stimulus rotation, b = .09, SE = .02, t = 4.26, p < .001, 95% CI [.05, .14], R2 = .06, β = 
.24, β 95% CI [.13, .36]. Thus, both evaluation modes produced significant positive slopes, 
however, comparing β values across the modes reveals that the slope fit in JE is more positive 
than the slope fit in SE (see Figure 17).  
Discussion 
 Results in Experiment 9 demonstrated that individuals in SE produced only a slightly 
positive linear function across the effort levels, however, the function for JE was much more 
positive suggesting that individuals are not sensitive to response times associated with reading 
rotated words. Thus, similar to Experiment 8, there is a discrepancy between judgments made in 
SE relative to JE. Examination of the SE function demonstrates the large increase in ratings from 
the 0° reference point to the first effort level (15°), as predicted by GET. That is, individuals 
demonstrated sensitivity to the reference point and less sensitivity to incremental differences 
thereafter. Experiment 9 lends further evidence to the claim that the perceived effort associated 
with stimulus rotation may be relatively less evaluable. 
Experiment 10 
To this point in Chapter 3, I have focused on the relation between SE and JE to examine 
the evaluability of task-specific efforts through individuals’ judgments of effort while keeping 
the evaluation scale consistent (i.e., a 0-100 scale). In addition to this method of examining 
evaluability, GET additionally predicts specific patterns of results across ratings and choices 
(e.g., would you buy A or B?) for low evaluability attributes. For instance, in GET, preference 
reversals across evaluation modes are credited to low evaluability values becoming more 
evaluable in JE choice relative to SE ratings (see similarly the Prominence Effect; Tversky, 




occur when a systematic change in preference order between normatively equivalent conditions 
is observed (Slovic & Litchenstein, 1983) and, as such, represents an internal inconsistency in 
judgment (Hsee, et al., 2004; Kahneman, 1994). For example, Hsee (1996) had individuals 
evaluate job candidates for a programming position on two attributes: GPA and experience. Hsee 
(1996) hypothesized that GPA would be the more evaluable attribute of the two given students’ 
putative knowledge about GPA. In SE, the candidate with the higher GPA was favored, whereas 
in JE the candidate with more programming experience was favored, demonstrating a preference 
reversal across evaluation modes. The authors thus argued that GPA was more evaluable to 
students relative to experience. Hence, examining inconsistencies across ratings and choice 
represents an additional gauge of value sensitivity. 
In Experiment 10, I utilized the stimulus rotation manipulation from Experiments 7-9 
crossed with a set size manipulation (i.e., number of words in the display). Experiments 7-9 
revealed that set size, in terms of number of items in the display, may be an evaluable attribute. 
Ratings in the 0° condition (i.e., upright) across the 1-word (Experiment 7), 2- word (Experiment 
9), and 9-word (Experiment 8) set sizes demonstrated a relatively linear increase in ratings as set 
size increased (see Figures 12, 14, and 17). Therefore, similar to the example above, a relatively 
evaluable attribute is pit against a relatively inevaluable one. In SE, individuals rated either a 
one-word display rotated 90° or a two-word display rotated only 15° on the same 0-100 scale 
used previously. Individuals in JE were presented with both displays and were asked to make a 
choice about which of the two displays would be more effortful to read aloud.  
I would expect individuals to rate the two-word display rotated 15° as more effortful 
relative to the one-word display rotated 90° in SE. This prediction is derived from SE results 




display rotated 90° as less-effortful to read than individuals assigned to SE in Experiment 9 rated 
the two-word display rotated 15° (see Figures 12 and 17). If the perceived effort associated with 
stimulus rotation is relatively inevaluable, then stimulus rotation should exert a greater influence 
in JE choice relative to SE ratings. That is, individuals should choose the one-word display 
rotated 90° as the more effortful alternative. Such a prediction for JE choice is counterintuitive 
given the clear difference in objective effort (e.g., as indexed by performance) between 
processing one word relative to two words (e.g., Dunn & Risko, 2016). 
Method 
Participants 
Three hundred MTurk workers participated in the online study. Fifty individuals were 
assigned to the SE group and 100 to the JE group. Five percent of individuals failed one attention 
check embedded in the survey resulting in a final N of 368 (MAge = 34 years, 49% female 
participants, 50% reported completing a Bachelor’s degree or higher).  
Design 
 A 2 (Evaluation Mode: Joint Evaluation, Single Evaluation) x 2 (Stimulus Rotation: 15°, 
90°) x 2 (Set Size: 1 Word, 2 Words) design was employed. 
Stimuli 
 Stimuli were similar to the previous experiments. 
Procedure 
 The procedure for SE was similar to the previous experiments. For JE, rather than 
providing judgments on the 0-to-100 scale, individuals were asked “Which of the two displays 
above do you feel would be more effortful to read aloud?” Individuals responded by either 




(i.e., top or bottom position) was not counterbalanced across participants, and thus an additional 
50 individuals were run through the JE condition (see above) to ensure equal presentation at the 
positions. Results were statistically similar across the runs therefore the aggregated data are 
reported for JE. The attention check for JE asked individuals to “Please click on the Display A. 
button” during the instruction phase. 
Results 
For SE, inferential statistics (i.e., between-group t-test) as well as Bayesian analyses were 
conducted on judgments with the BEST package (Kruschke, 2013) utilizing 100,000 estimates of 
the effect size (i.e., Cohen’s d) by way of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling. In 
addition, 95% Highest Density Intervals (HDI) are presented, as well as Bayes Factors (BF) 
computed using the BayesFactor package (Morey & Rouder, 2015). Bayes Factor interpretation 
follows the criteria outlined by Kass and Raftery (1995). Furthermore, visual inspection of the 
SE judgment data revealed signs of outliers (skewness = 2.66), thus a grand-mean outlier cut was 
employed using a 2.5 SD cut-off criterion. This procedure resulted in the removal of 
approximately 3% of cases.  For JE data, a Binomial Test was conducted on individuals’ “more 












Figure 18.  
Single and Joint Evaluation Results in Experiment 10 
 
Note: The left panel represents between-subject SE ratings; the right panel represents within-
subject JE choices. Error bars in both panels represent bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. 
  
First, in SE ratings, individuals judged the 15°/2-Word display (M = 10.04, SD = 14.03) 
to be similarly effortful to read as the 90°/1-Word display (M = 12.94, SD = 11.99), t(86) = -.87, 
95% CI [-7.99, 3.1], p = .38. Bayesian analyses revealed a simulated mode effect size of d = -
.16, 95% HDI [-.58, .24], and positive evidence for the null, BFNULL = 3.24. For JE choice, 
individuals selected the 90°/1-Word display as more effortful (66%, 95% CI [56%, 75%]) 
relative to the 15°/2-Word display, p < .01. Furthermore, a Bayes Factor computed for the 
binomial data demonstrated strong evidence for the alternative (i.e., that the proportion of 




as similarly effortful to read, whereas in JE, individuals selected the 90°/1-Word display as more 
effortful than the 15°/2-Word display (see Figure 18).   
Discussion 
Experiment 10 further examined the potential inevaluability of stimulus rotation by 
crossing stimulus rotation and a set size manipulation across a rating and choice context. In SE, 
individuals rated the 15°/2-Word display as similarly effortful to read aloud relative to the 90°/1-
Word display (though the pattern was very slightly in the direction opposite to that predicted). In 
JE, however, individuals more often chose the 90°/1-Word display as the more effortful of the 
two alternatives. Although not a complete preference reversal, these results demonstrate an 
inconsistency across ratings and choice as predicted by GET if one inevauable attribute is 
included as an alternative alongside an evaluable attribute. That is, stimulus rotation exerted a 
greater influence in JE relative to SE. This was the case even in light of clear differences in 
objective effort across the two options. Stimulus rotation costs for single items are relatively 
small (e.g., Jolicoeur, 1990; Risko et al., 2014) and would not be expected to be larger than the 
cost of processing an additional item (i.e., reading a one-word display relative to reading a two-
word display). Therefore, the results from Experiment 10 suggest, consistent with Experiments 
7-9, that perceptual effort as indexed by stimulus rotation is weakly evaluable. 
Experiments 11a and 11b 
Experiments 7 through 10 have demonstrated, through the application of GET, that the 
perceived effort associated with stimulus rotation is relatively inevaluable in contrast to a 
memorial or motor task. One clear limitation is the constrained task-specific efforts used to this 




question arising from Experiments 7-10 is whether the inevaluability evident with stimulus 
rotation is a product of perceptual effort being inherently inevaluable, or a product of stimulus 
rotation in-and-of-itself being relatively inevaluable. 
To examine this possibility, in Experiment 11a individuals provided effort ratings based 
on an additional perceptual task: identifying degraded stimuli ranging from 0% pixel removal to 
88% pixel removal in intervals of 22% pixels. Although stimulus degradation and stimulus 
rotation can both be considered perceptual manipulations, degradation arguably has associated 
with it a much clearer “failure point” (i.e., an upper limit in which an action cannot proceed 
without failure; see similarly Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). For 
example, such a failure point arguably exists for both set size and weight but not for the 
perceived effort associated with stimulus rotation (i.e., humans can process fully rotated stimuli 
at relatively minimal cost). Furthermore, this failure point is present for stimulus degradation as 
degradation can reach levels to the point where an item is unidentifiable. Therefore, following 
Experiments 7-9, if perceptual tasks are generally inevaluable, then I would expect individuals in 
SE to demonstrate greater sensitivity to the qualitative difference between 0% degradation and 
22% degradation, but not to demonstrate the same sensitivity to all differences thereafter. 
Judgments in JE should demonstrate a relatively positive linear function across all differences. 
Alternatively, if evaluability is not contingent on domain-specific tasks but rather is driven by an 
inherent failure point, then I would expect similar subjective effort functions for both the SE and 
JE evaluation modes. 
 In addition, Experiment 11b looked to extend the general results from hypothetical 
perceived effort, as has been investigated thus far, to perceived effort where individuals were 




were instructed that they would provide an effort rating (SE) or ratings (JE) for the levels of 
stimulus degradation and then be asked to attempt to read words that were presented to them on 
their screen. I offer no a priori hypothesis for why the pattern of ratings would differ if 
awareness of engaging in the task would affect perceived effort ratings relative to not having to 
engage in the task. However, if awareness that engaging in a task does not affect perceived effort 




 For Experiments 11a and 11b, 300 MTurk workers participated in the online study for 
compensation of .50¢ USD. Fifty individuals were assigned to each of the stimulus degradation 
dimensions in SE (i.e., 250 total for SE), and fifty were assigned to the JE group.  In Experiment 
11a, approximately eight percent of individuals failed at least one of three attention checks 
embedded in the survey resulting in a final N of 253 (MAge = 35.5 years, 47% female participants, 
61% reported completing a Bachelor’s degree or higher). In Experiment 11b, approximately 14% 
of individuals failed at least one of three attention checks embedded in the survey resulting in a 
final N of 258 (MAge = 32 years, 49% female participants, 53% reported completing a Bachelor’s 
degree or higher). 
Design 
 A 5 (Effort Level: Stimulus Degradation – 0%, 22%, 44%, 66%, 88%) x 2 (Evaluation 







Individuals judged displays consisting of the stimulus “WORD” degraded from 0% to 
88% of pixel removal in 22% increments using a diagonal grating. Individuals were asked “How 
effortful would it be to read this word aloud?. For Experiment 11b, five high frequency nouns 
(MWrittenFreq = 326.80) were generated (“FELT”, “WANT”, “MIND”, “DOOR”, “HELP”) and 
counterbalanced across five lists such that each word was presented equally across the five levels 
of stimulus degradation. 
Procedure 
 The procedure for JE and SE ratings in Experiment 11a followed Experiments 7-9. The 
procedure for Experiment 11b closely followed the aforementioned experiments. However, 
individuals were instructed prior to completing their effort ratings that, upon completion of the 
ratings, they would be asked to attempt to read a word (for SE) or words (for JE) and to enter the 
word presented into a text box. In SE, individuals only received one word to attempt to read 
corresponding to the degradation level they rated. In JE, individuals received five words to 
attempt to read corresponding to all levels of the stimulus degradation manipulation. 
Results 
All data analyses and reporting procedures followed Experiments 7-9. Subjective effort 
rating results are first presented for Experiment 11a followed by Experiment 11b (see Figure 19 
and Figure 20). Generalized additive mixed models (GAMM; see below) were constructed using 






Experiment 11a  
Effort Ratings 
Joint Evaluation Mode. No cases were removed for JE ratings. LMM results revealed a 
significant positive slope associated with increased degree of stimulus degradation, b = 16.11, 
SE = 1.82, t = 8.87, 95% CI [12.56, 19.77], β = .63, β 95% CI [.49, .77]. The slope model 
significantly improved model fit relative to the intercept-only model, χ2 (1) = 44.98, p < .001. 
Furthermore, visual inspection of loess fit to the data suggested a nonlinear model would best fit 
the JE data (i.e., an exponential fit). A GAMM model demonstrated a significant smooth term, 
edf = 2.55, F = 671.60, approximate p < .001. A deviance test demonstrated that the GAMM 
model produced a better fit to the JE data relative to the LMM model, p < .001, as well as a 
smaller AIC value relative to LMM model, AIC = 1795.15, AIC = 1853.32, for the GAMM and 
LMM models, respectively.  
Single Evaluation Mode. Approximately 5% of cases were removed. Linear model results 
for SE ratings revealed a significant positive slope associated with increased degree of stimulus 
degradation, b = 12.37, SE = 1.39, t = 8.90, p < .001, 95% CI [9.63, 15.10], R2 = .28, β = .53, β 
95% CI [.41, .64]. Similarly to JE ratings, inspection of a loess fit to the data suggested a 
nonlinear model may best fit the SE data (i.e., an exponential fit). A GAM model demonstrated a 
significant smooth term, edf = 1.86, F = 44.45, approximate p < .001. The GAM model produced 
a better fit to the SE data relative to the LM model, p = .003, as well as a smaller AIC value 








Joint Evaluation Mode. Less than 1% of cases were removed for JE ratings. LMM results 
revealed a significant positive slope associated with increased degree of stimulus degradation, b 
= 18.00, SE = 1.44, t = 12.48, 95% CI [15.10, 20.74], β = .69, β 95% CI [.59, .81]. The slope 
model significantly improved model fit relative to the intercept-only model, χ2 (1) = 64.82, p < 
.001. Furthermore, visual inspection of loess fit to the data suggested a nonlinear model may best 
fit the JE data (i.e., an exponential fit). A GAMM model demonstrated a significant smooth term, 
edf = 2.79, F = 1133.20, approximate p < .001. Furthermore, a deviance test demonstrated that 
the GAMM model produced a better fit to the JE data relative to the LMM model, p < .001, as 
well as a smaller AIC value relative to LMM model, AIC = 1796.43, AIC = 1911.77, for the 
GAMM and LMM models, respectively.  
Single Evaluation Mode. Approximately 10% of cases were removed. Linear model 
results for SE ratings revealed a significant positive slope associated with increased degree of 
stimulus degradation, b = 10.01, SE = 1.42, t = 7.03, p < .001, 95% CI [7.20, 12.82], R2 = .19, β 
= .44, β 95% CI [.32, .56]. Similarly to JE ratings, inspection of a loess fit to the data suggested a 
nonlinear model may best fit the SE data (i.e., an exponential fit). A GAM model demonstrated a 
significant smooth term, edf = 1.99, F = 13.45, approximate p < .001. The GAM model produced 
a better fit to the SE data relative to the LM model, p = .02, as well as a smaller AIC value 







Single and Joint Evaluation Subjective Effort Rating Results for Stimulus Degradation in 
Experiments 11a (Left Panel) and 11b (Right Panel). 
 
 
Note: Single Evaluation (SE) represents between-subject ratings; Joint Evaluation represents 














Standardized Beta Values for Slopes in Experiments 11a and 11b. 
 
Note: Single Evaluation (SE) represents between-subject ratings; Joint Evaluation represents 
within-subject ratings Error bars represent bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Reading Accuracy. Given the lack of variability in accuracy across several of the stimulus 
degradation conditions, performance is reported here only qualitatively (see Table 7). First for 
JE, accuracy was at ceiling (i.e., 100%) for the 0%, 22%, and 44% degradation conditions. 
Accuracy fell to 83% for the 66% degradation condition and to floor (0%) for the 88% 
degradation condition. For SE, accuracy was similarly at ceiling for the 0%, 22%, 44% 
degradation conditions, then falling to 82% accuracy for the 66% degradation condition, and 






Accuracy for Word Reading as a Function of Stimulus Degradation in Experiment 11b 
 
Note: Stimulus degradation was scaled as pixels removed from the original stimulus. Standard 
deviations are presented in parentheses.  
 
Discussion 
 Experiment 11a provides evidence that evaluability is not domain-specific; rather, it may 
be task-specific and contingent on a failure point. In contrast to the stimulus rotation 
manipulation used in Experiments 7-10, subjective effort ratings for the stimulus degradation 
manipulation used in Experiments 11a and 11b can be considered relatively evaluable. Ratings 
for both the SE and JE modes produced similar positive linear slopes in Experiment 11a. In 
addition, both functions were best fit with a non-linear exponential function relative to the linear 
functions. Results for Experiment 11b, where individuals had awareness that they were required 
to complete the task that they would rate, demonstrated a less positive slope for SE than the slope 
for JE. This suggests that having such awareness may affect ratings in SE but not JE, given the 
JE slope for Experiment 11b was extremely similar to Experiment 11a. To confirm that the 
flatness of the SE slope relative to the JE slope was not a result of noise, additional samples were 




slopes across the new samples with both closely matching the SE slope from Experiment 11a12. 
Thus, the difference across JE and SE slopes in Experiment 11b may indeed have been due to 
random variability in ratings. 
Critically, these findings contrast with Experiments 8 and 9 for the divergent patterns of 
effort ratings of stimulus rotation where SE slopes were flat and JE slopes were positively 
sloped. Tasks possessing a failure point associated with some value appear to drive consistent 
ratings across modes given the correspondence in effort functions across modes for degradation, 
set size, and weight. This similarity is absent for stimulus rotation. I return to these findings in 
the General discussion of this chapter. Furthermore, given the similarity of functions across 
Experiments 11a and 11b and replication samples (see Footnote 12), it does not appear that 
possessing awareness of having to engage in the task alters patterns of effort ratings.   
General Discussion 
General Evaluability Theory has been applied to various domains within economic, 
business, and management contexts (e.g., Bazerman, Loewenstein, & White, 1992; Hsee, 1993; 
1996; Nowlis & Simonson, 1997) in an attempt to gauge the putative sensitivity of a value of 
interest. Chapter 3 applied the GET logic to an additional determinant of decision-making: effort 
(see Table 8 for a review).  
                                                
12 For each SE rating condition, 250 participants were recruited through Mechanical Turk. In the 
Experiment 11a replication sample approximately 11% of individuals failed at least one attention 
check resulting in a final N of 222 (MAge = 32 years, 42% female participants, 53% reported 
completing a Bachelor’s degree or higher). In the Experiment 11b replication sample 
approximately 12% of individuals failed at least one attention check resulting in a final N of 219 
(MAge = 34 years, 52% female participants, 53% reported completing a Bachelor’s degree or 
higher). The two samples produced extremely similar positive slopes, β = .51, β 95% CI [.39, 
.63], β = .54, β 95% CI [.42, .65], for the Experiment 11a and Experiment 11b replication 
samples respectively, and are thus very comparable to the slope for SE in the original 




Table 8.  
Summary of the Current Experiments in Chapter 3 
 
Note: The replications of the SE mode slopes for Experiments 11a and 11b are reported in 
Footnote 12. 





JE-SE Relation Mode β 95% CI
Experiment 7 JE .48 [.27, .69]
SE .37 [.20, .55]
JE .86 [.75, .98]
SE .87 [.76, .97]
Weight JE .68 [.53, .82]
SE .48 [.31, .65]
Experiment 8 JE .43 [.31, .56]
SE .10* [-.05, .25]
JE .82 [.72, .92]
SE .87 [.80, .94]
JE .68 [.58, .77]
SE .62 [.50, .74]
Experiment 9 JE .50 [.36, .64]
SE .24 [.13, .36]
Experiment 10 - - -
- - -
Experiment 11a JE .63* [.49, .77]
SE .53* [.41, .64]
Experiment 11b JE .69* [.59, .81]
SE .44* [.32, .56]
11a .51 [.39, .63]
11b .54 [.42, .65]
Stimulus 
Degradation
More positive slope in 
JE relative to SE





Stimulus Rotation More positive slope in 












Stimulus Rotation Similar positive slopes
Set Size Similar positive slopes
Similar positive slopes
Stimulus Rotation Positive slope in JE, 
flat slope in SE




In Experiment 7, individuals provided judgments of expected effort in either the SE or JE 
mode across three task-specific efforts: stimulus rotation, set size, and weight. Results 
demonstrated that judgments of perceived effort for set size produced similar positive slopes 
across evaluation modes. The perceived effort associated with stimulus rotation and weight 
demonstrated similar patterns across modes, however not to the same degree as set size, 
suggesting that each type of task-specific effort may be evaluable. Experiment 8 addressed a 
potential concern of a floor effect in Experiment 7 by increasing the putative levels of effort to-
be-judged for the stimulus rotation and weight conditions. Results replicated the patterns found 
across modes for set size and weight, with both the SE and JE functions being very similar. 
Stimulus rotation, however, produced a positive linear function in JE and a flatter function in SE 
suggesting that perceptual effort in terms of stimulus rotation may not be highly evaluable. 
Experiment 9 looked to further examine this notion by focusing solely on judgments of stimulus 
rotations at finer rotation increments relative to Experiment 8. Again, JE produced a positive 
linear function across increments, whereas the linear function in SE was less positive. Taken 
together, Experiments 8 and 9 suggested that perceptual effort in terms of stimulus rotation may 
not be highly evaluable. That is, individuals do not appear to show value sensitivity to increasing 
effort in the task involving stimulus rotation. 
In Experiment 10, I further examined this possibility by crossing the relatively 
inevaluable stimulus rotation with a manipulation of set size (i.e., number of items in the display) 
across both ratings and choice (i.e., “Which is more effortful?”). Within this context, GET 
hypothesizes that a low-evaluability value will exert greater influence in JE (choice) relative to 
SE (ratings). Individuals more often selected the condition associated with greater levels of 




as similarly effortful in SE. Experiments 11a and 11b looked to test the hypothesis that 
evaluability is not domain-specific, but rather specific to tasks that are associated with a failure 
point, and whether awareness of completing the task that is to-be-rated affects subjective effort 
functions. Specifically, using stimulus degradation, both SE and JE produced similar positive 
slopes across effort levels, as well as exponential fits to the ratings data. In the following, I 
discuss potential determinants of effort evaluability, highlight potential shortcomings of the 
current chapter, and suggest avenues for future research.    
The Criticality of Reference Information 
At a normative level, all decision-making can be thought of as occurring between 
alternatives even when alternatives are not explicit (Hsee et al., 1999). Thus, what type of 
reference information is available to individuals in SE that would lead to consistent judgments, 
when no explicit reference information is afforded? Within GET, both knowledge (i.e., 
distributional information, such as the variability and average, gained through experience) and 
nature (i.e., whether individuals possess a stable physiological or psychological reference 
system) reflect internal reference information available when generating judgments in the 
absence of explicit reference points. In contrast, mode as utilized in the present investigation can 
be considered ad hoc evaluability (Hsee & Zhang, 2010). Importantly, knowledge and nature 
both acting as internal forms of references may provide the necessary information needed to 
produce high levels of value sensitivity in the absence of explicit reference information with all 
factors conjunctively working toward evaluability.  
Here I focus on potential candidates of what may constitute knowledge-based reference 
information and interact with mode potentially leading to, within the current experiments, some 




relative to nature given that nature-based reference information, according to GET, is explicitly 
tied to innate physiological or psychological scales not learned through experience. Aside from 
the clear issue of trying to generate testable predictions pertaining to proposed innate knowledge, 
there is no a priori reason to believe that humans possess innate psychological or physiological 
scales associated with remembering single items, lifting weights from the ground, or identifying 
degraded stimuli that would lead to heightened evaluability.  
Following from the evidence presented here in Chapter 3, then, individuals may learn 
reference information over time specifically pertaining to when an expected error or failure will 
occur as putative effort increases. There are clear limits to the number of items that humans can 
hold in short-term memory at a given time (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1971; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; 
Cowan, 2001; Miller, 1956). Similarly, there are clear limits with respect to the amount of 
physical exertion that humans are able to invest at a given time (Poole, Ward, Garner, & Whipp, 
1988; Suarez, 1996), and to the ability to identify degraded stimuli (Vokey, Baker, Hayman, & 
Jacoby, 1986). Individuals with good knowledge of these points may exploit this information to 
gauge their judgments from this point and, as such, benefit from increased evaluability across 
modes. 
Interestingly, a failure point would seem to be absent in the context of stimulus rotation. 
Increasing stimulus rotation is finite; an object can only be rotated so many degrees before it 
returns to its canonical orientation. Moreover, though there are clear performance costs 
associated with stimulus rotation, individuals are very capable of processing a wide range of 
rotated items (e.g., Graf, 2006; Jolicoeur, 1985; Koriat & Norman, 1984; Risko et al., 2014; Tarr, 
1995). That is, there does not seem to be a clear point of failure with regard to stimulus rotation 




information in SE would produce divergences in ratings across the modes. When this failure 
point information is present, however, individuals may exploit this reference information while 
generating their judgment of effort, leading to consistency in judgments across modes.  
The proposal that successful evaluability of effort can be driven by a failure point shares 
similarities with a proposal by Tversky and Kahneman (1992, see also Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) concerning what they term diminishing sensitivity in S-shaped probability weighting 
functions. Diminishing sensitivity states that the impact of a change in probability diminishes as 
the distance increases from a reference point. Importantly, two natural reference points drive the 
S-shape of probability weighting functions: certainty and impossibility, with the former 
psychologically being analogous to “certainly will happen” (i.e., a 100% probability) and the 
latter being analogous to “certainly will not happen” (i.e., a 0% probability; Gonzalez & Wu, 
1999). Here I have proposed that a failure point similar to impossibility potentially increases the 
evaluability of efforts. In contrast, following from GET, the existence of a failure point in 
probability weighting functions decreases the evaluability of the attribute. One clear reason for 
this discrepancy may be that perceived effort and perceived probability evoke different 
processes. Further considering how a failure point may foster evaluability in one case but 
inevaluability in another is an interesting question to pursue in the future. 
Subjective versus Objective Effort Functions 
The application of GET makes several assumptions with regard to value sensitivity that 
may pose problems for examining judgments of effort. First, there is a theoretically important 
distinction to make between an individual’s subjective value functions with respect to effort and 
their objective functions with respect to effort. The notion of value sensitivity or evaluability can 




closely map onto some measure of the level of objective processing demand that an act places on 
the system. There are strong reasons, however, to doubt this assumption.  
In Experiments 7-9, there was a close relation between JE and SE judgments of perceived 
effort associated with set size suggesting, according to GET, that this attribute is highly 
evaluable. However, if effort is measured through accuracy, then this is not the pattern expected. 
For example, Risko and Dunn (2015) demonstrated, using similar stimuli, that accuracy was near 
ceiling for smaller set sizes (2 and 4 letters), but fell radically at the medium set size (6 letters), 
and was near floor for the larger set sizes (8 and 10 letters). As would be expected from the 
experiments reported in this chapter, when individuals provided subjective ratings of accuracy 
and effort, results demonstrated relatively linear functions for both dimensions, where perceived 
effort increased and perceived accuracy decreased as the number of items increased. Therefore, 
the objective effort function (as indexed by accuracy) mimicked more of a decaying logistic 
function rather than a linear function as produced from individuals’ subjective judgments.  
A type of paradox then exists between subjective and objective effort functions: Based on 
the GET logic, a specific effort may be evaluable at the subjective level but not coincide with the 
associated objective function as indexed by some putative measure of objective effort (see also 
Hsee & Zhang, 2004, for a similar issue with regard to choice-experience inconsistencies). 
Resolving this apparent paradox requires taking seriously the notion that effort is a subjective 
phenomenon not necessarily tightly tied to objective processing demands (see Chapter 1; Kool & 
Botvinick, 2013; Westbrook & Braver, 2015). Indeed, several demonstrations exist of 
individuals’ decisions and subjective evaluations based on effort being dissociated from 
objective demands as indexed by various indirect measures (e.g., Chapters 1 and 2; Westbrook, 




subjective evaluations (e.g., across modes) without any expectation that those evaluations 
accurately map onto processing demand per se (or indirect measures of it). Separating the 
concept of evaluability from “accuracy” in this manner does not diminish the importance of 
understanding the former. This is because it is individuals’ subjective experience of effort that is 
proposed to drive behavior.  
Evaluating “Apples and Oranges” 
The current findings provide important insight into the relation between cognitive and 
physical judgments of effort. Kable and Glimcher (2009) note that subjective value allows for 
evaluation across options in such a way that decisions between “apples and oranges” are 
possible. Intriguingly, at specific effort levels in Experiments 7 and 8, individuals judged 
perceptual and memorial efforts as more effortful relative to physical effort and vice versa. For 
example, in Experiment 8, individuals’ effort ratings demonstrated that attempting to hold 10 
letters in memory and recall them accurately was perceived to be more effortful than lifting 50 
lbs. of weight from the ground, whereas lifting the same amount of weight was perceived to be 
more effortful than attempting to hold 6 letters in memory. These situations represent interesting 
instances where, if placed in a decision-making context, individuals would be faced with trading-
off one type of effort for another. 
Examination of these situations has implications for the study of cognitive offloading 
where a decision to forego some form of internal processing (i.e., cognitive effort) is made in 
favor for external processing (e.g., physical effort; Dunn & Risko, 2016; Gilbert, 2015; Kirsh & 
Maglio; 1994; Martin & Schwartz, 2005; Risko & Dunn, 2015; Risko & Gilbert, 2016; Risko et 
al., 2014; Wilson, 2002). For example, external normalization (Dunn & Risko, 2016; Risko et al., 




disoriented display to its canonical orientation, instead of performing the analogous internal 
transformation. Here, individuals trade-off cognitive effort in the form of some type of internal 
transformation for physical effort in the form of moving one’s body. Individuals more often 
choose to take on the physical effort associated with rotating the body as the putative cognitive 
effort of processing a rotated display increases (Risko et al., 2014). From the effort functions 
observed here, it can be argued that at some point the behavior would be expected to flip: 
Individuals would become more likely to take on the cognitive effort rather than the physical 
effort. Investigating whether a general bias exists toward avoidance of one form of effort, either 
cognitive or physical, in the context of offloading represents an intriguing avenue for future 
research. 
Methodological Implications 
 With regard to evaluation mode, Hsee et al. (1999) note an important issue for 
researchers interested in subjective evaluations to consider: Which evaluation mode is “better”, 
joint or separate? The authors note that often JE would be considered to be the better mode to 
place individuals in given that alternatives can be explicitly considered during judgment. 
However, in JE, individuals may be overly sensitive to a difference across options, thus inflating 
the within-subject effect when the effect may not even be detectable in SE (i.e., the between-
subjects effect). Moreover, if the consumption of an option should theoretically take place in SE, 
then the judgments elicited in JE may show inconsistencies with an individual’s actual 
consumption experience. Importantly, the design employed should match the researchers’ 
specific question regarding the judgments of some value of interest: Are we as researchers 
interested in how individuals decide (i.e., a within-subject design)? Or are we interested in how 




As an example, Schweitzer, Baker, and Risko (2013) examined the influence of including 
neuroimages (e.g., images of fMRI data) within scientific articles on individuals’ favorability 
judgments. Across four experiments utilizing between-subjects designs no effects were found 
when images were included relative to control conditions without images suggesting no 
neuroimage bias. In a fifth experiment, however, an effect was found when a within-subject 
design was used. Is the neuroimage bias a real phenomenon then? As highlighted above, GET 
would suggest that the answer depends on the mode in which you would expect individuals to 
use the neuroimaging evidence. In particular, if jurors were asked to decide between an argument 
that included a neuroimgage and one that did not (i.e., JE), then you might expect to find a 
neuroimage bias in individuals verdicts. However, if an argument was presented in isolation 
either with or without a neuroimage (i.e., SE), then that image would not be expected to have a 
strong impact on the believability of the argument. Thus, this bias arguably is constrained to 
situations where individuals would be making decisions both with and without the neuroimages 
present.  
Undoubtedly further examples exist where some effect is present in within-subjects 
designs but researchers fail to observe the same effect in between-subject designs (or vice versa), 
and further consideration of the issue of what evaluation mode to utilize would be of 
methodological importance across a wide range of contexts (e.g., Birnbaum, 1999). For example, 
within the context of heuristics and biases, Kahneman and Tversky (1996) argued that the two 
designs answer explicitly different questions. A between-subject design tests whether an 
individual relies on a given heuristic, whereas a within-subject design addresses how the conflict 




arguably offer a more realistic view of individuals’ reasoning (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). 
Conclusion 
 How individuals come to appraise the level of expected effort associated with some 
action is an essential question in the investigation of human decision-making. In this chapter, I 
have provided evidence with respect to how this is achieved through the lens of GET. Generally, 
both cognitive and physical effort as defined in the present investigation can be considered 
relatively evaluable, with increased evaluability being driven by exploiting a failure point 



















Chapter 3 examined the evaluability of effort, I proposed a process whereby individuals 
utilize reference information pertaining to expected error or failure points to explain why some 
efforts are evaluable. The evidence in Chapter 3 thus provides useful insight into further 
addressing the question of why effortful actions are evaluated as being effortful. If effort and 
errors are closely associated, then I would expect to see strong contributions of error likelihood 
to judgments of effort. Chapter 4 looked to directly test this idea. 
 
The following work is currently in review at Psychological Research (Dunn, Inzlicht, & Risko, 
submitted). 
















The question of what constitutes the cost of effort has recently come to the fore in 
research largely focused on the control of human behavior (e.g., Inzlicht, Bartholow, & Hirsh, 
2015; Kurzban, 2016). Effortful actions are often attributed to instances where behavioral control 
is deployed, are generally thought to carry a cost in decision-making, to be aversive (Dreisbach 
& Fischer, 2012), and to invoke an urge to disengage even when such actions may be considered 
adaptive (Kurban, 2016). For example, individuals willingly avoid lines of action associated with 
more effort (Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010) or requiring higher levels of reward to 
engage in such actions (Westbrook, Kester, & Braver, 2013).  
Although the discussion of effort as a key determinant in decision-making and control is 
pervasive, what constitutes effort is still an open question. Thus, empirically testing what drives 
effort judgments remains an important empirical problem. To better understand the constituents 
of effortfulness, in this chapter, I pit two basic determinants of effort against one another: error-
likelihood versus time-requirements. Specifically, I contrast individuals’ perception of effort 
when faced with a trade-off between engaging in a small amount of hard work (high error-
likelihood, low time requirements) versus a larger amount of easy work (low error-likelihood, 
high time requirements).  
Constituents of Effortfulness  
 Time requirements. The claim that processes that take more time are more effortful has 
enjoyed a successful history within psychology. For example, the Soft Constraints Hypothesis 
(Gray, Sims, Fu, & Schoelles, 2006) posits that, at relatively fast time scales, the cognitive 
system selects routines of actions that minimize time costs while achieving expected benefits. 




and attempting to maximize the Value of Computation (VOC) of a process, which consists of the 
reward of the computation discounted by the cost of the computation in terms of time.  
The general idea of more work (i.e., more time) being associated with effort costs is 
prevalent in several opportunity cost frameworks of behavioral control. An opportunity cost can 
generally be conceived of as engaging in some choice at the cost of some foregone alternative 
choice (e.g., “To go without fish to get game or the raising of wheat upon terms foregoing the 
raising of corn…”, Davenport, 1911, p. 725). Opportunity costs express the basic relation 
between scarcity and choice and, as such, provide a useful construct in understanding cost-
benefit analyses concerning behavioral control. For example, Niv and colleagues (2007) 
proposed that an average rate of reward serves as an opportunity cost in evaluations of physical 
effort. If the average rate of reward is high, then every second that a reward is not delivered is 
costly. Thus, there is a benefit of performing at a quicker rate even if the energetic costs of doing 
so are greater. Within this context, the average reward rate approximates the opportunity cost of 
time and the system may apply this rate across many types of decision contexts (Boureau, Sokol-
Hessner, & Daw, 2015). 
 Unsurprisingly, the opportunity cost approach to understanding behavioral control has 
been applied to specific accounts of cognitive effort. Kurzban and colleagues (2013; Kurzban, 
2016; see also Kool & Botvinick, 2014) proposed that opportunity costs arise as a function of 
parallel-processing capacity being finite and thus scarce (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Kahneman, 
1973; Kurzban et al., 2013; Navon & Gopher, 1979; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Wickens, 
2002), and dynamically allocated across processes. According to these approaches, the feeling of 
effort arises from an output of the mechanisms computing the costs and benefit of engaging in a 




therefore effortful tasks are those that engage work from multiple cognitive processes, such as 
control functions that encode and maintain representations of a task and marshal other functions 
such as attention, memory, and perception (Botvinick & Braver, 2015). Thus, increases in 
processing time prevent additional similar processes X, Y, Z from being carried out, given some 
amount of capacity is being held up by Task A. Furthermore, opportunity costs can accrue, be 
tallied, and tracked over time for use in the allocation of control (Westbrook & Braver, 2016) 
Comparable to opportunity cost accounts, motivational accounts of self-control similarly 
assign a cost to increased time-on-task. Inzlicht, Schmeichel, and Macrae’s (2014) shifting-
priorities process model of self-control hypothesizes that, given time is limited, the system 
attempts to optimally balance a trade-off between cognitive work and cognitive rest, with the 
former often requiring some external reward to engage in and the latter often being more 
intrinsically rewarding. Cognitive work continuing beyond some expected reward over time 
becomes aversive. This time cost accumulates and is tracked, leading to increased subjective 
experiences of signals such as mental fatigue and effort. These signals are then used by the 
system to amplify the urge to disengage in favor of more rewarding behaviors such as 
exploration, leisure, or a “want-to” (rather than “have-to”) goal. Thus, more work (i.e., more time 
requirements) can be considered as a determinant of effortfulness.  
 Error-likelihood. Beyond time, errors can also be considered as a potential determinant of 
effortfulness. At the neural level, error commission leads to a fast negative deflection in a fronto-
centrally located event-related potential (ERP) component known as the Error Related Negativity 
(ERN or Ne; Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, 
& Donchin, 1993; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis, Ridderinkhof, Blom, Band, & Kok, 




performance (Holyrod & Coles, 2002; c.f., Yeung, Botvinick, Cohen, 2004) and is expected to 
play a key role in driving behaviors. Upon error commission, the ERN is generated by activity 
from the mesencephalic dopamine system located within the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
signaling that the consequences of an action are worse (or better) than expected by the system 
(i.e., a temporal difference error; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). This difference between 
the expected and the experienced reward functions as a signal in action and outcome learning 
that increases a behavior’s reinforcement likelihood (Gläscher, Hampton, & O’Doherty, 2009; 
Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996). Thus, when a person commits an error (i.e., a deviation 
from intended behavior), an error signals that effortful control processes may be required for 
behavioral adjustment such as post error slowing (Rabbitt, 1966) or the reassessing of an entire 
behavioral plan (e.g., avoid a line of action or disengage from a current action; Taylor, Stern, & 
Gehring, 2007). For example, Frank and colleagues (2005) demonstrated that the magnitude of 
the ERN predicts learning from errors, and that more negative ERNs are associated with a higher 
avoidance of negative stimuli. Westbrook and Braver (2016) recently offered a formalization of 
the relation between effort and errors by hypothesizing that a specific form of error-related signal 
(i.e., reward prediction errors) carries effort-discounted signals for use in decision-making.  
An alternative but not necessarily mutually exclusive possibility is that errors can serve 
as a signal of whether the system is approaching capacity limitations when situated in a task. 
Such a view can be grounded in the distinction between automatic and controlled processing, 
with the former being argued to be relatively effortless and the latter being more effortful (for 
recent reviews see Botvinick & Cohen, 2014; Shenhav et al., in press). Recent work has 
suggested that the source of these capacity limitations lies in cross-talk produced by the use of 




Such processing bottlenecks may then require the intercession of control mechanisms to manage 
and minimize cross-talk (Shenhav et al., in press). From a limited-capacity perspective 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Kahneman, 1973; Kurzban et al., 2013; Navon & Gopher, 1979; 
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Wickens, 2002), error-likelihood may then signal the need to 
configure processes through control to avoid situations of cross-talk. 
Beyond response monitoring accounts of the error monitoring system (e.g., Dehaene, 
Posner, & Tucker, 1994; Holroyd & Coles, 2002), several alternative accounts suggest that the 
ERN also reflects a negative affective response to errors that is sensitive to motivational states 
and traits (Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005; Luu, Collins, & Tucker, 2000; Luu, Tucker, 
Derryberry, Reed, & Poulsen, 2003; Maier, Scarpazza, Starita, Filogamo, & Làdavas, 2016). 
Within this framework, errors can be considered broadly as maladaptive responses that, upon 
commission, may place an organism in danger and threaten its safety (Hajcak & Foti, 2008). To 
illustrate this notion, Hajcak and Foti (2008) demonstrated that defensive startle responses (i.e., 
the reflexive contracting of the body into a defensive posture) were larger upon error 
commission. The authors thus argue that errors prompt defensive responses, serving as a basic 
motivational function. Situated within accounts of control, errors can then be considered to be 
particularly aversive, to generate strong emotional responses upon commission, and to require 
greater adjustments of effortful control to resolve (Inzlicht et al., 2015). Therefore, hard work 
(e.g., tasks associated with a higher likelihood of errors than an alternative course of action) can, 
in addition to more work, be considered a determinant of effortfulness. 
Present Investigation  
The set of experiments in Chapter 4 looked to highlight the association between effort, 




Specifically, individuals made choices between two explicitly presented alternative tasks with 
respect to which was more effortful, had a higher likelihood of an error, or was more time 
demanding. Although many accounts of effort largely focus on why actions become subjectively 
effortful over time while situated within a task, relatively less attention has been paid to why 
some actions can be perceived as effortful at the point of initial evaluation, prior to engaging. 
Therefore, here I focus on individuals’ prospective evaluations of anticipated or perceived effort, 
time, and errors.  
Perceived effort, as opposed to experienced effort, has been argued to be crucial in the 
decision-making process (Dunn, Lutes, & Risko, 2016; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). 
Dunn and colleagues (2016) recently likened perceived effort to a subjective metacognitive 
evaluation not necessarily tied to the cognitive work that a task requires (see also McGuire & 
Botvinick, 2010; Westbrook & Braver, 2015). Critically, the evaluation of effort is for guiding 
behavior whether situated in a task (e.g., disengaging from an action) or not (e.g., avoiding an 
action). Thus, investigating judgments of perceived effort, time, and errors affords valuable 
insight into the extra-experimental biases that individuals bring to bear when making effort-
based judgments. This is not to devalue the utility of investigating experienced effort. Rather, 
prospective evaluations of perceived effort and “online” evaluations of experienced effort both 
deserve researcher’s attention. For example, the former likely plays a major role in decisions 
about whether to take on a task at all (i.e., one cannot experience the effortfulness of a task if it is 
avoided because of a prospective evaluation of effortfulness). 
 Throughout this chapter, I looked to establish whether a stimulus associated with more 
time or more errors would be considered more effortful. To manipulate time and errors, I used 




110° and two upright words. Critically, based on past research (Jordan & Huntsman, 1990; 
Koriat & Norman, 1984), reading a single word rotated 110° aloud generates more errors relative 
to two upright words, whereas reading two upright words takes longer to read relative to a single 
rotated word. I also confirmed this general pattern of data in Experiment 12a. Thus, in 
Experiment 12b, individuals were faced with a trade-off between a faster option associated with 
a higher likelihood of an error and a slower option associated with a lower likelihood of an error 
when making effort judgments. Experiment 12c utilized the same choice context and stimuli but 
manipulated the basis of individuals’ choices. Specifically, individuals were asked to make more 
time demanding or higher error likelihood choices. If effort judgments are associated with time, 
then the 2-words/0° display should elicit greater more effortful and more time demanding choices 
but lower higher error likelihood choices relative to the 1-word/110° display. Alternatively, if 
effort judgments are associated with more errors, then the 1-word/110° display should elicit 
greater more effortful and higher error likelihood choices, but lower more time demanding 
choices relative to the 2-words/0° display. 
Experiments 12a, 12b, and 12c 
Method 
In the following I report how I determined the sample size, all data exclusions, all 
manipulations, and all measures in the study (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). 
Participants 
 Initial Sample Size Determination for Experiment 12a. Twenty University of Waterloo 
undergraduates participated for course credit. This sample size allows for the detection of at least 
a medium effect size across conditions for a within-subject design. No individuals were removed 




 Initial Sample Size Determination for Experiments 12b and 12c. A pilot study was 
conducted based on Experiment 4 from Dunn et al. (submitted) where individuals similarly made 
effort-based choices between displays including stimulus rotation and set size. Results from the 
pilot study demonstrated an effect of 63% for effort choices favoring the stimulus rotation 
condition, g = .13, BFAlt = 1.40, suggesting a sample size of 93 was needed (based on null 
hypothesis significance testing; NHST). The initial sample size was set at N = 96 to ensure 
complete counterbalancing of the stimulus lists (see stimuli below). Given that the sizes of the 
effects for accuracy and time choices are unknown for Experiment 12b, the sample size from 
Experiment 12a was carried over for each of the dimensions.  
Current Sample for Experiments 12b and 12c. Ninety-six Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) workers were recruited in Experiment 12b for the online study (see Buhrmester, 
Kwang, & Gosling, 2011) and compensated $1 USD for participating. Twenty-five percent of 
individuals failed an attention check embedded in the survey (see procedure below) resulting in a 
final N of 72 (MedianAge = 29 years, MinAge = 20 years, MaxAge = 61 years, 54% male 
participants, and 54% reported completing a Bachelor’s degree or higher). 
One hundred and ninety-six MTurk workers were recruited in Experiment 12c for the 
online study and compensated $1 USD for participating. Nine percent of individuals failed the 
attention check embedded in the survey resulting in a final N of 174 (MedianAge = 31 years, 
MinAge = 20 years, MaxAge = 68 years, 57% male participants, and 48% reported completing a 
Bachelor’s degree or higher). 
Design 
 For Experiment 12a, a one-factor (Choice Option: 1-word/110°; 2-words/0°; 3-words/0°; 




(Choice Option: 1-word/110°; 2-words/0°) within-subject design was employed. For Experiment 
12c, a one factor (Rating Dimension: Time, Accuracy) x 2 (Choice Option: 1-word/110°; 2-
words/0°) mixed design was employed. Rating dimension was manipulated between-subjects. 
Figure 21. 
Example of Choice Screen with each Option 
 
Note: Both options, the 1-word/110° display and 2-words/0° display, were presented side-by-side 
to individuals. Individuals were instructed to choose which option they felt would be more 
effortful (Experiments 12a and 13), more time demanding (Experiments 12b and 13), or less 
accurate (Experiments 12b and 13) to read aloud.  
 
Apparatus 
 Experiment 12a was deployed using DMDX software (Forster & Forster, 2003). Stimuli 
were presented on a 24” LCD monitor with individuals sitting approximately 70 cm away. A 
standard QWERTY keyboard was used for manual responses.  
Stimuli 
 Stimuli consisted of a single word presented at ±110° and two words presented at upright 




Written Word Frequency = 273 per thousand. In addition, an arrow was placed between the 
words in the 2-word display to draw attention to reading direction. Twelve unique lists were 
constructed and counterbalanced such that each word appeared in every position across the left 
and right displays (see Figure 21). All stimuli were similar in Experiment 12c, though the arrow 
was removed from the 2-word stimuli given that several participants in Experiment 12b reported 
that it was unclear whether they were to imagine naming the word “ARROW” in the display. 
This removal resulted in a better rate of individuals passing the attention check. 
Procedure 
Experiment 12a. Individuals entered the testing room and were seated approximately 70 
cm away from the monitor. Instructions stated that individuals were to read each presented 
display aloud as quickly and as accurately as possible and to press the “B” button when they 
were finished. Extra emphasis was added to ensure that they had fully finished reading aloud 
prior to pressing the “B” button to avoid spoiled trials. In addition, individuals were asked to 
maintain an upright head position while loosely remaining in a headrest. Individuals were not 
required to fully set their chin into the headrest to ensure that they could comfortable respond 
aloud. Individuals completed 16 trials of each of the choice option conditions for a total of 80 
trials. The entire experiment took approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
Experiments 12b and 12c. MTurk workers selected the task and provided informed 
consent electronically. Instructions stated that the task to-be-completed would be to choose 
which out of two different tasks presented would be “More Effortful (i.e., difficult or 
demanding)” to complete. Individuals were further instructed that they were to imagine that the 
specific task they would be asked to do would be to produce the word or all of the words 




upright words and instructed that if they were presented the display, then I would want them to 
imagine that they would be expected to read all three words in the display in a natural left-to-
right manner. Once they confirmed that they understood the instructions as stated, participants 
were randomly presented one display from the list of 12. To make their “More Effortful” choice, 
individuals selected one of two radio buttons labeled “The Left Display” and “The Right 
Display”. For Experiment 12c, instructions for the time dimension stated that the task to-be-
completed would be to choose which out of two different tasks presented would be “More Time 
Demanding (i.e., take more time)” to complete. Instructions for the accuracy dimension stated 
that the task to-be-completed would be to choose which out of two different tasks presented you 
would be “Less Accurate (i.e., make more errors)” to complete. 
Once participants made their choice, an attention check was presented displaying the 
same choice screen that the participant had received and asked, “If we asked you to name the 
words on the left/right, then how many words total would you have named?”. The specific 
“left/right” designation was always to the 2-word display, thus the correct answer was “2” for 
every participant. Individuals then completed demographic information and were given a unique 
code to enter back into Mechanical Turk to receive payment. Completion of the study took 
approximately five minutes.  
Results 
Experiment 12a 
 The ezANOVA (Lawrence, 2015) package was utilized for ANOVA analyses. 
Performance coding was completed using CheckVocal software (Protopapas, 2007).  




finishing the response). Results are reported first for response times (RT) followed by accuracy 
(see Table 9). 
 All error trials were removed for RT analyses. One trial was removed as an extreme 
outlier based on Z-scoring (Z = 6.40). Upon removal, the RT distribution showed no signs of 
extreme skewnesss (.58) or kurtosis (2.99). A one-way Bayes Factor (BF) ANOVA 
demonstrated positive evidence for the alternative (i.e., the choice option condition had an effect 
on RTs relative to an error-only model), BFAlt = 5.34, F(4, 76) = 296.33, MSE = 28595.49, p < 
.001, η2 = .94. Individual BFs were computed for the 1-word/110° condition relative to all other 
conditions. Extreme evidence for the alternative was demonstrated for each of the four 
comparisons, minimum BFAlt = 102.28, minimum d = .57 for the 1-word/110° x 2-word/0° 
comparison. Thus, the 1-word/110° condition was faster to read aloud relative to all other 
conditions.  
For accuracy, A one-way Bayes Factor (BF) ANOVA demonstrated strong evidence for 
the null, BFNullt = 333.33, F(4, 76) = .91, MSE = .004, p > .1, η2 = .05, demonstrating that 
accuracy did not vary across the five choice option conditions, although qualitatively the 1-
word/110° condition produced the lowest accuracy (i.e., more errors) relative to all condition 
with the exception of the 5-word/0° condition.  
Table 9.  
Mean Performance Results for Experiment 12a 
 




Experiments 12b and 12c 
Bayesian analyses of the maximum a posteriori estimate (i.e., mode value; MAP) of the θ 
parameter (i.e., successes and failures for binomial data) and 95% Highest Density Intervals 
(HDI) around θ (Kruschke, 2013) were generated in R (R Core Team, 2014). Bayes Factors (BF) 
were computed using the BayesFactor package (Morey & Rouder, 2015) in R. Evidential 
strength categories for Bayes Factors (i.e., in favor of the alternative hypothesis) follow the 
criteria outlined by Lee and Wagenmakers (2013; see similarly Jeffreys, 1961): 1-3 “Anecdotal”, 
3-10 “Moderate”, 10-30 “Strong”, 30-100 “Very Strong”, > 100 “Extreme”. The determination 
of priors for the Beta distribution shape parameters β(a,b) (where a = successes and b = failures 
within the sample) used for HDIs and BFs is outlined preceding the reporting of results. 
Furthermore, Binomial and chi-square test results are presented alongside Bayesian analyses 
where applicable. For Experiments 12b and 12c, default priors were used for BFs (i.e., r scale = 
.707), and priors for estimation were set for β(a,b) as a = 4 and b = 4. The latter prior closely 
approximates the former for BFs, thus the two priors are fairly commensurate across the BF and 
estimation analyses.   
First, for Experiment 12b, individuals chose the 1-word/110° display as the more 
effortful option relative to the 2-words/0° display 75% of the time, BFAlt = 1569.77, MAP = 
73%, 95% HDI [63%, 82%], p < .001 Binomial test. For the error-likelihood dimension in 
Experiment 12c, individuals chose the 1-word/110° display as the less accurate option relative to 
the 2-words/0° display 79% of the time, BFAlt = 457,656.10, MAP = 77%, 95% HDI [68%, 
85%], p < .001 Binomial test. For the time dimension, individuals chose the 1-words/110° 
display as the more time demanding option relative to the 2-words/0° display 50% of the time, 




Furthermore, BF chi-square tests were conducted to test 1-word/110° display choices 
across the effort, error-likelihood, and time dimensions. Results demonstrated moderate evidence 
for the null hypothesis (i.e., that each column of the data has different probabilities) for 1-
word/110° choices across the effort (75%) and accuracy (79%) dimensions, BFNull = 5.00, χ2(1) = 
.17, p > .1. This offers moderate support for the notion that effort ratings closely track ratings of 
error likelihood. Comparisons of choices for the effort and error likelihood dimensions against 
the time dimension (50%) demonstrated very strong evidence for the alternative in both cases, 
BFAlt = 36.21, χ2(1) = 9.40, p < .001, BFAlt = 583.54, χ2(1) = 14.78, p < .001, for effort vs. time 
and error likelihood vs. time, respectively. This offers very strong support for the notion that 
ratings of effort do not track ratings of time-requirements, and also provides extreme support for 
the notion that ratings of error likelihood do not track ratings of time requirements.  
In sum, individuals similarly chose the 1-word/110° display as the more effortful and 
more error-prone option relative to the 2-words/0° display. In contrast, by individuals showing 
no preference on the dimension of time requirement, they contrasted sharply with their very clear 
preference (for the 1-word/110° display) on the dimensions of effort and error likelihood (see 
Figure 22).  
Discussion 
Experiment 12 demonstrates a dissociation between effort, error, and time judgments. 
Individuals chose the 1-word/110° display as both more effortful and more error-prone relative 
to the 2-words/0° display despite accuracy being relatively equivalent across the options based 
on performance estimates. Individuals showed no clear preference for either display when 
evaluating the displays on time requirements. This was the case even though performance 




display. Such findings coincide with much previous work highlighting dissociations between 
subjective reports of performance and actual performance (e.g., Bryce & Bratzke, 2014; Dunn & 
Risko, 2016; Dunn et al., 2016; Marti, Sackur, Sigman, & Dehaene, 2010; Miller, Vieweg, 
Kruize, & McLea, 2010). Therefore, individuals’ effort choices closely followed the option 




Figure 22.  
 
Individuals’ More Effortful, Higher Error Likelihood, and More Time Demanding Choices for 
the 1-word/110° display in Experiments 12b, 12c, and 13a. 
 
 
Note: All presented data points are for choices of the 1-word/110° display; the alternative choice 
relative to the 1-word/110° display is plotted on the X-axis. That is, choices below chance (50%) 
would reflect a tendency to more often choose the alternative choice denoted on the X-axis. Data 
for the 1-word/110° x 2-words/0° comparison were collected in Experiments 12b and 12c. All 
other data were collected in Experiment 13a. The mode θ values are based on the posterior 






Experiments 13a and 13b 
 Experiment 13a aimed to further explore the observed dissociation between judgments 
(i.e., effort = errors > time). Individuals completed a judgment task similar to that in Experiments 
12b and 12c. However, in Experiment 13a the set size manipulation ranged from 3 words to 5 
words while keeping the 1-word/110° contrasting display constant. Thus, by increasing set size, 
time judgments would be expected to fully dissociate from effort and error judgments (i.e., more 
items should increase the likelihood that individuals judge more words as having greater time 
requirements). A specific hypothesis is not forwarded as to the set size comparison in which this 
dissociation will occur, but rather by increasing set size, the likelihood that this dissociation will 
occur should increase accordingly. To foreshadow, Experiment 13a demonstrated a clear 
dissociation between effort and error-likelihood ratings relative to time when contrasting 1-
word/110° vs. 3-words/0°. Given the importance of the clear dissociation between choices across 
the three dimensions, a registered replication was completed of the specific 1-word/110° versus 
3-words/0° choice condition for all choice dimensions in Experiment 13b (please see 
https://osf.io/2szy3/registrations for the replication protocol). 
Method 
Participants 
 Initial Sample Size Determination for Experiment 13a. The sample sizes of n = 96 for 
each rating dimension (i.e., effort, accuracy, and time) from Experiments 12b and 12c were used 
in Experiment 2. 
Current Sample for Experiment 13a. Eight hundred and sixty MTurk workers were 
recruited for the online study and compensated $1 USD for participating. Ten percent of 




(MedianAge = 33 years, MinAge = 18 years, MaxAge = 82 years, 48% male participants, and 49% 
reported completing a Bachelor’s degree or higher). 
Initial Sample Size Determination for Experiment 13b. Three-hundred and twenty MTurk 
workers were recruited for the online study and compensated $1 USD for participating. The 
replication used optional stopping methods (Rouder, 2014) to determine the final sample size. A 
Bayes Factor of 5 favoring either the null or the alternative was used as the cut-off for data 
collection. Sub-samples of 32 individuals were tested until this cut-off was met (see below for 
final BFs).  
Current Sample for Experiment 13b. Ninety-six individuals were tested in the effort and 
accuracy dimensions and 128 individuals were tested for the time dimension. Seven percent of 
individuals failed the attention check embedded in the survey, resulting in a final N of 279 
(MedianAge = 32 years, MinAge = 19 years, MaxAge = 70 years, 48% male participants, and 54% 
reported completing a Bachelor’s degree or higher). 
Design 
A 3 (Choice Option: 1-word/110° vs. 3-words/0°, 1-word/110° vs. 4-words/0°, 1-
word/110° vs. 5-words/0°) x 3 (Rating Dimension: Effort, Time, Accuracy) between-subjects 
design was employed for Experiment 13a. Experiment 13b utilized a 2 (Choice Option: 1-
word/110° vs. 3-words/0) x 3 (Rating Dimension: Effort, Time, Accuracy) design. 
Stimuli 
 The stimuli closely followed Experiments 12b and 12c, however a larger word list was 




frequency nouns: “LINE”, “TURN”, “SHOW”, “FEET”, “PAST”, and “HALF”, Mean Written 
Word Frequency = 276 per thousand words. 
Procedure 
 All portions of the procedures followed Experiments 12b and 12c. 
Results 
 Results for Experiment 13a are presented (see Figure 22) followed by Experiment 13b. 
Following from Experiment 12, I present the results of each individual choice option condition 
separately to examine at what point judgments potentially become fully dissociated. All of the 
following analyses utilized priors as described in Experiments 12b and 12c.  
Experiment 13a 
 1-word/110° vs. 3-words/0°. First, a BF computed for the 2 (choice) x 3 (rating 
dimension) data demonstrated extreme evidence for the alternative that each column of the data 
had different probabilities, BFAlt = 558.31, χ2(2) = 19.94, p < .001. For the effort dimension, 
individuals chose the 1-word/110° display as the more effortful option relative to the 3-words/0° 
display 66% of the time, BFAlt = 23.51, MAP = 65%, 95% HDI [55%, 74%], p < .01 Binomial 
test. For error likelihood, individuals chose the 1-word/110° display as the less accurate option 
relative to the 3-words/0° display 67% of the time, BFAlt = 25.05, MAP = 66%, 95% HDI [56%, 
76%], p < .01 Binomial test. For time, individuals chose the 1-word/110° display as the more 
time demanding option relative to the 3-words/0° display 38% of the time, BFAlt = 3.18, MAP = 
39%, 95% HDI [29%, 48%], p = .03. Results supported the null hypothesis when comparing the 
effort and error likelihood dimensions, BFNull = 5.56, χ2(1) < .1,  p > .1, suggesting that the 




likelihood. Comparisons of the effort and accuracy dimensions against the time dimension 
demonstrated at least very strong evidence for the alternative in both cases, BFAlt = 278.94, χ2(1) 
= 13.53, p < .001, BFAlt = 309.56, χ2(1) = 13.66, p < .001, for effort vs. time and error likelihood 
vs. time respectively, meaning that evaluations of time requirements differed markedly from 
evaluations of effort and error likelihood. In short, individuals similarly chose the 1-word/110° 
display as the more effortful and less accurate option, but the 3-words/0° display as the more 
time demanding option. 
1-word/110° vs. 4-words/0°. A BF computed for the 2 x 3 data demonstrated strong 
evidence for the alternative that each column of the data had different probabilities, BFAlt = 
22.35, χ2(2) = 13.02, p < .001. For the effort dimension, individuals chose the 1-word/110° 
display as the more effortful option relative to the 4-words/0° display 50% of the time, BFNull = 
3.85, MAP = 50%, 95% HDI [40%, 60%], p > .1 Binomial test. For error likelihood, individuals 
chose the 1-word/110° display as the less accurate option relative to the 4-words/0° display 56% 
of the time, BFAlt = .43, MAP = 55%, 95% HDI [45%, 66%], p > .1 Binomial test. For time, 
individuals chose the 1-words/110° display as the more time demanding option relative to the 4-
words/0° display 30% of the time, BFAlt = 296.17, MAP = 31%, 95% HDI [22%, 41%], p < .001 
Binomial test. Results moderately supported the null hypothesis when comparing the effort and 
error likelihood, BFNull = 4.00, χ2(1) = .33,  p > .1. Comparisons of the effort and error likelihood 
dimensions against the time dimension demonstrated moderate and very strong evidence for the 
alternative, BFAlt = 8.90, χ2(1) = 6.77, p < .01, BFAlt = 64.69, χ2(1) = 10.64, p = .001, for effort 
vs. time and error likelihood vs. time respectively. Thus, individuals similarly chose the 1-
word/110° display at near chance levels for the effort and error-likelihood dimensions, but the 4-




displays, ratings of effort and error-likelihood tracked one another, and differed markedly from 
ratings of time requirements. 
1-word/110° vs. 5-words/0°. A BF computed for the 2 x 3 data demonstrated anecdotal 
evidence for the alternative that each column of the data had different probabilities, BFAlt = 2.02, 
χ2(2) = 8.33, p = .02. For the effort dimension, individuals chose the 1-word/110° display as the 
more effortful option relative to the 5-words/0° display 34% of the time, BFAlt = 11.59, MAP = 
36%, 95% HDI [25%, 45%], p < .01 Binomial test. For error likelihood, individuals chose the 1-
word/110° display as the less accurate option relative to the 5-words/0° display 36% of the time, 
BFAlt = 4.91, MAP = 36%, 95% HDI [26%, 47%], p = .02 Binomial test. For time, individuals 
chose the 1-words/110° display as the more time demanding option relative to the 5-words/0° 
display 18% of the time, BFAlt > 1,000,000, 95% HDI [13%, 29%], p < .001 Binomial test. 
Results supported the null hypothesis when comparing the effort and error likelihood 
dimensions, BFNull = 4.00, χ2(1) <.1,  p > .1. Comparisons of the effort and error likelihood 
dimensions against the time dimension demonstrated moderate evidence for the alternative in 
both cases, BFAlt = 3.74, χ2(1) = 5.40, p = .02, BFAlt = 5.45, χ2(1) = 6.07, p = .01, for effort vs. 
time and error likelihood vs. time respectively. Thus, individuals chose the 5-words/0° display as 
the more effortful, less accurate, and more time demanding option relative to the 1-word/110° 
display. Nonetheless, effort and error likelihood choices were similar with both dimensions 
producing higher 1-word/110° choices relative to the time dimension. 
Experiment 13b 
1-word/110° vs. 3-words/0°. A BF computed for the 2 x 3 data demonstrated only 
anecdotal evidence (based on the above evidential categories) for the alternative that each 




dimension, individuals chose the 1-word/110° display as the more effortful option relative to the 
3-words/0° display 53% of the time, BFNull = 3.57, MAP = 52%, 95% HDI [43%, 63%], p > .1 
Binomial test. For the error likelihood, individuals chose the 1-word/110° display as the less 
accurate option relative to the 3-words/0° display 52% of the time, BFNull = 3.57, MAP = 52%, 
95% HDI [41%, 62%], p > .1 Binomial test. For the time dimension, individuals chose the 1-
word/110° display as the more time demanding option relative to the 3-words/0° display 36% of 
the time, BFAlt = 20.84, MAP = 37%, 95% HDI [29%, 45%], p < .001 Binomial test. Results 
demonstrated evidence for the null hypothesis when comparing the effort and error likelihood 
dimensions, BFNull = 5.26, χ2(1) < .1,  p > .1. Comparisons of the effort and error likelihood 
dimensions against the time dimension demonstrated moderate and anecdotal evidence for the 
alternative, BFAlt = 3.23, χ2(1) = 5.28, p = .02, BFAlt = 2.06, χ2(1) = 4.34, p = .04, for effort vs. 
time and error-likelihood vs. time respectively. 
Given that the replication sample used the exact same methods and procedures relative to 
the original experiment, the initial sample and replication sample were combined to provide a 
clearer estimate of the choices for each rating dimension in the 1-word/110° vs. 3-words/0° 
condition (N = 567). The following analyses were unregistered. First, BFs demonstrated only 
anecdotal evidence at best that choices differed across the original and replication samples for all 
the rating dimensions, BFAlt < 1.25 for all, p > .07, for all chi-square tests. For the effort 
dimension, individuals chose the 1-word/110° display as the more effortful option relative to the 
3-words/0° display 59% of the time, BFAlt = 4.32, MAP = 59%, 95% HDI [52%, 66%], p = .01 
Binomial test. For error likelihood, individuals chose the 1-word/110° display as the less 
accurate option relative to the 3-words/0° display 59% of the time, BFAlt = 3.60, MAP = 59%, 




word/110° display as the more time demanding option relative to the 3-words/0° display 37% of 
the time, BFAlt = 238.66, MAP = 37%, 95% HDI [31%, 44%], p < .001 Binomial test. Results 
demonstrated evidence for the null hypothesis when comparing the effort and error likelihood 
dimensions, BFNull = 7.69, χ2(1) < .1,  p > .1. Comparisons of the effort and error likelihood 
dimensions against the time dimension demonstrated extreme evidence for the alternative in both 
cases, BFAlt = 3278.02, χ2(1) = 19.39, p < .001, BFAlt = 2185.93, χ2(1) = 18.55, p < .001, for 
effort vs. time and error likelihood vs. time respectively. Therefore, the combined analysis 
confirms the pattern that individuals similarly chose the 1-word/110° display as the more 
effortful and greater error likelihood, but the 3-words/0° display as the more time demanding 
option (see Figure 23). 
Figure 23.  
 
Individuals’ More Effortful, Higher Error Likelihood, and More Time Demanding Choices for 




Note: All presented data points are for choices of the 1-word/110° display. The mode percentage 






Additional dissociations between effort, error, and time judgments were observed in 
Experiments 13a and 13b. The 1-word/110° versus 3-words/0° comparison produced the 
strongest dissociation between the dimensions. Individuals more often choose the 1-word/110° 
display as more effortful and error prone, but the 3-words/0° display as more time demanding. 
Furthermore, the replication sample provided strong evidence for choices for the time dimension 
coinciding with the original sample, though choices for the effort and accuracy dimensions were 
somewhat lower relative to the original sample. Nonetheless, when taking the original and 
replication samples into account, the full dissociation persisted.  
Results from the 1-word/110° versus 4-words/0° comparison suggest that although 
participants overwhelmingly chose the 4-words/0° option as more time demanding, this 
difference in perceived time demand (and objective time demand based on Experiment 12a) did 
not translate to ratings of effort, where individuals’ choices were at chance. All dimensions did 
eventually favor the larger set size as being more effortful, time demanding, and less accurate at 
the 1-word/110° versus 5-words/0° comparison, though time judgments more favored the 5-
words/0° option, with effort and accuracy judgments being closer to chance. Importantly, in all 
cases evidence favored effort and error likelihood choices being similar with both being 
markedly different relative to time choices (i.e., effort = errors > time). Thus, Experiments 13a 
and 13b further demonstrate a strong association between effort and error judgments.  
Experiment 14 
 The previous experiments have relied on manipulations of stimulus rotation and set size 
to generate a trade-off between time and errors. One could argue, however, that closely 




but rather are based on low perceptual fluency related to a rotated display being aversive. Indeed, 
manipulations of perceptual fluency have been shown to influence a wide range of judgments 
and performance (e.g., Dunn et al., 2016; Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998; Winkielman, 
Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). To rule out perceptual fluency as a determinant of effort 
judgments, in Experiment 14 options were changed from stimulus rotation and set size to math 
problems.  
Based on previous research (e.g., Ashcraft & Faust, 1994; Siegler & Lemaire, 1997, 
Walsh & Anderson, 2009) one N x NN multiplication problem generates more errors relative to 
six simple addition problems, whereas solving six addition problems takes longer relative to a 
single multiplication problem. Hence, again individuals were faced with a trade-off between time 
and errors. If judgments of effort are driven by an evaluation of the likelihood of errors, then I 
would expect individuals to choose the one multiplication problem as the more effortful 
alternative relative to six addition problems. In addition, choices for the error dimension should 




 Initial Sample Size Determination. The sample size of n = 96 for each rating dimension 
(i.e., effort, accuracy, and time) was carried over from the previous experiments. 
Current Sample. Two-hundred and eighty-eight MTurk workers were recruited for the 
online study and compensated $1 USD for participating. Seven percent of individuals failed the 




MinAge = 18 years, MaxAge = 71 years, 43% male participants, and 50% reported completing a 
Bachelor’s degree or higher). 
Design 
 A 3 (Rating Dimension: Effort, Time, Accuracy) x 2 (Choice Option: 1 multiplication 
problem vs. 6 single digit addition problems) mixed design was employed. Rating dimension 
was manipulated between subjects. 
Stimuli  
  The general choice screen was similar to the previous experiments. The two choice 
options consisted of one N x NN multiplication problem and six simple single digit addition 
problems. To attempt to control for simple retrieval-based strategies for multiplication problems, 
all N digits ranged from five to nine and for the NN problems all digits ranged from 12 to 19. 
Seven unique problems were randomly generated: 15 x 9, 17 x 6, 13 x 7, 12 x 7, 16 x 8, 19 x 5, 
and 14 x 8. For the simple addition problems, digits ranged from one to four. Seven unique 
problems were randomly generated: 2 + 4, 4 + 3, 1 + 1, 1 + 2, 3 + 1, 2 + 3, and 4 + 1. The order 
of the addition problems presented within the choice screen was counterbalanced along with the 
multiplication problems resulting in seven unique choice screens (i.e., the multiplication problem 
varied across individuals while the same addition problems were utilized for all individuals but 
shifted through the order that they were presented).  
Procedure 






 All of the following analyses utilized priors as described in the previous experiments. A 
BF computed for the 3 x 2 data demonstrated extreme evidence for the alternative that each 
column of the data had different probabilities, BFAlt > 1,000,000, χ2(2) = 36.45, p < .001. For 
effort, individuals chose the one multiplication problem as the more effortful option relative to 
the six addition problems 72% of the time, BFAlt = 1344.85, MAP = 71%, 95% HDI [61%, 79%], 
p < .001 Binomial test. For error likelihood, individuals chose the one multiplication problem as 
the less accurate option relative to the six addition problems 85% of the time, BFAlt > 1,000,000, 
MAP = .83, 95% HDI [75%, 90%], p < .001 Binomial test. Last, for time, individuals chose the 
one multiplication as the more time demanding option relative to the six addition problems only 
44% of the time, BFAlt = .48, MAP = 44%, 95% HDI [35%, 54%], p > .1 Binomial test. Results 
reveal only anecdotal evidence for the alternative hypothesis when comparing the effort and 
error likelihood dimensions, BFAlt = 1.51, χ2(1) = 3.89,  p = .05. Comparisons of the effort and 
error likelihood dimensions against the time dimension demonstrated extreme evidence for the 
alternative in both cases, BFAlt = 310.66, χ2(1) = 13.68, p < .001, BFAlt > 1,000,000, χ2(1) = 


















Figure 24.  
 
Individuals’ More Effortful, Higher Error Likelihood, and More Time Demanding Choices for 
the One Multiplication Problem in Experiment 14 
 
 
Note: All presented data points are for choices of the one multiplication problem. The mode θ 




Consistent with the previous experiments in this chapter, the multiplication option 
generated more effortful and higher error likelihood evaluations that were both similarly above 
chance, with evaluations of time requirements differing markedly from these and being slightly 
below chance. Therefore, the apparent error bias in effort judgments is not driven merely by the 
low fluency associated with the stimulus rotation manipulation in Experiments 12 and 13. 






 In Chapter 4, I investigated the influence of two potential determinants of effortfulness: 
time requirements and error likelihood. Experiments 12b and 12c provided evidence of a 
dissociation between effort, errors, and time. The option associated with the higher error 
likelihood generated higher effort and error choices while time choices were equivalent across 
the options. Experiment 13 further demonstrated clear dissociations between effort, errors, and 
time choices, with effort and error choices closely tracking one another. To generalize the 
findings from Experiments 12 and 13, Experiment 14 utilized different task conditions in the 
same trade-off context. Again, individuals chose the option associated with a higher likelihood of 
an error as more effortful, with effort and error judgments tracking closely, but not time choices.  
Perceived Error Likelihood as a Determinant of Effortfulness 
Why are effortful actions evaluated as effortful? I propose that evaluations of effort are 
driven by a bias to more heavily weigh the perceived likelihood of error commission relative to 
time demands in explicit trade-off situations. Paired with the work outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, 
individuals can utilize and weight the likelihood of an error over salient available cues associated 
with an action, such as stimulus rotation in Experiments 12 and 13 or math problem type in 
Experiment 14, to generate their judgment of effortfulness. Such a bias can serve as a type of 
inferential heuristic in guiding initial action selection by generating satisfactory solutions for 
action selection while costing only modest amounts of cognitive work (Gigerenzer, 2008; 
Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC Research Group, 1999; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Simon, 1982; 
1990). Following Shah and Oppenheimer’s (2008) framework, this proposed bias predictably 
reduces cognitive work by (1) simplifying the weighting principle for cues, (2) allowing for the 




values, (4) requiring less information to be integrated, and (5) potentially leading to examining 
fewer alternatives, as I detail below. 
Utilizing error likelihood as a weighting principle across cues in judgments of effort can 
provide a low cost approximation of the potential effort associated with a line of action. As 
reviewed above, several accounts suggest that error commission signals the need to engage 
effortful control over behavior; for example, attempting to correct a deviation from intended 
behavior to be in line with expected rewards, avoiding cross-talk situations that quickly lead to 
capacity limits, or configuring behavior in ways that avoid danger and threats to safety. Under all 
of these accounts, errors can be considered aversive as they signal the potential for engaging 
demanding control processes that are intimately linked to increased cognitive work across the 
executive control network (for reviews see Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Shenav et al., in press). As 
such, evaluating lines of action that are associated with an increased error likelihood as effortful 
would be expected to be adaptive to the organism.  
Time demands were not associated with effort judgments to the same extent as errors 
across the current experimental context. This claim dovetails with recent works that have 
demonstrated dissociations between effort-based decisions and the time costs associated with a 
task (see Chapters 1 and 2; Dixon & Christoff, 2012; Kool et al., 2010; Westbrook et al., 2013), 
but diverges from opportunity cost models that suggest processes that require more time will be 
perceived as more effortful (e.g., Kurzban et al., 2013). One potential explanation of this 
divergence is that, relative to taking more time on a task, committing an error arguably generates 
a more immediate call for effortful control to the system. Classically, post-error slowing in 
speeded tasks (Rabbitt, 1966) has been conceptualized as a compensatory process tuned to 




shown to correlate positively with the likelihood of success on a following trial (i.e., minimizing 
errors; Hajcak, McDonald, & Simons, 2003). Hence, the system takes on a time cost to account 
for an error and minimize the future likelihood of more errors. 
In contrast, opportunity costs are hypothesized to tally and accrue over periods of time 
producing aversive signals used by the system to exert control and to move behaviors to a more 
rewarding alternative (Inzlicht et al., 2014; Kurzban et al., 2013). One could reasonably conceive 
of increased opportunity costs requiring longer timescales to signal a need for control, relative to 
the more immediate timescale associated with errors as discussed above. To nicely demonstrate 
the relation between errors and time at a relatively longer timescale, recent work by Blain and 
colleagues (2016) demonstrated that aversive signals related to cognitive fatigue only affected 
individuals’ propensity to engage in impulsive choices after very long periods of time of 
engaging in a demanding task. A significant increase of impulse-related choices was only 
observed after four-and-a-half hours where accuracy in the tasks remained relatively constant 
across the six-hour session. An opportunity cost perspective would suggest that the opportunity 
cost of engaging in the control-demanding task took hours before the aversive signal (i.e., 
fatigue) was great enough to divide capacity across different processes potentially leading to 
more impulsive choices (e.g., divided capacity led to decreased ability to engage more analytical 
processing during choice; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Thus, holding errors constant, fatigue 
required a relatively long time to initiate putative control to other processes leading to more 
impulsive choices.  
A comparable conclusion can be drawn currently from the observation that More 
Effortful choices only began to largely favor the option associated with the higher objective time 




comparison, d = 3.60 from Experiment 12a), though judgments of error-likelihood also similarly 
followed. Therefore, it is important to note that time and errors should not be considered 
mutually exclusive determinants of judged effort. Indeed, these two are intrinsically connected 
and both may be integrated to some extent when generating evaluations of effort. For example, 
taking too long in a task can be considered an error and errors sometimes lead to slowing down 
on tasks. If time is expected to play a determining role in effort judgments, however, then future 
work should look to examine effort judgments across varying time scales where error likelihood 
and time costs are explicitly traded off. 
While simplifying weighting principles and cue examination, utilizing error likelihood to 
determine prospective effortfulness can also circumvent the issue of the relatively increased 
cognitive demands associated with running more complex algorithms. Recently, competing 
cost/benefit accounts of how control should be deployed while situated within a task have been 
proposed (Gershman, Horvitz, Tenenbaum, 2015; Griffiths, et al., 2015). For example, the 
Expected Value of Control account (EVC; Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013) proposes that 
the allocation of control processes is driven by the computation of the expected gains and costs 
associated with the intensity of a given configuration of control signals, and is contingent on 
continuous monitoring of present state information through the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
(dACC). A comparison between this mechanism and the bias proposed here provides an 
important contrast with regard to perceived effort. For example, using errors as a proxy to judge 
effort would not be expected to be dependent on demanding online monitoring of information. 
Thus, utilizing error likelihood would be expected to require less information relative to more 




A further potential avenue for assessing the pervasiveness of the proposed bias can be 
through considering individual differences in personality and clinical contexts. For example, 
hyperactive error sensitivity has been demonstrated in clinical populations with obsessive-
compulsive disorder (Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000), and also in healthy samples of 
individuals that show high negative affect (Hajack et al., 2004) and are high in neuroticism 
(Pailing & Segalowitz, 2004). Hence, a straightforward prediction is that these individuals may 
show deficiencies in attempting to override strong error biases in making effort judgments. In 
addition, several clinical disorders such as alexithymia (Maier et al., 2016) and schizophrenia 
(Alain, McNeely, He, Christensen, & West, 2002; Bates, Kiehl, Laurens, & Liddle, 2002) 
demonstrate hypoactive error processing in affected individuals. As an interesting example, Gold 
and colleagues (2014) recently demonstrated that schizophrenic patient samples were unable to 
avoid courses of action associated with high levels of cognitive effort. The authors attributed this 
failure to avoid effortful courses of action to deficits in the monitoring of control costs. An 
alternative explanation based on the error account proposed here would suggest that insensitivity 
to errors may have caused the patient sample to inadequately map differential error likelihoods, 
and thus differential effort likelihoods to the options. 
Conclusion 
 The observation that humans are predisposed to avoid effortful actions is a cornerstone of 
theories of human behavior (e.g., Zipf, 1949). A clear assumption of this claim is that effortful 
actions evoke a need to be avoided. In this chapter, I have demonstrated a bias toward weighing 
the likelihood of errors in making these types of judgments. Time demands on the other hand 
demonstrated little association with effort judgments. Such findings pose challenges for 




increased effort, and suggest that avoiding effortful actions may simply be avoiding actions 






















In this series of studies, I have demonstrated that individuals utilize available cues during 
effort-based decision-making and that error likelihood appears to play an important role in the 
evaluation of effort.  
Chapter 1 tested the hypothesis that individuals avoid courses of effortful action based on 
their associated performance with each action (i.e., response times and errors), versus the 
hypothesis that individuals avoid such actions based on an inferential metacognitive evaluation 
of demand. Individuals in Experiment 1 completed a free-choice Demand Selection Task (DST) 
that used stimuli known to yield a dissociation between performance and perceived effort. 
Patterns of choices followed that of perceived demand rather than performance. Experiment 2 
provided a replication of this result, in addition to demonstrating a second dissociation between 
demand avoidance and a peripheral physiological measure of demand (i.e., blink rates), and a 
close correspondence between preference choices and self-reported ratings of effort. Experiment 
3 directly tested the notion that a general metacognitive evaluation of demand drives selections. 
A DST was utilized in a forced-choice paradigm that asked individuals to select what they felt to 
be the most effortful, time demanding, or least accurate of two choices. Patterns of selections 
were similar across all of these rating dimensions, lending credence to the notion that a general 
metacognitive evaluation of demand based on cues drives choices. 
Chapter 2 provided a further test of a cue utilization account of how individuals decide 
which course of action is the least effortful. Here, I contrasted the influences of time and 
demands on executive control with the influence of an available effort cue within the context of 
effort avoidance. Using a DST that focused on making effort-minimizing decisions, I provided 




control in a manner predicted by a cue-utilization account. In Experiment 4, low- and high-
demand options conditions were developed using manipulations of stimulus rotation and task 
switching. The former context can be argued to be associated with relatively low demands in 
terms of performance (i.e., be faster and cause less errors during processing) and executive 
control, whereas the latter context can be argued to be associated with relatively high demands 
on these dimensions. Interestingly, however, individuals avoided processing single rotated 
stimuli at a similar rate relative to more task switching. Experiment 5 specifically aimed to 
modulate avoidance behaviors by reducing the rate of task switching across options. In this 
context, individuals avoided processing single rotated stimuli at a greater rate relative to more 
task switching. Last, Experiment 6 directly pitted the stimulus rotation manipulation against the 
task switching manipulation in a DST. Again, individuals more often avoided the option 
associated with rotated stimuli. These results are consistent with individuals primarily utilizing 
the more salient effort cues in developing their effort preferences (i.e., individuals more often 
avoided rotated stimuli), rather than avoiding options associated with higher time demands and 
higher demands placed on the executive control system. 
Chapters 1 and 2 provided evidence in support of the cue-utilization hypothesis as it 
pertains to the of perceived effort and effort-based decision, an account aimed at addressing how 
individuals generate a notion of effort across alternative lines of action. Chapter 3 aimed to begin 
to answer the question of why some cues would signal that a task may be effortful. Evaluations 
of effort were examined through methods described by the General Evaluability Theory (GET; 
Hsee & Zhang, 2010). Here, the evaluability of effort is determined by examining subjective 
value functions across different evaluation modes. Individuals judged the anticipated effort of 




lifted, and stimulus degradation across joint (i.e., judged comparatively) and single (i.e., judged 
in isolation) evaluation modes. In the first three experiments (Experiments 7, 8, and 9), I 
demonstrated that the perceived effort associated with items to-be-remembered (memorial effort) 
and weight to-be-lifted (motor effort) can be considered relatively evaluable, whereas the 
perceived effort associated with stimulus rotation (perceptual effort) can be considered relatively 
inevaluable. Experiment 10 further established the inevauability of the perceived effort 
associated with stimulus rotation through a demonstration of inconsistencies in effort judgments 
across rating and choice contexts. Last, by examining an additional form of perceptual effort 
(i.e., stimulus degradation), Experiments 11a and 11b provided evidence that evaluability is not 
domain-specific; rather, it may be task-specific and contingent on a failure point. Following from 
the current evidence, I proposed that individuals utilize learned reference information 
specifically pertaining to when an expected error or failure may occur as perceived effort 
increases, and these points facilitate evaluability of effort values. 
The experiments in Chapter 4 aimed to address the question of why some actions are 
evaluated as effortful. I examined individuals’ perception of effort when they were faced with 
making judgments in a trade-off context between how much time a task takes versus how error-
prone it is. That is, do people consider a small amount of hard work (i.e., low time requirement, 
but high error likelihood), or a large amount of easy work (i.e., high time requirement, but low 
error likelihood) to be more effortful? Across three experiments and two separate trade-off 
contexts, I demonstrated that individuals perceive options that are associated with low time 
requirement but high error-likelihood as more effortful than options that are more time 
consuming yet low in error-likelihood. Moreover, when individuals were asked to evaluate 




effort-based and error-based choices closely tracked one another, but this was not the case for 
time-based choices. These results support the conclusion that the likelihood of error commission, 
rather than time demands, appears to drive effort-based choices.  
Effort as an Inferential Evaluation 
Taken together, the evidence presented in the current thesis supports the hypothesis that 
perceived effort is the result of a general metacognitive evaluation made over available cues. To 
the extent that cues serve as a signal for effort is driven by an inferential approximation of the 
likelihood of error commission. That is, the higher the perceived error likelihood relative to 
alternative lines of action, the higher the level of perceived effort. This account is at odds with 
the view that individuals possess direct-access to the “demand” or “work” associated with 
executing some cognitive processes, with effort reflecting the cost of engaging in this work. 
Importantly, however, the account offered here can be situated within current frameworks of 
control and, specifically, action selection (i.e., “Should I chose to engage in this line of action?” 
or “Should I disengage from this action?”). As an example, several recent proposals that have 
focused on cost-benefit mechanisms have stressed that effort weighs as a subjective cost in the 
control of behavior (Kool & Botvinick, 2014; Kool et al., 2010; Kurzban et al., 2013; McGuire 
& Botvinick, 2010; Westbrook, Kester, & Braver, 2013). As developed here, the general 
evaluation based on available cues and weighted on errors represents a strong candidate process 
for this subjective cost. This account contrasts with recent claims that such costs arise from an 
approximation of the opportunity cost in terms of deploying limited resources (Kool & 
Botvinick, 2014). Indeed, the potential subjective cost arising from an evaluation based on cues 
need not be based specifically on perceived opportunity costs, but rather is approximated through 




offset by some reward; Botvinick & Braver, 2015), examination of cues can be thus limited to 
only those coinciding with a high likelihood of perceived errors relative to alternative lines of 
action. 
Future Directions  
Much future work is needed to flesh out the extent that the use of a loose approximation 
of errors over cues is employed in effort evaluation. Nonetheless, several clear avenues for 
extension of the account are apparent. For example, using errors to determine how effortful a line 
of action is would not necessarily be constrained to generating prospective effort judgments. 
Individuals may simply estimate perceived errors while situated within a task where experience 
with the putative cognitive work of engaging in a task (e.g., control costs) is afforded and 
avoidance of a line of action is possible. Importantly, examining how an error bias may 
contribute to the feeling of expected and experienced effort relative to other signals such as 
conflict, uncertainty, or risk (Shenhav et al., in press) will provide useful insight into how 
individuals carry out action selection (e.g., avoidance behaviors) while situated in a task. As an 
example, the concept of risk entails the product of the predicted likelihood of error commission 
(as highlighted here) and the predicted consequence of the action (i.e., the gain/loss associated 
with the action, Brown & Braver, 2007; 2008). Specifically, risk has been proposed to account 
for many of the findings previously proposed to be best explained by conflict signals associated 
with processes carried out by the executive control network (e.g., the conflict monitoring 
hypothesis, Botvinick, 2007). Thus, risk represents an additional potential aversive element (e.g., 
effort, conflict, uncertainty, etc.) that is common and confounded across many contexts where 




against one another in decision and judgment contexts will allow for a clearer picture of effort as 
a unique driver of behavior. 
Conclusion 
Effort is undoubtedly a challenging construct to define theoretically and test empirically 
(Botvinick & Braver, 2015; Dunn & Risko, 2016; Kurzban, 2016; Westbrook & Braver, 2015). 
Nevertheless, empirically testing hypotheses aimed at addressing how individuals minimize 
effort and why effort is often considered aversive represents a critical theoretical undertaking in 
understanding human behavior. This is especially true given that, in its strongest form, effort 
avoidance is lauded as a law or principle of human behavior (Allport, 1954; Clark, 2010; Hull, 
1943; Rosch, 1998; Solomon, 1948; Zipf, 1949). The cue-utilization account presented here 
provides insight into both of these questions. Specifically, I proposed that effort is a result of a 
metacognitive evaluation made over cues in which individuals largely weigh the likelihood of a 
committing an error relative to alternative lines of action. This evaluation can then be used to 
drive action selection (e.g., engage in a task or not). The account I have developed in this thesis 
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Self-report Questionnaire Deployed in Experiment 4 
Q1. What was it like performing the task in part 1 (1-2 sentences)? 
Q2. How did you choose between the decks in the last (3rd) block (1-2 sentences)? 
Q3. Did you develop a least-effortful preference for one of the decks in the last (3rd) block (circle 
one)? 
YES NO 
Q4. Was there any difference between the decks in part 1 (circle one)? 
YES NO 
Q5. How confident did you feel that there was/was not a difference between the decks (from 0% 
- 100%)? 
Q6. For some participants, one of the two decks had the tendency to switch between colors more 
often while the other deck tended to repeat the same color. Did it seem like this was the case for 
you (circle one)? 
YES NO  
Note: Individuals completed all seven questions upon completion of both the rotation pair and 

















Self-report Questionnaire Deployed in Experiments 5 and 6 
Q1. What was it like performing the task in part 1 (1-2 sentences)? 
Q2. Was there any difference between the decks in part 1 (circle one)? 
YES NO 
Q3. How confident did you feel that there was/was not a difference between the decks (from 0% 
- 100%)? 
Q4. If you answered YES to question 2 above, what do you believe the difference(s) was 
between the decks (1 sentence)? 
Q5. How did you choose between the decks in the last (3rd) block in part 1(1 sentence)? 
Q6. Did you develop a least-effortful preference for one of the decks in the last (3rd) block (circle 
one)? 
YES NO 
Q7. If you answered YES to question 6 above, what was the attribute(s) that you used to decide 
that one deck as less effortful than the other? 
Note: Individuals completed all seven questions upon completion of both the rotation pair and 
switching pair (i.e., part 1 and part 2) in Experiment 2. The seven questions were only completed 
once upon completion of the DST in Experiment 3. 
 
 
 
 
